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Abstract 
 
Minimum wages and cash transfer (CT) programmes are two major social protection policies in 
developing countries aimed at alleviating poverty and redistributing income. While a lot of 
attention, and debate, has been put in place around the establishment of these policies, little 
attention has called the issue of how these policies have been implemented in practice. In the 
first part of this thesis, I evaluate the effects of the national minimum wage (NMW) policy of 
Ecuador where apart from registering increases in the legislated level of the minimum wage 
there are also increases in the intensity of its enforcement. In the second part, I evaluate the 
impact of the largest CT programme in the country, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), 
which has no enforced conditionalities attached to it. 
 In Part I, I provide evidence of the effects of increases in the two components of the 
NMW on employment, wages and monetary poverty (Chapters 2), and on wage inequality 
(Chapter 3). The findings go in line with the predictions of the traditional competitive two-sector 
model.  
 In Chapter 2, I find that the increases in the two components of the NMW policy 
increased wages of male covered workers and reduced the probability of remaining employed in 
the covered sector for the less-skilled workers, the labourers. The increase in wages for male 
covered workers, who remained employed in the covered sector, reduced the probability of being 
poor for this group of workers and their families. I find that most of the labourers who lost their 
jobs in the covered sector migrated to the uncovered sector and others became unemployed. 
Additionally, I find that the increase in labour supply in the uncovered sector reduced the 
earnings of uncovered self-employed individuals. 
 In Chapter 3, I find that the increases in the two components of the NMW policy reduced 
wage inequality by increasing the wages of workers located up through the 60th percentile of 
the wage distribution. Additionally, I estimate that the increases in the two components of the 
NMW account for approximately 50% of the reduction in wage inequality we observe for the 
period 2000-2016.  
 In Part II, Chapter 4, I analyse the effects of the BDH on the components of food 
expenditure and find that the programme increased food expenditure on protein-rich products 
such as meat, chicken, milk, eggs, etc. Additionally, I find that the beneficiary families with 
under-5s spend significantly more on this kind of products and significantly less on sugar and 
sweets, and on meals outside the house. However, unlike other conditional CT programmes in 
the region, I did not find that the BDH increased expenditure on fruits and vegetables. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Social Protection in Latin America 
Latin America remains as one of the two most unequal regions in the world (Lakner and 
Milanovic 2013)2. In the last decade, however, inequality fell in most Latin America nations 
(Cornia 2014). A number of studies argue that a significant part of the decline in inequality 
and of the reduction in absolute poverty, in the region, is explained by an expansion of the 
social protection schemes (Ribe et al. 2010).  
 Social protection includes contributory social insurance schemes as social security 
systems and non-contributory social assistance programmes as cash transfers (see Figure 
1.1). The goals of these, contributory and non-contributory, social protection schemes is to 
protect individuals from felling into poverty; help those in poverty lift out of it; and, to 
redistribute income in favour of low-income individuals and families. Under what conditions 
can these protections tools accomplish these objectives? Are those conditions met in 
developing countries with weak institutional capabilities to enforce compliance with the 
regulations imposed by these policies? Who pays for poverty alleviation and redistribution? 
Who benefits from these policies? 
 In most countries of the region, employers of salaried workers (or wage workers) are 
required by law to register their employees to the social security system. In theory, affiliation 
of workers to the social security system implies that workers get paid at least the minimum 
wage, have a retirement pension, and received other benefits (see Figure 1.1). This system 
is commonly designed to be self-financing; that is, revenues come from a payroll tax that is 
partly paid by employees and partly paid by their employers.3 
 On the other hand, non-contributory social assistance programmes as cash transfers 
require the financing of the government, via the general tax system, or the economic support 
of other non-governmental institutions. Cash transfer programmes are usually targeted to the 
poor and take the form of child benefits, non-contributory social pensions for the elderly, 
disability pensions, and other programmes (see Figure 1.1). This kind of programmes spread 
widely in the region in the 2000s.  
                                               
2 The other most unequal region is Sub-Saharan Africa. 
3 In this thesis, I use the terms participation, affiliation and contribution as synonyms for referring to a worker 
that is registered in the social security system, and he and his employers made their contribution to the system. 
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 In an increasing number of Latin American countries, social security systems coexist 
with non-contributory cash transfer programmes. Contributory systems have low coverage 
in these countries as they only cover salaried workers, for whom participation is compulsory. 
Additionally, not all salaried workers are affiliated to the social security system. In 
particular, salaried workers working in small establishments (with 5 or fewer employees) 
are significantly less likely to be affiliated than workers in larger firms (Auerbach et al. 
2007). This dual nature of the labour markets in the region limits the scope of the social 
security system as a social protection tool for all workers and their families. This limitation 
is precisely the main driver of the rise of cash transfers programmes as a tool for social 
protection. 
Figure 1.1 Social Protection Schemes in Latin America  
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
 In Table 1.1, I show the proportion of workers that are unskilled self-employed 
workers and unpaid (family and non-family) workers. The proportion of unskilled self-
employed individuals ranges from 17 percent, as in Argentina, Costa Rica and Chile, to 
around 30 percent or more, as in Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
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Honduras, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. This group of workers are not covered by the 
social security system because they cannot enforce themselves to contribute to the system 
and to paid themselves the minimum wage.  
Table 1.1 The Structure of the Labour Market in Selected Latin American Countries 
  Formal   Informal 
  
Entrepre- 
neurs 
Salaried workers Self-
employed 
profession-
als 
  Salaried 
in small 
firms 
Self-
employed 
unskilled 
Workers 
with 
zero 
income   
Large  
firms 
Public 
 sector   
Argentina 3.7 35.4 18.6 3.8   21.2 16.9 0.5 
Bolivia 4.4 14.3 8.7 2.6   12.8 38.9 18.3 
Brazil 3.7 35.1 12.3 2.1   19.6 20.8 6.4 
Chile 2.9 50.8 12.3 3.2   12.7 17.6 0.5 
Colombia 4.1 29.4 3.9 3.6   15.5 39.0 4.6 
Costa Rica  4.3 41.4 14.6 1.4   19.9 17.2 1.2 
Dominican Rep.  3.2 29.9 13.8 2.2   11.7 37.8 1.4 
Ecuador 3.3 26.6 9.5 2.1   19.3 28.6 10.6 
El Salvador 4.3 31.0 7.5 0.8   19.8 27.3 9.3 
Guatemala 2.6 28.6 5.3 0.3   24.0 24.9 14.2 
Honduras 9.6 17.9 6.1 0.5   19.8 31.6 14.3 
Mexico 8.4 35.3 10.1 1.0   26.6 12.7 5.9 
Panama 3.0 37.5 15.5 1.6   12.5 24.5 5.3 
Paraguay 5.1 21.2 11.4 1.9   21.5 29.8 9.1 
Peru 4.0 21.4 8.6 3.3   14.8 31.7 16.1 
Uruguay 4.2 43.1 14.7 2.5   14.7 19.9 0.9 
Venezuela 4.5 29.0 16.6 2.3   12.6 33.4 1.6 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank) data. 
Note: data are from 2014-15. Only the data from Venezuela is from 2006, the last available information. 
 While self-employed workers are not obligated to contribute to the social security 
system, in the region, there is also a significant proportion of (covered) salaried workers that 
are not affiliated to the system. This issue derives from noncompliance with labour 
regulations, which is widespread in the region, as well as in other developing countries (see 
Marshall 2007; Rani et al. 2013; Ronconi 2015). To appreciate the magnitude of this issue, 
in Table 1.2, I show compliance rates based on affiliation of salaried workers to social 
security for years 2005 and 2015. In 2005, compliance rates ranged from a maximum of 
65%-80%, as in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, to a minimum of 29%-34%, as in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. One decade after, in 2015, two countries 
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register an increase in compliance of more than 20 p.p.; in Dominican Republic compliance 
increased from 47 to 85 percent, and in Ecuador compliance increased from 33 to 59 percent. 
Finally, in 2015, seven out of fifteen countries included in Table 1.2 have compliance rates 
below 50 percent (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and 
Peru). 
Table 1.2 Share of Salaried Workers Affiliated to Social Security in Selected Latin 
American Countries 
  2005   2015   Absolute change 
 2015-2005 
  Total 
Gender   
Total 
Gender   
  Female Male   Female Male   Total 
Argentina 52.8 49.8 63.5   67.4 68.6 74.6   14.5 
Bolivia 32.7 46.4 34.9   40.6 50.7 46.9   7.9 
Brazil 66.7 69.6 73.8   77.8 80.1 82.1   11.2 
Chile 79.8 77.4 85.8   82.5 83.7 87.4   2.7 
Colombia — — —   63.1 66.0 70.4   — 
Costa Rica  67.8 69.1 75.8   70.0 67.7 76.6   2.2 
Dominican Rep.  46.7 57.2 47.7   77.5 84.7 80.4   30.8 
Ecuador 33.1 44.5 37.5   58.5 70.2 59.3   25.4 
El Salvador 52.5 74.2 51.8   48.4 57.3 52.1   -4.1 
Guatemala 36.4 46.7 40.3   29.2 40.5 31.5   -7.2 
Mexico 39.4 46.2 42.3   38.3 42.5 43.0   -1.1 
Nicaragua 33.9 49.9 34.5   40.9 58.1 41.0   7.0 
Paraguay 29.0 41.2 36.1   38.6 46.7 46.0   9.6 
Peru 30.0 35.2 41.1   47.0 51.4 55.9   17.0 
Uruguay 73.8 75.0 81.6   88.1 89.9 92.2   14.3 
Venezuela 60.3 69.2 64.7   — — —   — 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank) data. 
Note: the data points for 2015 come from this year for most countries, the exception is Chile, with data from 
2006, and Guatemala, with data from 2004. Similarly, the data points for 2015 come from this year for most 
countries, the exception is Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua with data from 2014. 
 Informal self-employed workers and a significant fraction of salaried workers, 
especially those working in small establishments, are not protected by the social security 
systems of their countries. It is fundamental to acknowledge the difference between these 
two groups of workers. Informal self-employed workers are not protected by the 
contributory social security system because the legislation does not protect them or leaves it 
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as optional. On the other hand, “informal” salaried workers are not protected by social 
security because employers and employees are not complying with the labour law. 
Additionally, their classification as “informal” employees, using the definition of informal 
employment as proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO, see Hussmanns 
2004 for a review of the definitions), derives from the fact that for these employees their 
employment relationship is in practice, but not in law, not subject to national labour 
legislation. 
 This distinction is important conceptually, as well as for policymaking. For informal 
self-employed workers, and for economically inactive individuals, CT programmes serve to 
protect them, and their families, because otherwise these individuals will not have access to 
a safety net. In contrast, CT programmes are also helping to protect informal salaried 
workers whose employers do not comply with the labour regulations and do not pay them at 
least the minimum wage. As shown in Table 1.3, families with a head of household working 
as a self-employed individual (including farmers), or as a salaried worker in small 
establishments where noncompliance with labour legislation is common, represent the 
largest fraction of beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes in the region. Another group 
with a large fraction is composed by beneficiary families with an economically inactive 
household head. In countries as Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador, this group represent between 
19-23 percent of all beneficiary households. 
 The problem of noncompliance with labour regulations is the result of weak 
enforcement. There are three main reasons that explain this low intensity of enforcement. 
First, legislators usually pass the law but put little attention and efforts on the mechanisms 
that will be used to enforce the labour regulations they just imposed. This issue, I argue, 
responds to the political economy involved around labour regulations, mainly those related 
with the minimum wage law. While in developed countries there is a conflict between unions 
that promote minimum wage legislation and employer organizations that try to impede it. In 
countries in the region with a weak institutional capability, this conflict is less relevant since 
legislators can satisfy both constituencies. They can pass the law in line with workers wishes 
and then do nothing to enforce it in line with some employers’ interest. 
 Second, policy makers usually take decisions based on the cycles of the economy. 
They can push an increase in the intensity of enforcement of labour regulations during 
periods of expansion (growth) with less risk of employment losses in the covered sector. In 
contrast, policy makers, and the institutions in charge controlling compliance with labour 
regulations, will be less prone to increase the intensity of enforcement during periods of 
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economic contraction. What is more, during recession, they might turn a blind eye to 
noncompliance with the labour code, especially in small production units. They want to 
prevent covered workers from losing their jobs and migrating to the uncovered sector or 
becoming unemployed. 
 The third reason is the weak institutional capabilities of the institutions in charge of 
enforcing labour regulations. As countries develop there is an organic emergence of 
contract-enforcement institutions as result of the pursuit of individual interest (Greif 2005). 
The role of these institutions is to enforce contracts with a credible commitment of imposing 
sanctions to agents that do not comply with the law. However, these institutions may be 
limited by the lack of human and financial resources, or subject to corruption (S. Lee et al. 
2014). More importantly, these weak contract-enforcement institutions may be the result of 
prevailing coercion-constraining institutions (Greif 2005) that are more in line with 
extractive institutions rather than with inclusive ones (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
 Given the problem of noncompliance in the region, when analysing the performance 
of a policy or programme it is necessary to study the effects of the effective regulation, i.e., 
the combination of the of written laws, codes, rules, and conditions, and the state of 
enforcement efforts to achieve compliance with them. The issue of noncompliance in Latin 
America is so relevant that any empirical work that analyses the effects of de jure regulations 
and conditions imposed by a policy will provide a misleading picture of the effects of this 
policy.  
 The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of the effective regulation of two 
of the major protection tools available in countries in the region: the minimum wage and the 
cash transfer programme. For this purpose, I use the case of Ecuador. This country provides 
a suitable setting for conducting this research. 
 Concerning the minimum wage policy, Ecuador is one of the few countries where 
the government apart from increasing the real value of its national minimum wage (NMW), 
it also increased the intensity of enforcement of the labour law, which includes compliance 
with NMW. These policy changes allow me to identify the effects of the minimum wage 
policy when there are increases in its two main components: the level of the minimum wage 
and the intensity of its enforcement.  
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Table 1.3 Characteristics of CTs Beneficiary Households in Selected Latin American Countries 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of Stampini and Tornarolli (2012).  
Notes: FIS = Familias por la Inclusión Social, AUH = Asignación Universal por Hijo, BF = Bolsa Familia, CS = Chile Solidario, FA = Familias en Acción, AV = 
Avancemos, BDH = Bono de Desarrollo Humano, MFP = Mi Familia Progresa, RDO = Red de Oportunidades, AF = Programa de Asignaciones Familiares. 
Country  ARG  BRA CHL  COL  CRI  ECU  GUA  MEX  PAN  PER  PRY  URU  
Year  2010  2009  2009  2010  2010  2010  2011  2010  2008  2010  2010  2010  
Program  FIS+AUH  BF CS FA AV BDH MFP Oportunidades RDO Juntos Tekoporá  AF  
Urban share  100.0  68.2  74.4  73.7  45.4  38.1  19.9  39.9  3.3  5.3  8.6  94.3  
Family size  4.9  4.2  4.6  4.8  4.9  4.4  6.3  4.9  6.4  6.2  5.2  4.7  
# of children (<12)  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.9  1.1  2.0  3.0  2.1  3.2  3.3  2.4  1.9  
Household head                          
Age (years)  43.4  41.5  45.5  42.7  45.9  55.3  41.2  48.7  46.7  45.7  47.7  42.9  
% Male-headed  66.1  66.7  63.5  68.4  65.0  73.0  85.5  77.5  82.7  83.6  82.1  61.0  
Education                          
Years of schooling  8.2  4.7  7.9  5.2  6.4  4.5  2.4  4.3  4.0  4.7  4.1  6.9  
% none-primary  54.2  81.9  58.1  65.8  68.7  84.2  93.6  78.4  87.6  91.4  77.0  54.8  
% some/compl. secondary  38.4  14.2  39.7  30.3  28.3  13.8  6.2  20.6  12.2  8.6  20.9  43.5  
% some/compl. tertiary  7.4  4.0  2.3  4.0  3.0  1.9  0.2  1.0  0.2  0.0  2.2  1.7  
Labour market status                          
% Inactive  19.0  16.4  23.0  15.8  16.6  22.4  7.2  9.6  12.2  1.5  15.3  14.0  
Unemployed  5.5  5.3  6.7  3.6  4.5  1.3  1.5  0.3  1.0  0.0  0.9  4.5  
Salaried formal  15.7  22.0  22.9  8.4  35.2  7.2  7.9  3.0  10.8  0.6  1.6  36.1  
Salaried informal  34.7  22.2  19.5  20.2  19.3  26.9  39.8  40.5  17.9  5.5  4.8  17.1  
Unpaid worker  0.0  4.7  0.1  0.8  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.5  2.4  0.2  0.4  0.2  
Self-employed  21.2  16.2  20.1  33.6  15.3  14.1  8.1  11.5  6.0  4.1  3.2  23.2  
Farmer  1.3  11.8  5.1  16.6  8.3  27.1  32.2  34.4  49.3  88.1  72.8  3.8  
Employer  2.5  1.3  0.6  1.1  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.2  0.0  0.1  1.1  1.1  
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 Regarding the CT programme, unlike most programmes in the region, the Ecuadorian 
CT, Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), is an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programme 
as their conditions were never enforced by its administrators. This characteristic of the BDH 
allows me to identify the effects of a CT programme with de jure conditions and compare the 
findings with the effects generated by other conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes with 
monitored and enforced conditions. 
 A social security scheme as the minimum wage has the objective of increasing the 
income of low-paid salaried workers to provide them, and their families, a minimum standard 
of living, which includes access to adequate food and other basic needs. However, focusing on 
analysing the impact of changes in the legislated level of the minimum wage is not enough to 
capture the effects of this policy. What if the government increases the level of the minimum 
wage, in real terms, but makes no efforts on enforcing it? Should we expect that this policy will 
benefit low-paid salaried workers, acknowledging that noncompliance with the minimum wage 
law is particularly large among this group of workers? What if the government increases the 
intensity of enforcement of the labour law? Should we expect that the increased enforcement 
will increase wages of low-paid salaried workers, reduce employment in the covered sector, 
and compress the wage distribution? 
 Similarly, cash transfer programmes targeted to the poorest households have yet to 
achieve their full potential in terms of poverty alleviation and accumulation of human capital 
(Ribe et al. 2010). This is particularly important for countries in the region considering that CT 
programmes are a core social assistance tool. CT programmes usually impose conditions to 
beneficiary families regarding investment in children's human capital, such as sending them to 
school or bringing them to health centres on a regular basis. However, these conditions may not 
be truly enforced in practice. What if the government introduces a CT programme, promotes it 
as a CT with conditions attached to it, but turns a blind eye to the enforcement of the conditions? 
Should we expect UCTs to generate the same results in terms of their impact on the 
accumulation of human capital as CCTs? 
1.2 The Minimum Wage Policy 
Most countries in the region state the provision of a minimum wage in their constitutions as 
part of their social security (Alaimo et al. 2015 report that 17 out of 18 Latin American and the 
Caribbean countries included in their study have a minimum wage provision). Policy makers 
who may want to protect low-paid workers can increase the value of the minimum wage and 
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they can also increase the intensity of its enforcement. Increases in one or both components 
have the potential to alleviate poverty and redistribute income by providing a wage floor for 
low-paid workers. However, these changes can also reduce jobs in the covered sector and 
increase unemployment, by adding rigidities in the labour market. 
 Most countries have experienced changes in the legislated level of the minimum wage. 
In some countries the level of the minimum wage is particularly high. For example, the level 
of the minimum wage in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and 
Peru, represents more than 70 percent the average monthly wage (see Table 1.4). There are also 
significant differences in the level of the minimum across countries. For instance, the level of 
the monthly legal minimum (measured in USD, constant 2011, PPP) in Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Panama and Paraguay is more than two times higher than in Dominican Republic and Mexico 
(see Table 1.4). On the other hand, very few countries, as in the case of Ecuador and Costa 
Rica, have implemented programmes to increase the intensity of enforcement of the minimum 
wage legislation. What is more, in the case of Ecuador the government also hardened the labour 
law in order to reduce noncompliance with the minimum wage. 
 In theory, a well enforced minimum wage law, as predicted by the traditional 
competitive two-sector model (Harris and Todaro 1970; Welch 1974; Gramlich 1976; Mincer 
1976), will reduce employment in the covered sector and some workers will migrate to the 
uncovered sector or to unemployment. Therefore, although it may be desirable to increase the 
levels in both components of the minimum wage policy to achieve its social objectives, the 
increases may generate job losses in the covered sector. On the other hand, under an imperfectly 
competitive labour market, as the monopsony (Stigler 1946), the minimum wage policy will 
increase wages without reducing employment. This result will hold only if the level of the 
minimum is set between the competitive wage and the inferior non-competitive wage imposed 
to workers by their monopsony employers. In this scenario, the minimum wage will be an 
effective policy tool to increase wages of low-paid workers by redistributing income from 
employers to employees.  
 One argument often made is that minimum wages only benefit covered workers living 
in non-poor households. The evidence for some developing countries, however, shows that a 
relatively high fraction of workers covered by the minimum wage law belongs to poor 
households. For example, in Ecuador, I estimate that more than 30 percent of covered workers 
earning below the NMW lived in poor household in 2010. Similarly, in Indonesia, more than 
45 per cent of low-wage covered workers lived in poor households (Bird and Manning 2008), 
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and in Honduras, 71 per cent of minimum wage earners lived in poor households (Gindling and 
Terrell 2010).   
Table 1.4 Minimum Wages in Selected Latin American Countries 
  
Minimum legal 
monthly wage (local 
currency) 
Minimum legal 
monthly wage, PPP 
(constant 2011 
international $) 
Minimum legal 
monthly wage (% of 
average monthly 
wage in the main 
occupation) 
Argentina 4,133 708 67.99 
Bolivia 1,440 423 59.27 
Brazil 724 366 42.29 
Chile 241,000 569 52.01 
Colombia 616,000 475 66.25 
Costa Rica  303,313 767 73.24 
Dominican Rep.  6,880 296 46.61 
Ecuador 340 555 72.69 
El Salvador 197 358 64.63 
Guatemala 2,249 518 91.94 
Honduras 7,311 617 100.00 
Mexico 1,946 193 34.26 
Nicaragua 4,198 376 74.92 
Panama 527 845 84.37 
Paraguay 1,824,055 706 82.37 
Peru 750 434 82.19 
Uruguay 8,960 426 43.99 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of the Labor Markets and Social Security Information System (The 
SIMS - IADB). 
Note: data are from 2014. Only the data from Chile is from 2015. 
 
 In the debate, supporters of this policy advocate for the establishment of minimum 
wages as a way to contrast the inequality of bargaining power between workers and employers. 
They argue that imperfect labour markets with a lopsided distribution of resources and rights 
put employers in a dominant position in wage bargaining and the individual workers in a weaker 
and dependent position (Kaufman 2010).  
 On the other hand, supporters of the free labour market argue that the establishment of 
labour regulation leads to a loss of efficiency. The government is preventing workers and 
employers from freely negotiating employment contracts. A flexible labour market that reduces 
or eliminates the weight of labour regulations reduces the price of labour and induces firms to 
hire more people. All sides gain from free negotiation and this results in an increase in welfare. 
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Finally, those who are against this policy often argue that a non-enforced labour regulation can 
be regarded as an optimal option, as this in practice is equivalent to non-having any government 
intervention in the labour market.  
 The empirical literature on the effects of minimum wages has mostly focused on 
analysing the effects of changes in the level of the minimum wage. The results are mixed. While 
some studies find that the policy increases wages of low-paid workers and generates job losses, 
others find no effect on wages and employment (see Cunningham 2007; and Neumark and 
Wascher 2007; for reviews of the empirical literature). In most cases where authors find no 
effects of changes in the level of the minimum wage, they argue that this is due to the problem 
of noncompliance with the law. 
 There is a gap in the literature regarding the effects of changes in the intensity of 
enforcement of the minimum wage law on the labour market. Very few studies have analysed 
the impact of changes in this component of the minimum wage policy. See Gindling et al. 
(2015), for Costa Rica; Almeida and Carneiro (2009), and Almeida and Carneiro (2012), for 
Brazil; Ronconi (2010), for Argentina; Harrison and Scorse (2010), for Indonesia; and 
Soundararajan (2014), for India. Among these studies, only the analysis for the cases of Costa 
Rica (Gindling et al. 2015) and Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse 2010) measure the effects of an 
exogenous increase in the intensity of enforcement. Similar to these two cases, I exploit the 
exogenous increase in the intensity of enforcement of the Ecuadorian national minimum wage 
policy and analyse its effects on labour market. In Part I of this thesis, I contribute to this 
literature.  
1.3 Cash Transfers Programmes 
 In developing countries with a large fraction of uncovered workers, who are not 
protected by the minimum wage policy, cash transfer (CT) programmes complement the role 
of the contributory system as a tool for poverty alleviation and redistribution. In Latin American 
countries this kind of programmes covered around a quarter of the population in 2010 (see 
Table 1.5). The number of CT programmes went from 6 in 2000 to 27 in 2010 (Cecchini and 
Atuesta 2017). By the end of the 2000s, most countries in the region had a CT programme 
implemented with conditionalities. This conditional cast transfer (CCT) programmes generally 
impose conditionalities to beneficiary families related to school attendance and medical check-
ups of children in the household.  
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 The countries with the largest CT programmes, in terms of relative coverage 
(beneficiaries/total population) are Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Argentina, and 
Brazil (see Table 1.5). In these countries, CT programmes cover more than a quarter of the 
population. On the other hand, in countries as Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay, and 
Peru, CT programmes cover less than 10 percent of the population. Additionally, it is worth 
noticing that the largest programmes in terms of number of beneficiaries are Brazil’s Bolsa 
Familia, reaching 52 million beneficiaries, followed by Mexico’s Oportunidades with 27 
million beneficiaries.  
Table 1.5 Number of Beneficiaries of CT Programmes in Selected Latin American Countries 
  
Beneficiaries (2010, 
in millions) 
Population (2010, in 
millions)  Beneficiaries / Pop.  
Argentina 11.79  40.41  0.29  
Bolivia 5.69  9.93  0.57  
Brazil 52.39  194.95  0.27  
Chile 1.30  17.11  0.08  
Colombia 11.69  46.29  0.25  
Costa Rica  0.19  4.66  0.04  
Dominican Rep.  2.98  9.93  0.30  
Ecuador 6.13  14.46  0.42  
El Salvador 0.57  6.19  0.09  
Guatemala 3.25  14.39  0.23  
Honduras 1.07  7.60  0.14  
Mexico 27.25  113.42  0.24  
Nicaragua — 5.79  — 
Panama 0.36  3.52  0.10  
Paraguay 0.55  6.45  0.09  
Peru 2.59  29.08  0.09  
Uruguay 0.76  3.36  0.23  
Source: Stampini and Tornarolli (2012).  
 
  There is also great variability in the amount of the transfer across countries in the region. 
For instance, the transfer in Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Paraguay, accounts 
for around 20-25 percent of the total income of beneficiary families (see Figure 1.2). Panama’s 
Red de Oportunidades is the programme with the most generous transfer, it accounts for 43 
percent of beneficiaries’ total income. In contrast, the size of the transfer is relatively small in 
countries as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Uruguay. In these countries 
the transfer accounts for 11 percent or less of beneficiaries’ total income. 
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 The institutions in charge of the administration of CT programmes are generally the 
ministries or secretariats of social development or social inclusion. These institutions play an 
important role not only in designing the programme, targeting beneficiaries, and making the 
payment of the transfer, but also enforcing and controlling compliance with the conditionalities 
of the programme. This last responsibility, however, is sometimes not executed in practice. The 
administrators of the programmes may try to incentivise compliance with the conditionalities, 
but their success will depend of their institutional capabilities to enforce it. Additionally, they 
might turn a blind eye to non-complying households in order to minimize the political cost of 
imposing any penalties or sanctions. 
Figure 1.2 Magnitude of Cash Transfers as Percentage of Recipients’ Income in Selected 
Latin American Countries 
 
Source: Stampini and Tornarolli (2012).  
Note: ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, CRI = Costa Rica, ECU = Ecuador, GUA 
= Guatemala, JAM = Jamaica, MEX = Mexico, PAN = Panama, PER = Peru, PRY = Paraguay, URU = Uruguay. 
Poor beneficiaries defined on the basis of the poverty line of USD PPP 2.5. 
 
 As highlighted by Özler (2013), CT programmes can be categorized in a spectrum from 
a pure UCT to a heavy-handed CCT. There can be CTs that are explicitly unconditional, CTs 
that have de jure conditions on paper, those that have de jure conditions and implemented a 
social marketing campaign to incentivise compliance with the conditions, CCTs with 
imperfectly monitored and minimal enforced conditions, and, in the other end of the spectrum, 
CCTs with well-monitored and -enforced conditions. This characterization of CT programmes 
is more helpful that the binary labelling of CT as CCT or UCT. 
 There is a debate about making or not CTs conditional. On one hand, one can attach 
conditionalities to a CT based on three main arguments. First, it helps direct behaviour towards 
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specific actions as individuals will not always behave as expected; second, conditioning on 
“good behaviour” may increase the support from the public, who may finance this kind of 
programmes through paying taxes; third, conditioning may help to achieve a social optimal 
investment in human capital, that otherwise will not take place (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). On 
the other hand, one can argue that UCT programmes allow recipients freedom of choice. If we 
assume individuals are informed rational agents with interest in investing in the human capital 
of their children, then we can expect that UCT will be an efficient way to allocate the CT. 
Additionally, conditionalities can be expensive to administer and ineffective in areas with an 
insufficient supply of services such as health care or education. 
 The empirical literature that compares the effects of CCTs versus UCTs shows that there 
are significant differences in the effects generated by these two options, mainly when the 
conditions attached to CCTs are well enforced and monitored. For example, in a systematic 
review of the effects of CCTs and UCTs on schooling outcomes, Baird et al. (2013) show that 
CCTs with explicit schooling conditions monitored and enforced generate substantively larger 
effects on school enrolment than UCTs. Similarly, in a meta-analysis, Saavedra and García 
(2012) find that stronger conditions were positively associated with larger secondary enrolment 
and attendance effects. In contrast to these two studies, Manley et al. (2012) find that when CTs 
have conditions attached, relating to health and education, they do not have significantly 
different effects on child nutritional status than UCTs. However, the authors of this last paper 
do not account for the differences in the intensity of enforcement of the conditionalities in the 
CCT programmes included in their meta-analysis. 
 There is a vast empirical literature of the effects of CT programmes implemented in the 
region, as well as in other developing countries (see Bastagli et al. 2016, for a review of the 
empirical literature). Most studies have focused on analysing the effects on educational and 
health outcomes. The results on education show, overall, that this kind of programmes 
incentivise school attendance, but are not conclusive in terms of improving learning outcomes 
and cognitive achievement. Similarly, the results of their impact on health and nutrition show, 
on the whole, that CTs play an important role in increasing the use of health services.  
 In terms of access to food and dietary diversity, CTs increased the proportion of 
expenditure on food as a fraction of total expenditure (the food share) in Colombia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, and Brazil (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Additionally, the studies that report an 
effect of food expenditure generally find that the increases are directed toward increasing the 
quality of food intake. Studies for Colombia, Nicaragua, Brazil and Mexico show that the 
increases take place on expenditure on fruits, vegetables and products rich in proteins, such as 
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meat, chicken, eggs, etc. (see Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004, for Oportunidades in Mexico; 
Maluccio and Flores 2005 for Red de Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua; Attanasio and 
Mesnard 2006, for Familias en Accion in Colombia; Martins and Monteiro 2016, for Bolsa 
Família in Brazil). 
 For the case of Ecuador, two studies find that the BDH increases food expenditure; as a 
fraction of total expenditure, Schady and Rosero (2008); and in absolute value, Buser et al. 
(2017). The authors find, respectively, that the BDH increases the food share by about 4 
percentage points, and the total amount of expenditure in food by approximately the amount of 
the BDH transfer, 35 USD per month. However, no study has evaluated the effects of the BDH 
on food expenditure patterns to identify which of the various components of food expenditure 
increased the most. In Part II of this thesis, I fill this gap in the literature.  
1.4 The Ecuadorian Case and Thesis Contribution 
The national minimum wage (NMW) law and the BDH programme are the main social 
protection tools in Ecuador. The primary objective of these two policies is to increase the 
income of low-income families to provide a minimum standard of living, which includes access 
to adequate food, education, health and other basic needs. By increasing the income of these 
families, these policies can also help to reduce income inequalities.  
 Achieving these goals are a central concern in Ecuador. Compared to other countries in 
Latin America, monetary poverty and income inequality in the country were located above the 
regional average by the beginning of the 2000s (see ECLAC 2012, for poverty rates; and Cornia 
2014, for inequality measures). The official figures, for around 2010, show that of a population 
of approximately 14 million, a third lived under the poverty line; 24 percent of children under 
5 years of age were affected by chronic malnutrition; and the Gini coefficient of the distribution 
of income was 0.51 (SIISE 2015). 
 In the country, the NMW policy and the BDH programme cover a significant proportion 
of the population. The NMW with its value located at around the median of the wage 
distribution, if well-enforced, can directly influence the wages of at least half of salaried 
workers in the economy. Meanwhile, the BDH, is the largest social protection tool. In 2010, it 
covered around 1.2 million households (around 32% of the total number of households, SIISE 
2015). Households with an uncovered self-employed head of household represent the largest 
fraction among BDH recipients; for 2010, my estimate is 41 percent. Considering the scope that 
  
30 
these two policies have, it is mandatory to evaluate how effective they are in achieving their 
objectives. 
  The Ecuadorian Ministry of Labour is the institution in charge of controlling and 
enforcing the labour law, including the NMW law. The Ecuadorian Social Security Institute 
(Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social, IESS) also helps the Ministry to perform this task. 
Since 2010, the Ministry increased significantly the intensity of enforcement of the labour law. 
It put special emphasis on reducing non-compliance with the affiliation of employees, by their 
employers, to the IESS. Affiliation to the IESS implies that employers will pay at least the 
NMW to their workers. Additionally, in order to push further the increased enforcement of the 
labour law, in May 2011 the government approved, by referendum, that employers can go to 
prison if they do not affiliate their employees to the IESS. 
 This exogenous increase in the intensity of enforcement of the law, that took place 
mainly in 2010 and 2011, resulted in a significant reduction of noncompliance rates. I estimate 
that affiliation of salaried workers to the IESS increased by more than 10 p.p. from 40 percent 
in December 2009 to 53 percent in December 2011 (see Part A of Table 2.13 in Chapter 2). 
Similarly, I estimate that the fraction of fulltime salaried workers earning below the NMW 
reduced significantly from 37 percent in December 2009 to 30 percent in December 2011 (see 
Part B of Table 2.13 in Chapter 2).  
 In Part I of this thesis, Chapters 2 and 3, I exploit the increase in the intensity of 
enforcement of the NMW law and provide evidence on the effects of changes the minimum 
wage policy when there are increases in its two main components: the level of the minimum 
and the intensity of its enforcement. I measure the effects on employment, wages, monetary 
poverty, and wage inequality. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I answer the question: Has the NMW 
policy of Ecuador been effective in increasing the wages of low-paid workers? For this purpose, 
I measure the effects of increases in the two components of the NMW on wages, employment, 
and monetary poverty. In Chapter 3, I analyse if the changes in the NMW policy reduced wage 
inequality in Ecuador. For this purpose, I measure the effects of increases in the two 
components of the NMW policy on the dispersion of wages of workers covered by the NMW 
law. 
 The findings in these two chapters provide policy lessons of the consequences of 
increased enforcement of the legal minimum. These lessons can be useful for policy makers in 
other developing countries who seek to reduce noncompliance with the minimum wage 
legislation. For example, the case of Ecuador is similar to the cases of other countries such as 
Peru, Colombia, Paraguay, and Honduras. In these five countries wage employment in the 
  
31 
private sector, as a fraction of total employment, is around 35-40 percent; noncompliance with 
the minimum wage is above 30 percent; and, the level of the minimum wage measured by the 
minimum wage/average wage ratio is larger than 50 percent (Marinakis 2016). Additionally, 
the lessons learned can be also useful for Asian countries such a Mali, Philippines, and India, 
where noncompliance rates are higher than in Latin American countries (Rani et al. 2013). 
 In the case of the CT programme, the Ecuadorian government conceived and launched 
the BDH, in 2003, as a CCT. It implemented a social marketing campaign that emphasized that 
beneficiary families have to invest in the human capital of their children. Specifically, the 
campaign promoted that school-aged children of beneficiary families had to regularly attend 
school, and that under 5’s had to be taken to health centres for growth check-ups. However, 
these conditions were never monitored or enforced in practice. This characteristic makes the 
BDH different from other CCT programmes implemented in the region. For instance, explicit 
CCT programmes as Bolsa Familia in Brazil or Oportunidades (Progresa) in Mexico have 
conditions that, although imperfectly, are monitored and enforced (Baird et al. 2013). 
 The non-enforced conditions of the BDH give the opportunity to evaluate the effects of 
this programme and compare it with the impact generated by other CCT programmes 
implemented in the region. The empirical literature of the effects of the BDH have focused on 
analysing its impact on school enrolment (Araujo and Schady 2006); on child development and 
cognitive achievement (Ponce and Bedi 2010; Paxson and Schady 2010; Fernald and Hidrobo 
2011); and on poverty alleviation (Araujo et al. 2017). However, no study has evaluated the 
effect of the BDH on food expenditure patterns. 
 In Part II of this Thesis, Chapter 4, I fill the gap in the literature by analysing the effects 
of the BDH programme on total food expenditure and its composition. I answer to the question: 
Does the BDH programme increase the quantity and improve the quality of food consumption?  
Answering this question is relevant since the BDH transfer accounts for around 25 percent of 
recipients’ total family income. Additionally, the BDH is the second largest programme in 
terms of relative coverage, it covers around 40 percent of the population of the country. Finally, 
it is not only necessary to identify if the BDH increases food expenditure or if it diversifies food 
intake, what is more relevant is to identify if the BDH shifts the expenditure on food toward 
higher-quality sources of calories. This is particularly important considering that, in the country, 
one in four children under 5 years of age suffers from chronic malnutrition (stunting)  and that 
this prevalence has stagnated during the last decade (SIISE 2015). 
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Part   I  
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2 The Effects of Increased Enforcement of the National 
Minimum Wage Law in a Developing Country: The Case of 
Ecuador 
2.1 Introduction 
The effects of minimum wages on the labour market have been, and continue to be a topic of 
major debate. Economists and social scientists have long debated the effectiveness of this policy 
as a mechanism to protect and redistribute to favour to low-paid workers. The conventional 
neoclassical model predicts that an increase in the minimum wage will increase wages of 
workers who remain employed, but will also reduce employment of some workers. In practice, 
minimum wages benefit low-paid workers only if the law covers them, if the law is enforced, 
and if workers remain employed.  
 The standard Welch-Gramlich-Mincer Two-sector Model (Welch 1974; Gramlich 
1976; Mincer 1976) relaxes the assumption of complete coverage and considers the existence 
of a covered sector and an uncovered sector. Under this model, a minimum wage imposition 
(or increase) above the equilibrium wage will reduce employment in the covered sector, and 
the workers who lost their job in this sector will migrate to either the uncovered sector or to 
unemployment. Regarding the effect on wages, a minimum wage will increase wages of low-
paid workers who keep their jobs in the covered sector, and the increase in the labour supply in 
the uncovered sector will pull down the earnings of uncovered workers. However, to generate 
these predictions, the Two-Sector Model assumes that there is perfect enforcement of minimum 
wage legislation within the covered sector. 
 Weak enforcement of labour regulations and, by implication, low compliance among 
covered workers is a serious problem for minimum wage policies in developing countries. In 
Latin America, for example, compliance rates that are based on social security contributions at 
the beginning of the 2000s ranged from a maximum of 70%-80% (as in Costa Rica, Chile, 
Uruguay and Panama) to a minimum of 25%-50% (as in Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and 
Paraguay) (Marshall 2007). Despite the evidence for a high rate of noncompliance, most 
empirical studies have focused on measuring the employment and wage effects of changes in 
the legislated level of the minimum wage (see Cunningham 2007 and Neumark and Wascher 
2007 for reviews that cover developing countries).  
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There are few studies that analyse the effects of the intensity of enforcement of labour 
regulations on labour market outcomes in developing countries. See Gindling et al. (2015) for 
Costa Rica, Almeida and Carneiro (2009) and Almeida and Carneiro (2012) for Brazil, Ronconi 
(2010) for Argentina, Harrison and Scorse (2010) for Indonesia, and Soundararajan (2014) for 
India. Among these, only the studies for the cases of Costa Rica (Gindling et al. 2015) and 
Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse 2010) measure the effects of an exogenous increase in the 
intensity of enforcement that is generated through a campaign targeting wages and employment.  
The other studies identify the impacts of enforcement by exploring the variation in the 
number of labour inspectors, or inspections, across provinces or municipalities. Nevertheless, 
the main obstacle in this approach is that the number of inspectors is not distributed randomly 
across provinces. The authors use instrumental variables such as distance to the nearest 
enforcement office (Almeida and Carneiro 2009, 2012), election years (Ronconi 2010), and the 
number of inspectors in charge of safety and health regulations (Soundararajan 2014), to deal 
with this problem of endogeneity of the enforcement variable. 
In this article, I contribute to the literature by evaluating the impact of an enforcement 
programme implemented in Ecuador. I exploit the fact that in the years 2010 and 2011, the 
Campaign period, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Labour campaigned to increase compliance with 
the national minimum wage (NMW) legislation. This began in March, 2010 with an awareness 
campaign that targeted domestic workers and their employers. In January, 2011, the Ministry 
extended the scope of the programme to include all private employees and launched the Decent 
Work Campaign.  
To further increase enforcement of the labour law, in May 2011 the government 
approved by referendum that employers can go to prison if they do not affiliate their employees 
to the Ecuador Social Security Institute (IESS is its Spanish acronym), which implies 
compliance with NMW. The Campaign period was not a reaction of the government to 
increases in noncompliance rates, rather, it was a policy change that occurred because a new 
government recognized that labour violations were a serious issue in the country.  
I evaluate the effects of the Campaign using a difference-in-difference identification 
strategy with two individual-level panel data sets of workers living in urban areas. The first 
panel was collected before the Campaign, during June of 2008 (baseline survey) and during 
June of 2009 (follow-up survey), and the second panel was collected during the Campaign, 
during the June months of 2010 and 2011. With these data, I compare what happened during 
the pre-Campaign and Campaign periods to the wage growth and the employment of private 
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employees who were earning below the NMW (treatment group) to private employees who 
were earning above the NMW (control group). 
The Campaign targeted the non-affiliation of private employees, by their employers, to 
the IESS. In principle, the affiliation of an employee to the IESS means that he/she is paid at 
least the NMW. Hence, in the case of Ecuador, all private employees in the economy are 
covered by the NMW law, irrespective of the sector where the employee works, e.g. formal 
sector or informal sector. Employees who work in a small establishment (with less than five or 
ten workers), which are regarded as informal enterprises by the definition of informality 
proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO 2002), are covered by the NMW 
legislation. Similarly, employees of unregistered employers, such as those who are not 
registered with the tax authority, are covered by the NMW legislation. 
I analyse the impact of the Campaign on all private employees as a group and I explore 
the effects splitting this group into four subgroups: salaried men, salaried women, labourers, 
and domestic workers. These groups represent, respectively, 50%, 28%, 14% and 8%, 
respectively, of all private employees (in urban areas, see Table 2.15 in the Appendix). I do this 
division because these groups of private covered workers may be affected differently by the 
Campaign. Salaried workers have monthly wages and are more likely to have permanent jobs 
in comparison to Labourers (mostly men) who do a temporary or casual job (mostly) in the 
agriculture or construction industries for wages paid on a daily or weekly basis. Domestic 
workers (mostly women) were the first group targeted by the Ministry of Labour and I expect 
that this group of workers will be the most affected by the Campaign. 
I also examined the indirect effects of the increased enforcement of the labour law on 
the group of uncovered self-employed workers. In developing countries, there is a significant 
fraction of workers that are uncovered by labour protective regulations. In Ecuador, for 
example, during June of 2008, self-employed workers represented around 28% of the total 
labour force, 1.8 million self-employed workers (out of 6.6 million workers) (see Table 2.14 in 
the Appendix). This group of workers are uncovered by the NMW law because they cannot be 
forced to pay themselves the NMW, and they are not obligated to affiliate themselves to the 
IESS.  
Finally, I evaluated the impact of the Campaign on household income and poverty. If 
the Campaign generates an increase in wages for low-paid covered workers, it is natural to think 
that there will be a reduction in the incidence of poverty for this group of workers and their 
families. On the other hand, the predicted decrease in earnings in the uncovered sector may lead 
to an increase in the incidence of poverty among self-employed workers and their families. 
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Especially, if the increase in labour supply in the uncovered sector push down the earnings of 
self-employed workers earning far below the NMW.  
 Ecuador is an interesting case study because of the scale of the noncompliance issue. 
My estimates indicate that in the pre-Campaign period, 2008 and 2009, around 34% of the 
workers in the private covered sector had wages that were lower than 95 percent of the value 
of the NMW (see Table 2.13 in the Appendix). This sector represents the largest labour sector 
of the economy, during June of 2008, it accounts for approximately 40% of the total labour 
force, 2.8 million private employees out of 6.6 million workers (see Table 2.14 in the 
Appendix). This reveals that around 1 million private employees that should be paid at least the 
NMW, have wages that were lower than the NMW just prior to the Campaign. 
This pre-Campaign setting provides an opportunity to contribute to the literature by 
evaluating the effects of increased minimum wage policy enforcement in a country that is 
characterized by a high degree of noncompliance and weak enforcement of the labour 
regulations. Gindling et al. (2015) identified the impact of a similar campaign in Costa Rica. 
However, compliance rates in Costa Rica in the early 2000s were around 80%, while 
compliance rates in Ecuador were lower than 50% (Marshall 2007). In terms of enforcement in 
Costa Rica, with a labour force of around 1.5 million people, the Ministry of Labour carried out 
nearly 10,000 labour inspections during 2006 (Gindling and Trejos 2010). This is similar to 
Ecuador. With a workforce of around 6.6 million people, Ecuador carried out only 500 labour 
inspections during the same year (Ministry of Labour 2011). 
There are only two studies that analyse the wage and employment effects of minimum 
wages in Ecuador, and they only measure the impact of changes at the legislated level of the 
minimum wage. Canelas (2014) estimated the effects of NMW level increases during the period 
between 2000 and 2012 and did not find a significant increase in wages of covered workers. 
Furthermore, Canelas (2014) found a small increase in employment in the covered sector. This 
last finding contradicts the predictions of the Two-Sector Model, and the author argues that the 
high level of noncompliance with the minimum wage law is the main explanation for this result. 
Wong et al. (2016) measured the impact of increases in the sectoral minimum wages between 
December of 2011 and December of 2012 after the Campaign took place. Their results revealed 
there was a significant increase in wages of low-paid covered workers. Nevertheless, for this 
group of workers, they also found an increase in the probability of remaining employed and a 
rise in the number of hours worked. Based on these results, the authors conclude that further 
research is necessary to distinguish between the different working sectors of workers recorded 
as employed. 
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This paper differs from the two previous studies of Ecuador in two ways. First, I 
estimate the wage and employment effects of an increase in the intensity of enforcement of the 
NMW legislation. Second, I measure employment effects by tracking the movements of 
workers from the private covered sector into any other labour sector (uncovered self-
employment sector, public sector) or employment status (unpaid family work, unemployment, 
out of the labour force). With my panel data sets, not only was I able to observe the movement 
of private covered workers between employment and unemployment but, I also was able to 
track the transition of workers from the private covered sector into any other sector or 
employment status. I am also able to examine the transition of workers within the private 
covered sector from full-time to part-time employment (working less than 40 hours a week). 
These distinctions are crucial if one wants to have a more comprehensive analysis of the impact 
of minimum wages in a developing country.  
I answer these four questions about the direct effects of the Campaign: 1) What is the 
effect of the NMW on the changes in wages of covered workers if there is an increase in the 
intensity of enforcement of the NMW legislation? 2) If there is an increase in wages, does this 
increase reduce the likelihood of being poor among covered workers and their families? 3) Does 
the increase in the enforcement of the NMW law reduce the probability of remaining as a private 
covered worker? 4) Where do the workers who leave the covered sector move after the increase 
in enforcement of the NMW legislation?  
In a competitive labour market, the consequences of an increase in the intensity of 
enforcement of a minimum wage law, for covered workers with sub-minimum wages, will be 
the same as those predicted by the Two-sector Model when there is a newly introduced (or 
increased) minimum wage. There will be an increase in wages of covered workers whose 
employers newly comply with the law. This result also holds during instances in which the 
labour market can be characterized by imperfect competition (see Basu et al. 2010). In terms of 
employment, the increase in enforcement will cause job losses in the covered sector and 
workers will migrate to the uncovered sector, or to unemployment. However, under imperfect 
competition, the model developed by Basu et al. (2010) predicts that at a given minimum wage, 
which is lower than the competitive wage, an increase in the intensity of enforcement will leave 
employment unchanged for firms in strict compliance and will raise employment for any other 
(newly compliant or noncompliant) firm. Hence, under this model, there will be an increase in 
employment in the covered sector. 
My results provide evidence that is in line with the predictions of the Two-sector Model. 
I found that the Campaign increased (by approximately 12 p.p. to 16 p.p.) the real wages of 
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male covered workers (salaried and labourers) who were earning below the NMW and remained 
employed in the covered sector. This increase in wages reduced (by 7 p.p. to 10 p.p.) the 
likelihood that these workers and their families are poor. In terms of employment, my results 
show that labourers were 15 p.p. less likely to remain employed in the private covered sector 
during the Campaign period, compared to the pre-Campaign period, and suggest that those who 
lost their jobs mainly moved to the uncovered self-employment sector, or to unemployment.  
For the case of salaried women, I found no significant effects on wages and 
employment. Domestic workers were found to be special. My results show that there was an 
increase of approximately 16 p.p. in the real wages of domestic workers who remain employed 
as full-time workers, but this increase did not reduce (significantly) the probability that these 
workers and their families were poor. These results also suggest that some domestic workers 
moved from full-time to part-time employment as consequence of the Campaign. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2.2, I outline the development of the 
Campaign and discuss my identification strategy. I describe the data used for the analysis in 
Section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines the impact of the Campaign on wages of private covered 
workers. The results for employment are then presented in Sections 2.5. In Section 2.6, I analyse 
the effects of the Campaign on the uncovered self-employment sector. Finally, in Section 2.7, 
I examine the impact of the Campaign on monetary poverty for covered workers and their 
families, and for uncovered self-employed workers and their families. In Section 2.8, I discuss 
the results and provide a conclusion. 
2.2 Background and Identification Strategy  
2.2.1 Background  
In March of 2010, the Ministry of Labour in Ecuador began a comprehensive programme to 
promote the affiliation of private workers to the IESS and to enhance compliance with the 
NMW legislation. It began with the Campaña de Trabajo Doméstico Digno (Decent Domestic 
Work Campaign) targeting domestic workers and their employers. Building on this campaign, 
the Ministry extended the scope of the programme and launched (during January of 2011) the 
Campaña de Trabajo Digno (Decent Work Campaign). This broad campaign targeted all private 
employees: salaried workers, labourers, domestic workers- and their employers.  
The main goal of the programme was to increase compliance with the affiliation of 
private workers, by their employers, to the Ecuadorian social security system (IESS). In 
principle, affiliation to the IESS means that employees get paid at least the national minimum 
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wage (NMW). Affiliation also implies that workers have legal working hours and receive other 
benefits that include paid vacation, the thirteenth salary, and fourteenth salary.4 
Additionally, on May 7th, 2011, there was a referendum that asked Ecuadorians if the 
National Assembly should make the non-affiliation of employees, by employers, to the IESS a 
criminal offence.5 Ecuadorians approved this idea with 55.02% of valid votes, and it increased 
the level of awareness over the non-affiliation to the IESS within Ecuadorian society. The 
approval of the question makes noncompliance with the IESS, and with the NMW, by 
employers a serious issue that can result in jail time for offender, which indicates a credible 
commitment of the government to enforce compliance with the labour regulations.  
 The first campaign in 2010 was not a reaction to increases in noncompliance with the 
affiliation to the IESS. Rather, it was a response by the government to the widespread non-
affiliation with the IESS that characterized the country, especially among domestic workers. 
My estimates indicate that in December of 2009, prior to the launching of the first campaign, 
that only 16.6% of domestic workers were affiliated to the IESS by their employers and around 
80% were paid less than the NMW (see Table 2.13 in the Appendix). Additionally, as is shown 
in Figure 1, my estimates indicate that compliance with the IESS for all private covered workers 
(in urban areas) was roughly constant at around 43% in 2007 and 2008. This compliance rate 
increased to 48.0% in 2009. These rates of compliance show that more than half of private 
covered workers were not affiliated to the IESS at the end of 2009. 
 After the launching of the Decent Domestic Work Campaign during March of 2010, 
compliance with IESS for all private covered workers increased approximately 6 p.p. from 
48.0% in December of 2009 to 54.3% in December of 2010. This significant increase in 
compliance took place among both private salaried workers and domestic workers (see Table 
2.13 in the appendix). These measurements suggest that the first campaign for domestic workers 
have also influenced the group of private salaried workers.  
 The broad campaign and the question in the referendum, in 2011, push further the 
enforcement of labour regulations. As shown in Figure 2.1, the highest increase in compliance 
with the IESS for all private covered workers took place during 2011, 7.9 p.p. from 54.3% in 
                                               
4 Legal hours are 8 hours per day with a total of 40 hours per week, working hours above these limits imply the 
payment of extra hours. Employees are entitled to 15 paid days of vacation per every year worked. The thirteenth 
salary is equal to the sum of all the salaries received by the worker between December and November, divided by 
12; it is paid in December. The fourteenth salary is equivalent to the monthly national minimum wage; it is paid 
on March in the coast region and on August in the highland and amazon regions. 
5 The labour code stipulates 3 to 7 days in prison and a fine of 1 to 3 NMWs for employers that do not affiliate 
their workers to the IESS. In the case of firms, the sanction is a fine of 3 to 5 NMWs per worker that is not affiliated 
to the IESS.   
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December of 2010 to 62.2% in December of 2011. In 2011, the increase in compliance with the 
IESS for domestic workers, 11.6 p.p., is higher than the increase in compliance for private 
salaried workers, which was 8.5 p.p. (see Table 2.13 in the appendix).  
The case of labourers is different from salaried workers and domestic workers. The 
proportion of labourers who are affiliated to the IESS by their employers was only 2.1% in 
2009. It increased to 5.4% during the campaign period, and subsequently decreased to an 
average of 3% after 2012 (see Table 2.13 in the appendix). The low rates of compliance with 
the IESS among labourers stem from differences in the entitlement of workers to labour 
protection. If a labourer performs a repetitive task on a regular schedule, then he/she is covered 
by the IESS and by the NMW. On the other hand, if a labourer performs casual work for a short 
time project, then he/she is not protected by the labour law. However, in both cases, labourers 
negotiate their wage with their employers on a daily (or a weekly) basis using the value NMW 
as a reference. Hence, I regard all labourers as private covered workers. 
 
Figure 2.1 Compliance with the Affiliation to the IESS for Private Covered Workers 
Living in Urban Areas, and the National Minimum Wage, 2007-2014 
 
Source: Compliance with the IESS and unemployment rates are estimated from the Urban-ENEMDU 2007-
2014. The real value of the National Minimum Wage is computed using the CPI Historical Series of the INEC. 
Real GDP growth comes from the Monthly Statistical Reports published by the Central Bank of Ecuador 
 
I define the period under which the campaigns and the referendum take place (2010 and 
2011) as the Campaign period. During this time, the Ministry of Labour featured three 
components to increase the enforcement of the labour law: 1) it created awareness among 
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workers and employers about their duties and labour rights; 2) it prevented employers that did 
not affiliate their employees to the IESS to do so in order to avoid labour disputes in the future; 
3) it increased the number of labour inspections targeting those not affiliated with the IESS. 
Under both campaigns (during 2010 and 2011) the staff of the Ministry of Labour gave 
personalized information to more than half a million people about their duties and rights as 
employers and employees (Ministry of Labour 2011). This component also included 
advertisements in the national media and announcements by the president of the country during 
his weekly Saturday radio and television show.  
In 2011, the Ministry of Labour also significantly increased the number of labour 
inspectors targeting the non-affiliation to the IESS. Under the restructuring of Ministry, it 
increased the number of labour inspectors from 46 in 2010 to 240 in 2011 (see Table 2.16 in 
the Appendix). Regarding labour inspections (in 2011) the Ministry carried out around 26,000 
inspections (Ministry of Labour 2011). This situation contrasts with the pre-Campaign period. 
For example, during the mid-1990s, the Quito branch of the Ministry that was in charge of 
roughly half of the national workforce (with 26 inspectors) carried out inspections only at the 
request of the workers or their unions, had no vehicle for this purpose and workers used to pay 
the cab fare for the inspector to perform the checks (MacIsaac and Rama 1997, p140). 
 Additionally, from January of 2010 to June of 2011 the Ministry inaugurated 13 of the 
26 new branches it opened during 2011. As part of restructuring the Ministry, it opened new 
offices in cities where there was not a branch. The increase in the number of labour inspectors 
took place not only in the main cities where it used to have a branch (Quito, Guayaquil, and 
Cuenca), but also in other cities in order to provide staff for the new branches (e.g. in Santo 
Domingo, Riobamba, Manta, Ambato, Machala, Quevedo). 
The Campaign period represents a major change in the institution of the Ministry of 
Labour and in its capacity to enforce compliance with labour regulations. The Campaign period 
involved the promotion of workers’ duties and rights, a significant increase in labour inspector 
and inspections, new infrastructure and new vehicles to perform the controls. All these changes 
represent an increase in enforcement of the labour law and can be considered as an exogenous 
“treatment” event for private covered workers that earn below the NMW. This fact allows me 
to address the problem of endogeneity of the enforcement variable that affects other studies that 
use state variation in the number of labour inspections (or inspectors) to identify the effects of 
increased enforcement. 
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2.2.2 Identification Strategy 
The typical approach to measuring the effects of minimum wage legislation is to identify a 
group of workers who are most likely to be directly affected by the minimum wage and compare 
their wage growth and employment changes to workers who are less likely to be directly 
affected. This methodology is in the spirit of the conventional non-experimental programme 
evaluation, where trends in other groups can be used to infer what would have happened to the 
outcome variables in the absence of treatment. A notable and influential example of this 
approach is the study done by Card and Krueger (1994). The authors compare the change in 
employment in New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the rise in the minimum wage in 
New Jersey (treatment group). Under the assumption that in the absence of the treatment, 
employment trends in New Jersey would have been equal to the ones observe in Pennsylvania 
(where the minimum wage was constant), the authors regard their difference-in-difference 
estimate as the causal effect of the rise in the minimum wage.  
In this study, I use this difference-in-difference methodology and adapt it to evaluate the 
effects of the Campaign. I borrow from the empirical literature that analyses the effects of 
changes in the legislated level of the minimum wage and identifies the impact based on the 
position of covered workers across the wage distribution (see Currie and Fallick 1996; 
Fajnzylber 2001; Neumark et al. 2004; Stewart 2004; Stewart and Swaffield 2008). 
Specifically, I follow the adaptation of the difference-in-difference methodology implemented 
by Stewart (2004). The author estimates the impact of the introduction of the national minimum 
wage (NMW) in the U.K by comparing the wage growth and employment change of covered 
workers with wages below and above the NMW, prior the introduction of the law. 
 My identification strategy exploits the fact that the group of private covered workers 
whose wages had to be raised to comply with the NMW (i.e. those initially below the NMW) 
will be more affected by the Campaign than the group of private covered workers with wages 
above the NMW. Stewart (2004) defines those earning below the new NMW as the treated 
group and those earning at, or slightly above the new NMW as the control group. In my case, I 
am analysing the effects of increased enforcement of a minimum wage law that is already in 
place. This fact implies that there is a significant proportion of covered workers earning at the 
NMW, even before the Campaign started (see Panels A and B of Figure 2.4 in the Appendix). 
Therefore, in this study there are two treated groups. Private covered workers who were earning 
below the NMW in 2010 are the group of workers that are mostly affected by the Campaign. 
This group of workers is my treatment group 1 and it is the focus of this study. The group of 
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workers who were earning at the NMW, in 2010, will be affected mostly by the increase in the 
value of the NMW and it is my treatment group 2. Finally, my control group are all private 
covered workers who earned above the NMW during 2010. 
 I use a bound of 5% to allow for some measurement error in my earnings variable. The 
group of workers earning at the NMW includes those with wages within 0.95 and 1.05 of the 
value of the NMW. Workers below the NMW are those earning less than 0.95 of the NMW, 
and workers above the NMW are those earning more than 1.05 of NMW. In addition, I restrict 
the analysis to workers with wages within 25% of the NMW to make the comparison between 
treatment and control groups as similar as possible, in terms of wage. As shown in Figure 2.2, 
treated group 1 are private covered workers earning below the NMW in 2010 (240.0 USD per 
month) with wages that range from 180.0 USD (per month) to 228.0 USD. Treated group 2 are 
private covered workers earning at around the NMW in 2010, from 228.0 USD to 252.0 USD. 
Finally, the control group contains private covered workers earning above the NMW in 2010 
whose wages ranged from 252.0 USD to 300.0 USD.  
 
Figure 2.2 Definitions of “Treated” and “Control” groups 
 
  
Private Covered Sector Uncovered Self-employed 
Sector 
Earning Below the NMW 
($180.0 ≤ W(2010) < $228.0) 
Treated_1 Indirectly_Affected_1 
Earning At the NMW 
($228.0 ≤ W(2010) ≤ $252.0) 
Treated_2 Indirectly_Affected_2 
Earning Above the NMW 
($252.0 < W(2010) ≤ $300) 
Control_Covered Control_Uncovered 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Note: The classification of workers into those earning Below, At, and Above the NMW uses a bound of 5% around 
the NMW. 
 
 With my identification strategy, I move upward in the wage distribution and chose a 
group of covered workers that is not directly affected by the Campaign. This approach makes 
my control group as similar to my treatment group as possible, in terms of unobservables. 
Nevertheless, the existence of spillover effects and measurement error in the wage variable can 
obscure the identification of any effect of the Campaign on my treatment group. These threats 
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to my identification strategy are reduced when I regard also as treatment group the group of 
covered workers who were earning at around 5% of the NMW (treated group 2). 
 Another option is to move to another sector of the labour market and use those workers 
that are uncovered by the NMW law, the self-employed workers, as a control group. With this 
approach, I can choose a control group that is as similar to the treatment groups as possible in 
terms of initial earnings. However, using the self-employed workers as a control group threatens 
my identification, which states that the treatment does not affect our untreated comparison 
group. As predicted by the Two-sector Model, the empirical literature for developing countries 
frequently reports that minimum wage laws also affect the earnings of workers in the uncovered 
self-employed sector (Maloney and Mendez 2004, Lemos 2009). This suggests that using the 
self-employed workers as the control group not only reduces the similarity in unobservable 
characteristics between treatment and comparison groups, but also threatens my identification 
assumption. For these reasons, I prefer to use the group of covered workers with wages slightly 
above the NMW as my control group. 
 A direct comparison of the wage growth and employment change of covered workers 
earning below the NMW and those earning above the NMW will not be appropriate to identify 
any causal effect because even in the absence of the Campaign, there can be significant 
differences in the outcome variables. The differences in the outcome variables between 
treatment and control groups during the Campaign period can be compared to the equivalent 
differences found during the pre-Campaign period. This is my difference-in-differences 
estimator of the effect of the Campaign. It generates a more reliable estimate of the causal effect 
of the Campaign because with this approach, I can account for any pre-existing differences 
between the treatment and control groups. 
Ideally, a panel data set of workers interviewed four times to implement my difference-
in-difference estimation strategy is needed: two times before the Campaign started, during 
December of 2008 and December of 2009, and two times during the Campaign period, during 
December of 2010 and December of 2011. Unfortunately, there is not such a panel data set. 
The only existing data are two separate panel data sets: one with information from workers 
collected before the Campaign period, during June of 2008 and June of 2009, and the other 
panel with information from workers collected during the Campaign, during June of 2010 and 
June of 2011.  
Figure 2.3 outlines the timing of both panel data sets and the timing of the changes in the 
NMW and its enforcement campaigns. The Figure also shows how my outcome variables are 
computed and illustrates my identification strategy. As we can see in Figure 2.3, the last survey 
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of my second panel dataset was conducted in June, 2011, only one month after the question in 
the referendum and only six months after the broad Decent Work Campaign was launched. This 
implies that my results represent the short-term effects of the increased enforcement of the 
NMW. 
 
Figure 2.3 Chronology of Changes in National Minimum Wage and its Enforcement 
Campaigns, Data, Outcome Variables, and Identification Strategy 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
I begin by comparing the year-on-year (real) wage change (hereafter wage growth) for 
the Campaign period, from June of 2010 to June of 2011 between my treatment and control 
groups and then compare this difference with the corresponding difference for the pre-
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Campaign period from June of 2008 to June of 2009. Real wages are computed by deflating the 
nominal wage by the consumer price index (CPI), where CPI equals 100 in June of 2010. One 
would expect that the wages of covered workers whose wages had to be raised to comply with 
the NMW will increase more than the wages of covered workers who already earned above the 
NMW.  
For those directly affected by the Campaign (my treatment group), what would their 
employment status be if the Campaign had not been implemented? To try to answer this 
question, I estimate the difference in the conditional probability of remaining employed in the 
private covered sector, between workers in my treatment and control group during the 
Campaign period, and compare it to the corresponding difference for the pre-Campaign period. 
For workers who lost their jobs in the covered sector, I try to identify to which other sector or 
employment status they migrated. Their transition options are: move to the uncovered self-
employment sector, go to the public sector, become unemployed, move out of the labour force, 
or for full-time private employees, become part-time workers in the same covered sector. 
Finally, I compare the incidence of monetary poverty in the follow-up surveys among 
covered workers who remain employed in the covered sector and are divided in to treatment 
and control groups. I also perform this analysis for all workers who report being self-employed 
workers in the follow-up surveys; this includes those covered workers in the baseline surveys 
who became self-employed workers in the follow-up surveys. If the Campaign increases the 
wages of low-pay covered workers, I expected will expect to find a significant reduction in 
poverty among these workers and their families. On the other hand, if the Campaign reduces 
the earnings of workers in the uncovered sector, I will expect to find an increase in poverty 
among self-employed workers and their families. 
2.3 Data 
I use two panel data sets of individuals constructed from four survey rounds of the Encuesta 
Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo, ENEMDU (national survey of employment, 
unemployment and underemployment). The institution in charge of the ENEMDU is the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, INEC (National Institute of Statistics and Census). 
The ENEMDU is carried out quarterly in urban areas using a rotating sampling strategy. Under 
this design, 25% of the households are interviewed for two consecutive quarters, rest for two 
quarters, and are interviewed again for the two last quarters (see Table 2.17 in the Appendix). 
The sample is renewed every two years. 
  
47 
 Panel 1 comes from the ENEMDUs carried out during June of 2008 (baseline survey) 
and June of 2009 (follow-up survey). Similarly, panel 2 originates from the ENEMDUs 
conducted during June of 2010 and June of 2011. To construct these panel data sets, the INEC 
matched the households and the individuals that were interviewed during both June rounds; it 
matched the households that remained at the same address and the individuals who remained 
within the same households.  
 The baseline and follow-up surveys of Panel 1 were collected before any enforcement 
campaign was implemented and I use this data as my pre-Campaign panel data set (see Figure 
2.3). The baseline survey of Panel 1 is a subsample of the ENEMDU from June of 2008. It 
contains information from 11,144 individuals aged 15 to 70, which represents 64.1% (11,144/ 
17,398) of the total working-age individuals recorded in the complete urban sample of the 
ENEMDU. Table 2.18 in the Appendix compares the distribution of the working-age 
population across sectors (or employment status) between both data sets and shows that the 
proportion of workers that fell into each category are around the same. 
 The baseline and follow-up surveys of Panel 2 were gathered during the Campaign 
period. Specifically, the baseline survey is a subsample of the ENEMDU from June of 2010 
and it was collected two months after the Ministry launched the Decent Domestic Work 
Campaign. This baseline survey contains information from 10,974 individuals aged 15 to 70, 
which represent 37.4% (10,974/ 29,325) of the total working-age population registered in the 
complete urban sample of the ENEMDU. As is shown in Table 2.18, the proportions of workers 
that fell into each category between both data sets are practically equal.  
 The information of the national minimum wage comes from the Ministry of Labour, 
which publishes (by the end of each year) the NMW that will apply for the following year. The 
NMW is registered in the labour law as the minimum monthly payment for full-time private 
salaried workers. The labour law does not specify an hourly minimum wage for part-time 
workers. In this case, the Ministry of Labour applies a corresponding hourly minimum wage 
by dividing the monthly NMW by the legal numbers of hours per week (40) multiplied by 4.35 
weeks per month. In addition to the NMW, in Ecuador there are wage Councils that use the 
NMW as a floor to fix the sectoral minimum wages, but its values do not differ significantly 
from the NMW. This form of setting the minimum wages in this country implies, in principle, 
that all full-time salaried workers in the economy should earn at least the NMW.  
 To determine which workers fell into my treatment and control groups during the 
Campaign period, I assigned each worker in Panel 2 the value of NMW during the year 2010, 
240.0 USD per month. Similarly, to do so for the pre-Campaign period, I assigned each worker 
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in Panel 1 the value of NMW in 2008, 200.0 USD. For both full-time and part-time workers, I 
compared their reported monthly gross earnings from their main job with the value of the 
monthly NMW. In the ENEMDU surveys, workers report their monthly earnings for the 
previous month, but they usually report hours worked per week. Thus, to reduce any potential 
measurement error that may arise from using hourly earnings, I used the reported monthly gross 
earnings for the analysis and present results for full-time workers only, and for both full-time 
and part-time workers. 
 Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of private covered workers in my treatment 
and control groups in the baseline survey of Panel 2 for June, 2010.  While males represent 
55.6% of the workers earning below the NMW, they represent 73% of the workers earning 
more than the NMW. Workers earning below, or at the NMW are younger than workers with 
wages above the NMW. Compared to workers in the treatment groups, workers in the control 
group are better educated, more likely to work in medium and large-size firms, are more likely 
to work in the construction industry, and are less likely to work in agriculture and commerce.  
 These differences show that my control group is not an ideal counterfactual, and 
suggests that I should account for these characteristics to determine if these differences are not 
driving my results. Finally, when I compare covered workers that earn below the NMW with 
uncovered self-employed workers earning below the NMW, the differences in these 
characteristics are even greater, and this is the primary reason why I do not use the uncovered 
self-employed workers as my control group (see Table 2.19 in the Appendix).   
2.4 Effects on Wages of Covered Workers 
2.4.1 Difference in Difference 
Table 2.2 illustrates my difference-in-difference estimation of the effect of increased 
enforcement of the NMW on wages. The sample is restricted to workers who were employed 
in the private covered sector in the baseline survey and remain employed in this sector in the 
follow-up survey (for each panel data set). In Panel A of Table 2.2, I compare the pre-Campaign 
change in wages of covered workers who were earning below, and at, the NMW to the pre-
Campaign change in wages of covered workers who were earning above the NMW. Each cell 
reports the average change in log (real) monthly wages for the group labelled on the axes, along 
with the standard error and the number of observations. In Panel B of Table 2.2, I performed 
the same exercise for the Campaign period, June of 2010-June of 2011.  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Private Covered Workers with Wages Below, At, and 
Above the NMW during June of 2010 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-
time workers Characteristics (% in each 
category) 
Below 
the 
NMW 
At the 
NMW 
Above 
the 
NMW 
  Below 
the 
NMW 
At the 
NMW 
Above 
the 
NMW 
Gender               
Male 55.6 60.9 73.0   57.4 60.0 72.0 
Female 44.4 39.1 27.0   42.6 40.0 28.0 
Ethnicity               
Mestizo / White / others 93.2 92.3 94.2   92.6 92.7 94.3 
Indigenous / Afro 6.8 7.7 5.8   7.4 7.3 5.7 
Age               
15-24 23.4 23.3 17.0   23.4 23.4 17.4 
25-34 30.7 33.2 32.5   30.1 32.4 31.5 
35-44 21.0 24.8 29.1   20.3 24.3 29.5 
45-54 13.6 12.8 15.7   13.6 13.3 15.6 
54-64 6.8 4.4 5.2   8.0 5.1 5.5 
65+ 4.5 1.5 0.5   4.5 1.6 0.5 
Education               
Primary (1–6years)  38.1 26.9 29.3   37.3 26.4 27.8 
Secondary (7–12years)  48.8 51.5 45.5   48.0 51.7 44.7 
University (13–21 years)  13.1 21.6 25.1   14.7 22.0 27.5 
Firm size                
Small-firms (1–10 workers) 67.2 48.8 50.0   68.5 49.3 50.4 
Medium/Large-firms (11+) 32.8 51.2 50.0   31.5 50.7 49.6 
Industry                
Agriculture  11.0 4.9 7.3   12.3 5.5 6.9 
Manufacturing  21.8 24.3 22.5   20.8 23.9 22.3 
Service  19.7 14.6 12.6   20.8 16.1 13.6 
Construction  10.0 10.2 18.6   10.0 10.0 17.9 
Commerce  29.7 31.1 23.0   27.5 29.5 23.3 
Transportation  4.2 5.3 6.3   4.7 5.7 6.2 
Finance  3.7 9.5 9.7   4.0 9.3 9.7 
                
Number of Observations 381 588 382 
 
448 633 403 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data set June2010-June2011. 
Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 15-70 who reported working in the private covered sector 
during June of 2010. The classification of workers into those earning Below, At, and Above the NMW uses a 
bound of 5% around the NMW.  
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 During the pre-Campaign period, June of 2008–June of 2009, there was a 12.9 percent 
(0.122 log points) increase in real wages of (full-time) covered workers who were earning 
below the NMW. For covered workers earning above the NMW, the average change in (real) 
wages was an increase of 3.4 percent (0.034 log points). Thus, before any enforcement 
campaign of the NMW took place, the wage growth of (full-time) covered workers earning 
below the NMW was approximately 9 p.p. higher than the wage growth of covered workers 
earning above the NMW. This reveals that even in the absence of our "treatment", those at the 
bottom of the wage distribution have larger increases in wages, which suggests that I should 
take into account this pre-existing difference to appropriately identify the effects of the 
Campaign on wages. 
 During the Campaign period, workers in both of my treatment groups, those earning 
below and at the NMW, experience significantly larger real wage growths compared to workers 
in my control group. Specifically, the wage growth of (full-time) covered workers earning 
below the NMW was 16.5 p.p. higher than the wage growth of covered workers that earn above 
the NMW. Likewise, the wage growth of (full-time) covered workers earning at the NMW was 
10.7 p.p. higher than the wage growth of covered workers earning above the NMW.   
 Finally, I compute my difference-in-difference estimates by taking the difference 
between the single-difference estimates of Panels A and B and present the results at the bottom 
of the table. The relative wage growth for full-time workers earning below, or at, the NMW 
increased by approximately 7 p.p. more during the Campaign period, compared to the relative 
wage growth during the pre-Campaign period. The difference-in-difference estimates for 
workers earning at the NMW are statistically significant at the 5% level, in both specifications 
(full-time workers only, and both full-time and part-time workers). The difference-in-difference 
estimate for workers who were earning below the NMW is statistically significant at the 10% 
level in the specification that includes full-time workers only, and it is not significant at 
conventional levels when I include both full-time and part-time workers. 
The results of Table 2.2 give some evidence that the Campaign increased the wages of 
covered workers who were earning below or at the NMW. The magnitude of the effects are 
similar to the wage effect of the enforcement campaigns implemented in Costa Rica (Gindling 
et al. 2015) and Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse 2010). The increase in wages implies that the 
Campaign effectively increased compliance with the NMW. However, these results could be 
driven by differences in the characteristics of covered workers earning below, or at, the NMW 
with that of covered workers earning above the NMW. In the next section, I perform the analysis 
in a regression framework and control for individual characteristic of workers. 
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Table 2.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on Wage Growth 
for Private Covered Workers 
A. Pre-Campaign Period  
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time 
Workers   Obs. Change in log 
monthly wage 
(2008-2009) 
  Obs. Change in log 
monthly wage 
(2008-2009) 
Covered Workers in June 2008:         
Below the NMW 281 0.122   352 0.078 
  (0.021)     (0.02) 
At the NMW 368 0.061   418 0.039 
  (0.016)     (0.016) 
Above the NMW 286 0.034   316 0.026 
  (0.019)     (0.018) 
Difference: Below - Above   0.088***     0.052* 
    (0.028)     (0.028) 
Difference: At - Above   0.027     0.013 
    (0.025)     (0.024) 
B. Campaign Period  
  Obs. Change in log 
monthly wage 
(2010-2011) 
  Obs. Change in log 
monthly wage 
(2010-2011) 
Covered Workers in June 2010:         
Below the NMW 247 0.183   321 0.135 
  (0.016)     (0.018) 
At the NMW 450 0.132   493 0.113 
  (0.012)     (0.012) 
Above the NMW 295 0.030   314 0.028 
  (0.018)     (0.018) 
Difference: Below - Above   0.152***     0.107*** 
    (0.025)     (0.026) 
Difference: At - Above   0.102***     0.086*** 
    (0.021)     (0.021) 
            
Difference-in-Difference (Below-Above) 0.064*     0.056 
    (0.036)     (0.035) 
Difference-in-Difference (At-Above) 0.075**     0.073** 
    (0.033)     (0.033) 
Source: Calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June 2011.  
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered workers in 
the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up surveys. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.   
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2.4.2 Regression-Adjusted Models 
The raw comparisons in Table 2.2 do not control for other factors that might explain the increase 
in wages. One factor is, for example, the industry in which the employee was working during 
June of 2010. This and other characteristics are taken into account (controlled for) in the 
estimates presented in Table 2.3. I estimate the following wage equation on all workers who 
remained employed in the private covered sector and whose initial wages were within 25% of 
the NMW: 
 ∆"#$%,' = ) + +,-."/0%,'++123%,' + 45' + 6,75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 
(2.1) 																																									+6175' ∗ 23%,'9 + ;′%,'= + >%,' 
 
where the dependent variable, ∆"#$%,', is the change in the log of real wage of worker i in the 
period t (1 during the Campaign, 0 for the pre-Campaign period). -."/0%,' = 1 if worker i 
reports a salary in the baseline survey of period t that is below 95% of the NMW (treatment 
group 1), and =0 otherwise. Similarly, 23%,' = 1 if worker i reports a wage in the baseline survey 
of period t that is within 5% of the NMW (treatment group 2), and =0 otherwise. For example, 
for the Campaign period, -."/0 includes those with initial monthly wages that range from 
180.0 USD to less than 228.0 USD, and 23 includes those with wages that range from 228.0 
USD to 252.0 USD. Above (the control group) includes those with wages above 252.0 USD, 
but below or equal to 300.0 USD.  
 5'=1 if time t corresponds to the Campaign period, and equals 0 for the pre-Campaign 
period. The coefficients 6, and 61, on the interaction terms 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 and 75' ∗ 23%,'9, 
respectively, capture all the variation in wage growth that is specific to the treatment groups 
(relative to the control group) during the Campaign period (relative to the pre-Campaign 
period). These two coefficients are my difference-in-difference estimators of the effect of the 
Campaign on wages. Finally, ;%,'	 is a vector of individual specific characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry, that is reported in the baseline survey 
for each period t. 
Table 2.3 presents the estimates of the 6, and 61 from Eq. (2.1). The estimates shown 
in columns 1 and 3 are directly comparable to the raw difference-in-difference estimates 
presented at the bottom of Table 2.2. Columns 2 and 4 report the estimates of the regression-
adjusted models that include the set of control variables. Column 2 shows the regression-
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adjusted estimates for full-time covered workers only, and Column 4 reports the estimates for 
both full-time and part-time covered workers. In both cases, the introduction of individual 
characteristics into the models do not have a sizeable impact on the coefficients: the magnitude 
of the coefficients changes marginally and they remain statistically significant. Additionally, 
the coefficient on the interaction term 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 for the model that includes both full-time 
and part-time covered workers becomes statistically significant with the inclusion of the control 
variables. The results of the regression-adjusted models suggest that the significant wage 
effects, presented in the previous section, are not caused by differences in individual 
characteristics between workers in my treatment and control groups.  
 
Table 2.3 OLS Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on Wage 
Growth for Private Covered Workers 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time 
Workers 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Campaign*Below  0.064* 0.079**   0.056 0.066*   
(0.038) (0.037)   (0.037) (0.036) 
Campaign*At 0.075** 0.069**   0.073** 0.065**  
(0.033) (0.032)   (0.033) (0.031) 
Individual controls   Yes     Yes 
R2  0.031 0.094   0.017 0.082 
N 1,927 1,927   2,214 2,214 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up 
surveys. Control variables are: gender, ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
 
To determine which group of workers felt the impact of the Campaign (on wages) the 
most, I ran the difference-in-difference regression model for each subgroup of private covered 
workers: salaried men, salaried women, labourers (mostly men), and domestic workers (mostly 
women). Table 2.4 presents the estimates of the coefficients for the interaction terms,  6, and 61, from Eq. (1). In this case, the treatment group is the subgroup private employees indicated 
in each column of Table 2.4. The comparison group is the same as those for Tables 2.2 and 2.3: 
workers who were earning above the NMW and who remained employed in the private covered 
sector. I report the raw OLS estimate at the top of the table and show OLS estimates with 
controls (my preferred specification) at the bottom of the table. 
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The results in Table 2.4 show that the Campaign increased by approximately 12 p.p. the 
wages of salaried men who were earning below the NMW. In contrast, the estimated 
coefficients for female salaried workers with sub-minimum wages are not statistically different 
from zero. Labourers and domestic workers are the groups of covered workers who benefited 
most from the Campaign with regards to wage growth. The relative wage growth of full-time 
labourers and domestic workers who were earning below the NMW increased by approximately 
16 p.p. more during the Campaign period, compared to the relative wage growth during the 
pre-Campaign period. Likewise, the relative wage growth for those who were earning at the 
NMW increased by approximately 14 p.p. more during the Campaign period, compared to the 
pre-Campaign period. As I mentioned in Section 2, some labourers are not covered because 
they do a form of casual work, but they negotiate their wage using the NMW as reference. The 
results in Table 4 for this group of workers shows evidence that is in line with this affirmation. 
 
Table 2.4 OLS Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on Wage 
Growth for Different Groups of Private Covered Workers 
 
Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  Salaried 
Men 
Salaried 
Women 
Labourer Domestic 
Worker 
  Salaried 
Men 
Salaried 
Women 
Labourer Domestic 
Worker   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates           
C*Below  0.106** -0.019 0.115 0.125*   0.124** -0.019 0.098 0.011 
  (0.049) (0.047) (0.083) (0.072)   (0.050) (0.051) (0.071) (0.081) 
C*At 0.054 0.073 0.130** 0.128*   0.051 0.065 0.115* 0.158**  
  (0.037) (0.047) (0.064) (0.076)   (0.037) (0.044) (0.065) (0.072) 
                    
OLS difference-in-differences estimates with controls           
C*Below  0.112** -0.001 0.148* 0.145**   0.117** -0.003 0.124* 0.008 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.084) (0.068)   (0.049) (0.050) (0.072) (0.079) 
C*At 0.05 0.076* 0.137** 0.127*   0.039 0.068 0.130** 0.142**  
  (0.036) (0.046) (0.063) (0.075)   (0.035) (0.043) (0.063) (0.071) 
                    
N 1,228 981 772 689   1,364 1,104 874 762 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up 
surveys. The treatment group is the subgroup of covered workers indicated in each column. The comparison group 
is the same as in Table 3 (all covered workers with wages above the NMW). Control variables are: gender, 
ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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The effects for male covered worker (salaried and labourers) who were earning below 
the NMW is statistically significant in both specifications for full-time workers, and for both 
full-time and part-time workers. This is not the case for domestic workers who were earning 
below the NMW. The difference-in-difference estimate for full-time domestic workers who 
remained as full-time workers in the covered sector is 0.145 log points, and it is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. However, in the specification that includes both full-time and part-
time domestic workers, the magnitude of the coefficient is reduced to nearly zero, and it 
becomes not significant.  
These findings suggest that some full-time domestic workers who were earning less 
than the NMW moved to work part-time in the same covered sector during the Campaign 
period. This reduces their monthly wages (from their main job), which in turn pushes down the 
average increase in wages. The results in Table 2.20 in the Appendix confirm this conclusion. 
In this table, I restrict the sample to full-time covered workers in the baseline surveys who 
report being part-time or full-time covered workers in the follow-up surveys. The estimate of 6, = 0.018. It is lower than 6, = 0.145 from column 4 of Table 2.4, and it is not significantly 
different from zero.  
In summary, the analysis of the effects on wages suggests that the Campaign has 
increased the wages of salaried men, labourers, and domestic workers who earned below the 
NMW. The significant effects on wages imply that the Campaign has increased compliance 
with the NMW among these groups of workers. However, the results also reveal the Campaign 
had no significant effect on the wages of salaried women who were earning less than the NMW. 
 
2.5 Effects on Employment of Covered Workers 
2.5.1  Impact on the Probability of Remaining Employed in the Covered Sector  
In this section, I examine the effect of the Campaign on the probability of remaining employed 
in the private covered sector. Using the panel data sets for the pre-Campaign and Campaign, I 
estimate the following employment equation:  
 @A/B(DE@%,' = 1) = 	ΦH) + +,-."/0%,'++123%,' + 45' + 6,75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 
(2.2) 																																																								+6175' ∗ 23%,'9 + ;′%,'= + >%,'I 
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where the binary response variable DE@%,' = 1 if individual i is working as a private covered 
worker in the baseline survey and he/she remains employed in the private covered sector in the 
follow-up survey for each period t (pre-Campaign and Campaign). DE@%,' = 0 if individual i is 
working as a private covered worker in the baseline survey and he/she moves to another sector 
(e.g. uncovered self-employment sector, public sector) or employment status (e.g. 
unemployment, out of the labour force) in the follow-up survey. For the analysis of full-time 
workers only, DE@%,' = 1 if individual i remains as a full-time private covered worker in the 
follow-up survey, and equals zero otherwise. In this last case, DE@%,' = 0 also when individual 
i remains employed in the same private covered sector but he/she moves from full-time to part-
time employment. 
 The explanatory variables are the same as those in the wage equation, and Φ is the probit 
transformation. As in the wage equation, workers with wages above the NMW in the baseline 
surveys act as the control group. The coefficient on the interaction terms capture the effect of 
the Campaign. Specifically, the probability difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of 
the Campaign are the marginal effects of the interactions 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 and 75' ∗ 23%,'9, 
derived from the probit coefficient estimates and evaluated at the sample means of the 
explanatory variables. 
 Table 2.5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates of the probit model with 
controls in columns 2 and 4. For comparison, Table 2.5 also reports raw (i.e., without control 
variables) OLS difference-in-differences estimates in columns 1 and 3. Table 2.5 shows the 
results for full-time workers only, and for both full-time and part-time workers. All difference-
in-differences estimates in Table 2.5 are not significantly different from zero. However, for the 
group of full-time workers only (see columns 1 and 2), the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients on the interaction 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 suggest that they may be a negative impact of 
the Campaign on the probability of remaining employed for a sub-group of covered workers. 
Table 2.6 reports the result for the four sub-groups of private covered workers: salaried 
men, salaried women, labourers, and domestic workers. The comparison group is the same as 
that for Table 2.5: private covered workers who were earning above the NMW in the baseline 
surveys. The first block of Table 2.6 provides the raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates. 
The second block presents the probit difference-in-differences estimates, which are the 
marginal effects of the interactions 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 and 75' ∗ 23%,'9. These estimates are 
probability difference-in-differences and can be interpreted as the effect of the Campaign on 
the probability of remaining employed in the private covered sector for each group of workers.  
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Table 2.5 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the Probability 
of Subsequent Employment for Private Covered Workers 
 
  
Full-time Workers Only 
  
Both Full-time and Part-time 
Workers 
  OLS Probit   OLS Probit 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Campaign*Below  -0.049 -0.054   0.004 0.000 
(0.045) (0.044)   (0.040) (0.040) 
Campaign*At 0.009 0.006   0.024 0.022 
(0.039) (0.039)   (0.037) (0.036) 
Individual controls   Yes     Yes 
N 2,632 2,632   2,912 2,912 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys. Control variables are: gender, ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. The 
marginal effect of interactions terms derived from the probit coefficient estimate and are evaluated at the sample 
means of the explanatory variables.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
 
 The OLS and probit difference-in-differences estimates on the interaction 75' ∗-."/0%,'9 are negative and statistically different from zero for the group of labourers (see 
Columns 3 and 7 of Table 2.6). The results suggest that there is a reduction, during the 
Campaign period, of approximately 15 p.p. in the relative probability of remaining employed 
in the covered sector for labourers who were earning below the NMW, compared to the relative 
probability during the pre-Campaign period. Additionally, the signs of the estimates for the 
groups of salaried men and domestic workers who were working full-time and were earning 
below the NMW are negative, but they are not statistically significant. This is interesting 
because these workers, with the group of labourers, were the ones who saw their wages increase 
as consequences of the Campaign. 
Although not significant, the estimates on the interaction 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 for full-time 
domestic workers are negative and larger (in absolute magnitude) than the positive estimates 
for both full-time and part-time domestic workers (see Columns 4 and 8 of Table 2.6). These 
results, with the results of the effects on wages, suggest that domestic workers remained 
employed in the private covered sector, but some of them moved from full-time to part-time 
employment within this sector. 
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Table 2.6 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the Probability 
of Subsequent Employment for Different Groups of Private Covered Workers 
 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  
Salaried 
Men 
Salaried 
Women 
Labourer 
Domestic 
Worker 
  
Salaried 
Men 
Salaried 
Women 
Labourer 
Domestic 
Worker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates           
C*Below  -0.041 0.025 -0.161* -0.117   0.009 0.056 -0.136** 0.036 
  (0.059) (0.066) (0.085) (0.115)   (0.053) (0.058) (0.069) (0.101) 
C*At 0.035 -0.041 -0.035 0.113   0.034 0.021 -0.024 0.073 
  (0.046) (0.057) (0.079) (0.103)   (0.043) (0.054) (0.068) (0.092) 
                    
Probit difference-in-differences estimates with controls         
C*Below  -0.053 0.007 -0.163* -0.104   0.005 0.042 -0.151** 0.048 
  (0.060) (0.069) (0.084) (0.110)   (0.054) (0.061) (0.071) (0.104) 
C*At 0.04 -0.064 -0.031 0.102   0.039 0.005 -0.02 0.068 
  (0.046) (0.059) (0.080) (0.098)   (0.043) (0.055) (0.071) (0.094) 
                    
N 1,635 1,331 1,034 915   1,772 1,459 1,118 978 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys. The treatment group is the subgroup of covered workers indicated in each column. 
The comparison group is the same as that for Tables 5: all private covered workers who were earning above the 
NMW. Control variables are: gender, ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. The marginal effect of the 
interaction terms are derived from the probit coefficient estimates and are evaluated at the sample means of the 
explanatory variables.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
 
2.5.2 Dynamic Effects: Employment Transitions of Covered Workers 
In the previous section, I found significant evidence that the Campaign led to some labourers 
moving out of the covered sector. In this part, I examine where labourers move after they lost 
their jobs because of the Campaign. Labourers who leave the private covered sector can migrate 
to another sector of the labour market (self-employment, business owner, the public sector) or 
they can change employment status (unemployment, unpaid family work, out of the workforce, 
or part-time employment in the same covered sector). 
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To track the movement of covered workers, I identify the sector or employment status 
where he/she is working in the follow-up surveys. The options for labourers are: stay in the 
private covered sector, move to self-employment or become a business owner, move to the 
public sector, become unemployed or an unpaid family worker, or leave the labour force. 
Additionally, full-time labourers in the private covered sector can also move within the same 
sector from full-time to part-time employment. 
I use a multinomial logit model to determine the difference-in-differences estimates of 
the effect of the Campaign on employment transitions. The dependent variable JAK#L%MN,' 
identifies the movement of labourer i from sector c (the private covered sector) into one of the 
other sectors/status z of the labour market. The base category for the analysis is that worker i 
stays in the private covered sector. Hence, the probability that workers i leaves the private 
covered sector c for sector/status z, conditional on reporting being in sector c in the baseline 
survey, is characterized by: 
 @A/B7JAK#L%MN,' = 19 = .OP7Q%MN,'9	/ S1 − .OP7Q%MN,'9U (2.3) 
 
where Q%MN,' = 	)MN + +,MN-."/0%,'++1MN23%,' + 4MN5' + 6,MN75' ∗ -."/0%,'9   																											+61MN75' ∗ 23%,'9 + ;′%,'=MN + >%MN,'  
 
The explanatory variables are the same as those used in the wage and employment 
equations; the vector of control variables, ;V, in this case includes age, years of education, and 
a dummy variable for ethnicity. The effects of the Campaign on the probability of moving from 
the private covered sector c into sector/status z are the “marginal effects” of the interactions of 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 and 75' ∗ 23%,'9. These marginal effects derived from logit coefficients 
estimates and are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. A positive number 
indicates that the Campaign increased the probability that a labourer who was earning below or 
at the NMW leaves his/her job and moves to sector/status z. 
Table 2.7 reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Campaign 
on employment transitions for labourers. Panel A shows the estimates for the sample of 
labourers who were working full-time in the baseline surveys. Panel B reports the estimates for 
both full-time and part-time labourers in the baseline surveys. None of the estimates of the 
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interaction term 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 are statistically different from zero for this group of workers. 
For comparison, I also ran the transition analysis for the other sub-groups of covered workers 
and, as was expected, I found that the estimates of the interaction 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 are not 
statistically different from zero (see Table 2.21 in the Appendix).  
 
Table 2.7 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the Probability 
of Leaving the Private Covered Sector for Another Sector/Status, for Labourers 
 
  
C*Below   C*At 
Marginal 
Effect  
Std. Err.   
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. Err. 
Panel A: Origin is Full-time Labourer 
Self-employed 0.078 (0.055)   0.048 (0.058) 
Public Sector -0.005 (0.009)   -0.005 (0.009) 
Unemployed 0.049 (0.055)   -0.028 (0.034) 
Not in Labour Force 0.014 (0.014)   0.01 (0.012) 
Part-time Private Covered 0.019 (0.056)   0.001 (0.055) 
N 1,034 
Panel B: Origin is Part-time or Full-time Labourer 
Self-employed 0.066 (0.049)   0.06 (0.057) 
Public Sector -0.002 (0.009)   -0.002 (0.009) 
Unemployed 0.059 (0.052)   -0.041 (0.037) 
Not in Labour Force 0.006 (0.011)   -0.003 (0.012) 
N 1,034 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys. The treatment group is the sub-group of covered workers indicated in each Panel. 
The comparison group is the same as that for Tables 5: private covered workers who were earning above the 
NMW. Control variables are: ethnicity, age and years of schooling. The marginal effect of interactions terms 
derived from the mlogit coefficient estimates and are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
Hausman-McFadden test of IIA assumption: prob > Chi-square =1 when omitting the categories of Self-employed, 
Unemployed, Not in Labour Force, and Part-time Private Covered; did not meet asymptotic assumptions of the 
test when omitting Public Sector. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
 
The significant disemployment effects for labourer (shown in Table 2.6) and the 
magnitude of the estimates in Table 2.7 suggest that the labourers who lost their jobs mainly 
moved to the uncovered self-employment sector, or they became unemployed. The transition 
of some labourers from the covered sector into the uncovered sector goes in line with the 
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prediction of the Two-Sector Model, and calls for the analysis of the effects of the Campaign 
on the earnings of (uncovered) self-employed workers. I perform this analysis in the following 
section. 
2.6 Effects on the Uncovered Sector 
In Section 2.5, I found some evidence that the Campaign reduced the likelihood of remaining 
employed in the covered sector of labourers, and that some of these workers migrated mostly 
to self-employment, or they became unemployed. In this section, I analysed the effects of the 
Campaign on the change in earnings of uncovered self-employed workers and tested the 
predictions of the Two-Sector Model. According to this model, one should expect that the 
earnings of self-employed workers will fall as result of the displacement of workers from the 
covered sector into the uncovered sector. 
  
Table 2.8 OLS Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the 
Change in Earnings of Uncovered Self-employed Workers 
 
  Full-time Workers Only  Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  All Men Women   All  Men Women 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates     
C*Below  0.018 -0.03 0.17   -0.026 -0.043 0.089 
  (0.129) (0.146) (0.301)   (0.118) (0.136) (0.250) 
C*At -0.280** -0.304** -0.177   -0.356*** -0.338** -0.287 
  (0.127) (0.141) (0.301)   (0.120) (0.136) (0.251) 
                
OLS difference-in-differences estimates with controls     
C*Below  0.01 -0.042 0.136   -0.035 -0.056 0.066 
  (0.130) (0.148) (0.301)   (0.118) (0.135) (0.250) 
C*At -0.249** -0.294** 0.007   -0.344*** -0.338** -0.192 
  (0.125) (0.138) (0.293)   (0.118) (0.135) (0.249) 
                
N 686 504 182   882 604 278 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) uncovered self-
employed workers in the follow-up surveys. The comparison group includes self-employed workers with earnings 
above the NMW. Control variables are: age, years of schooling, and industry. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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Table 2.8 reports the difference-in-difference estimates of the Campaign on the change 
in earnings of individuals who report being self-employed workers in the follow-up surveys. 
This group includes those workers who were employed in other sectors in the baseline surveys 
and report being self-employed workers in the follow-up surveys. Table 2.8 shows the OLS 
estimates of the coefficients on the interaction terms,  6, and 61, from Eq. (1) applied to the 
earnings of self-employed workers. The comparison group, in this case, are self-employed 
workers with earnings above the NMW. Table 2.8 shows the results of the earnings models for 
men, women, and for both groups. The top panel shows the raw OLS estimates (i.e. without 
controls) and the bottom panel shows the OLS estimates with controls. 
 The results in Table 2.8 reveal a significant fall in the relative earnings growth of male 
self-employed workers who were earning at the NMW during the Campaign period. This 
finding provides evidence that is in line with the predictions of the Two-Sector Model: the 
earnings of uncovered workers will fall as a consequence of the migration of workers from the 
covered to the uncovered sector. As I mentioned above, some labourers in the covered sector 
move to the uncovered self-employment sector and this might be the cause of the fall in the 
earnings growth of workers in this sector. 
2.7 Effects on Household Income and Poverty  
In Section 2.4, I found that the Campaign increased the wages of male salaried workers, 
labourers, and domestic workers. I also found (in Section 2.6) that the Campaign led to a 
reduction in labour earnings of male self-employed workers. In this section, I study the impact 
that these changes, in wages and earnings, had on household income and monetary poverty. 
Specifically, I try to answer two questions: 1) Do covered workers that were earning below the 
NMW, and their families, are less likely to be poor during the Campaign period? 2) Are 
uncovered workers, who saw their earnings decrease, and their families more likely to be poor 
during the Campaign? 
 To answer these two questions, I first compute the per-capita household income for each 
worker based on the official methodology of the INEC. Additionally, I use the official monthly 
poverty line, which equals 66.29 USD in 2009 and 71.33 USD in 2011. Second, I define 
workers in each follow-up survey that have a monthly per-capita household income below the 
poverty line as poor. Finally, I implement my difference-in-differences identification strategy 
to estimate the impact of the Campaign on poverty. 
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 The effect of the Campaign on household income and poverty may be different from its 
impact on wages of covered workers and on earnings of self-employed individuals; it will 
depend on the pattern of employment, the magnitude of the income sources, and the number of 
people within the household. High income earners may be the only workers in relatively low-
income households, while low-pay workers may be secondary family workers in relatively 
high-income households (Alaniz et al. 2011). Additionally, in households with comparable 
patterns of employment and numbers of individuals, the incidence of poverty among families 
of workers earning below the NMW will be larger than the incidence among the families of 
workers earning at or above the NMW. 
2.7.1 Impact on Covered Workers and their Families 
To obtain the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Campaign on poverty, I 
first compute the incidence of poverty in the follow-up surveys during the pre-Campaign and 
Campaign periods for covered workers earning below, at, and above the NMW in the baseline 
surveys. Table 2.9 shows these statistics. The Table shows that while the incidence of poverty 
among covered workers who were earning above the NMW remains constant (at around 7-8%), 
during the pre-Campaign and Campaign periods, the incidence of poverty among covered 
workers who were earning below the NMW reduces in around 8 p.p., from 17-19% in the pre-
Campaign period to 9-11% during the Campaign period. At the bottom of the Table, I report 
the difference-in-difference estimates. The estimates are positive and statistically significant (at 
the 5% level). They suggest that the increase in wages of those earning below the NMW, due 
to the Campaign, reduced the probability that their households are poor by around 7-8 p.p.  
In Table 2.10, I report the difference-in-difference estimates of the Campaign 
implemented via OLS regression and via a probit model with controls. The probit model is 
described as: 
 @A/B(@//A%,' = 1) = 	ΦH) + +,-."/0%,'++123%,' + 45' + 6,75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 
(2.4) 					+6175' ∗ 23%,'9 + ;′%,'= + >%,'I 
 
where the binary response variable @//A%,' = 1 if the worker's household is poor in the follow-
up survey and 0 if non poor in the follow-up survey, for each period t (pre-Campaign and 
Campaign).  
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Table 2.9 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the Probability 
that a Covered Worker's Household is Poor in t+1 
 
A. Pre-Campaign Period  
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time 
Workers 
  Obs. Percentage 
(June 2009) 
  Obs. Percentage 
(June 2009) Covered Workers in June 2008:         
Below the NMW 281 17.1   352 18.8 
  (2.2)     (2.1) 
At the NMW 368 8.2   418 9.8 
  (1.4)     (1.5) 
Above the NMW 286 7.7   316 7.6 
  (1.6)     (1.5) 
Difference: Below – Above   9.4***     11.2*** 
    (2.7)     (2.6) 
Difference: At – Above   0.5     2.2 
    (2.1)     (2.1) 
            
B. Campaign Period  
  Obs. Percentage 
(June 2011) 
  Obs. Percentage 
(June 2011) Covered Workers in June 2010:         
Below the NMW 247 9.3   321 11.2 
  (1.9)     (1.8) 
At the NMW 450 6.9   493 7.3 
  (1.2)     (1.2) 
Above the NMW 295 7.1   314 7.6 
  (1.5)     (1.5) 
Difference: Below – Above   2.2     3.6 
    (2.4)     (2.3) 
Difference: At – Above   -0.2     -0.3 
    (1.9)     (1.9) 
            
Difference-in-Difference (Below-Above) -7.2**     -7.6** 
    (3.4)     (3.3) 
Difference-in-Difference (At-Above) -0.7     -2.6 
    (3.1)     (3.1) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered workers in 
the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up surveys. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.   
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 The explanatory variables are the same as those in the wage equation and Φ is the probit 
transformation. As in the wage equation, workers with wages above the NMW in the baseline 
surveys are considered the comparison group. The vector of control variables, 	;′%,', of each 
worker i include gender, ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry, reported in the baseline 
survey for each period t. The coefficient on the interaction terms captures the effect of the 
Campaign. Specifically, the probability difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the 
Campaign are the marginal effects of the interactions 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 and 75' ∗ 23%,'9 derived 
from the probit coefficient estimates and evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
Table 2.10 OLS and Probit Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign 
on the Probability that a Covered Worker's Household is Poor in t+1 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time 
Workers   OLS Probit   OLS Probit 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Campaign*Below  -0.072** -0.059*   -0.076**  -0.068**  
(0.036) (0.031)   (0.035) (0.030) 
Campaign*At -0.007 0.002   -0.026 -0.013 
(0.029) (0.025)   (0.028) (0.025) 
Individual controls   Yes     Yes 
N 1,927 1,927   2,214 2,214 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up 
surveys. Control variables are: gender, ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. The marginal effect of 
interaction terms derived from the probit coefficient estimate and are evaluated at the sample means of the 
explanatory variables. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
 
 On Table 2.10, columns two and four show the difference-in-differences estimates of 
the probit model with controls. For comparison, Columns 1 and 3 report the raw (i.e., without 
control variables) OLS difference-in-differences estimates. Table 2.10 shows the results for 
full-time workers only, and for both full-time and part-time workers. All marginal effects of the 
interactions 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 are positive and significantly different from zero. These results 
support the findings in Table 2.9. 
 Table 2.11 reports estimates of the impact of the Campaign for covered workers 
classified into heads and non-heads of households by gender. In the Appendix, I also show the 
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estimates for workers classified the same way as in Table 2.4: salaried men, salaried women, 
labourers, and domestic workers (see Table A11). In both tables, the comparison group is the 
same as that in Table 2.10: private covered workers who were earning above the NMW in the 
baseline surveys. The first block of Table 2.11 shows the raw OLS difference-in-differences 
estimates. The second block presents the probit difference-in-differences estimates, which are 
the marginal effects of the interactions 75' ∗ -."/0%,'9 and 75' ∗ 23%,'9. These estimates are 
probability difference-in-differences and can be interpreted as the effect of the Campaign on 
the probability that a worker’s household is poor. 
 
Table 2.11 OLS and Probit Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign 
on Poverty for Different Groups of Private Covered Workers 
 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  
Heads of 
Household 
  
Non-Heads of 
Household 
  
Heads of 
Household 
  
Non-Heads of 
Household 
  Male Female   Male  Female   Male Female   Male  Female 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates 
C*Below  -0.066 -0.041   -0.108* -0.034   -0.079 -0.031   -0.107** -0.047 
  (0.068) (0.095)   (0.057) (0.039)   (0.063) (0.082)   (0.054) (0.040) 
C*At -0.007 0.046   -0.027 0.008   -0.037 0.002   -0.036 0.000 
  (0.051) (0.067)   (0.034) (0.029)   (0.051) (0.065)   (0.034) (0.029) 
                        
Probit difference-in-differences estimates with controls 
C*Below  -0.04 -0.07   -0.095** -0.071   -0.063 -0.063   -0.098** -0.077 
  (0.053) (0.137)   (0.047) (0.051)   (0.053) (0.112)   (0.046) (0.049) 
C*At 0.000 0.018   -0.014 0.01   -0.026 -0.03   -0.018 0.002 
  (0.043) (0.129)   (0.029) (0.031)   (0.045) (0.106)   (0.029) (0.033) 
                        
N 1,001 694   1,003 972   1,111 770   1,127 1,096 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up 
surveys. The treatment group is the subgroup of covered workers indicated in each column. The comparison group 
is the same as that in Table 10 (covered workers with wages above the NMW). Control variables are: gender, 
ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. The marginal effect of interaction terms derived from the probit 
coefficient estimate and are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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 The results in Table 2.11, and in Table 2.23 (in the Appendix), show that the Campaign 
reduced the incidence of poverty among male covered workers (salaried and labourers) and 
their families. Table 2.11 reveals that this effect takes place among male non-head of 
households. For this group, the effect of the Campaign on poverty is around 10-11 p.p. Most 
men within this group are the sons of working heads of household. This result suggests that the 
increase in wages of male covered workers (due to the Campaign) helped to reduce the 
incidence of poverty among families in which the low-pay covered worker is the secondary 
family worker. It is also interesting to note that while I found an increase in wages among 
domestic workers, this increase does not have a significant effect on reducing the incidence of 
poverty among female heads (and non-heads) of household. 
 There is a reduction in the incidence of poverty among households with a male 
secondary wage earner. However, does this mean that poor households transitioned out of 
poverty? Unfortunately, there is not a high enough number of observations to estimate the 
impact of the Campaign on the probability that a poor household in the baseline survey will 
become non-poor in the follow-up survey. The sample size for the estimation of the impact on 
poverty for male non-heads of households is 1003 workers (see Column 4 of Table 2.11). Out 
of this total, 76 workers are poor in the follow-up surveys and 72 are poor in the baseline 
surveys. For the analysis of the transition out of poverty, our sample will restrict to the 72 poor 
workers in the baseline surveys. With this small sample size, the number of observations in 
each cell for the implementation of my difference-in-difference strategy is far less than 25, with 
some cells with zero observations.  
2.7.2 Impact on Uncovered Workers and their Families 
In Section 2.6, I found that the Campaign led to a reduction in labour earnings of male self-
employed workers that were earning at the NMW. The questions that follows are: Do these 
workers and their families became more likely to be poor as consequence of the Campaign? 
Table 2.12 show the OLS and Probit difference-in-difference estimates of the Campaign for 
self-employed workers. I show the estimates for all self-employed workers, and for self-
employed workers classified by gender. None of the estimates are significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels. Although there is a reduction in wages among male self-employed 
workers, the fact that this effect takes place among those that were earning at the NMW makes 
the impact on poverty not significant because these workers and their families are less likely to 
be below the poverty line.  
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Table 2.12 OLS and Probit Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign 
on the Probability that an Uncovered Worker's Household is Poor in t+1 
 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  All Men Women   All  Men Women 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates     
C*Below  -0.079 -0.137 0.017   -0.029 -0.129 0.133 
  (0.072) (0.088) (0.126)   (0.063) (0.081) (0.097) 
C*At 0.07 0.117 -0.053   0.083 0.09 0.075 
  (0.075) (0.092) (0.128)   (0.066) (0.084) (0.103) 
                
Probit difference-in-differences estimates with controls     
C*Below  -0.066 -0.125 -0.01   -0.022 -0.121 0.119 
  (0.071) (0.088) (0.115)   (0.062) (0.080) (0.090) 
C*At 0.062 0.109 -0.091   0.076 0.084 0.049 
  (0.073) (0.088) (0.127)   (0.064) (0.081) (0.099) 
                
N 686 504 182   882 604 278 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) uncovered self-
employed workers in the follow-up surveys. The treatment group is the subgroup of covered workers indicated in 
each column. The comparison group are self-employed workers with earnings above the NMW. Control variables 
are: age, years of schooling, and industry.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
2.8 Conclusions 
During the years of 2010 and 2011, the Ecuadorian government campaigned to increase 
compliance with the NMW legislation. To evaluate the effects of the Campaign period, I used 
a difference-in-difference identification strategy. With this approach, I compared what 
happened to the wage growth, the change in employment, and the incidence of poverty of 
covered workers who were earning below the NMW on the one hand, and covered workers who 
were earning above the NMW on the other hand, during the pre-Campaign and Campaign 
periods. I use two panel data sets of workers. The first panel has information of workers for the 
pre-Campaign period, June of 2008 and June of 2009, and the second panel has information 
from workers for the Campaign period, June months of 2010 and 2011. 
 The evidence for men falls into line with the theoretical predictions of the Two-Sector 
Model. I found that the Campaign increased by approximately 12 p.p. to 16 p.p. the wages of 
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male covered workers (salaried and labourers) who were earning below the NMW and remain 
employed in the covered sector. This increase in wages lead to a reduction in the probability of 
being poor for this group of workers and their families. This impact on monetary poverty takes 
places particularly in families where the low-paid covered workers are the secondary workers 
in the household. 
 In terms of employment, the results suggest that the Campaign reduced the probability 
that labourers remain employed in the private covered sector. Specifically, I found that the 
relative probability of remaining employed in the covered sector for labourers who were earning 
below the NMW was approximately 15 p.p. lower during the Campaign period, compared to 
the pre-Campaign period. Additionally, the analyses of employment transitions suggest that 
most of the labourers who lost their jobs in the covered sector moved to the uncovered self-
employed sector, and others became unemployed.  
 As predicted by the Two-sector Model, I also found that the Campaign led to a fall in 
the earnings of uncovered self-employed workers. My results show that the relative earnings 
growth of male self-employed workers who were earning at the NMW decreased by 
approximately 27 p.p. during the Campaign period, compared to the relative earnings growth 
during the pre-Campaign period. Some labourers moved to the uncovered self-employment 
sector, which increased the labour supply in this sector and may have caused the fall in the 
earnings of male self-employed workers who were earning around the NMW. Despite this fall 
in earnings, I did not find that the Campaign led to a significant increase in the probability of 
being poor for this group of workers and their families. This may be explained by the fact that 
the increase in labour supply reduced the earnings of self-employed workers who were earning 
at the NMW and these individuals are less likely to be poor than those with earnings that are 
far below the NMW. 
 The results regarding domestic workers indicate that the Campaign increased by 
approximately 16 p.p. the wages of workers who remained in full-time employment. This effect 
implies that the Decent Domestic Work Campaign has effectively increased compliance with 
the NMW. However, in terms of poverty reduction, this increase in wages has not reduced 
significantly the incidence of poverty among domestic workers and among female covered 
workers in general. The results also show (weak) evidence that the Campaign led to some 
domestic workers moving from full-time to part-time employment. This transition is a novel 
result and suggests that some domestic workers’ employers started to comply with the NMW 
law on a part-time basis. 
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Finally, I do not find a significant effect on wages of salaried women who were earning 
sub-minimum wages. This implies that the Campaign has not increased compliance with the 
NMW among this group of workers. Considering that almost half of salaried women with sub-
minimum wages work in commerce, the Ministry of Labour can design a special campaign 
targeting women in this industry if its objective is to increase compliance with the NMW. 
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Appendix 
Table 2.13 Compliance with the Affiliation to the IESS and Noncompliance with the NMW 
for Full-time Private Covered Workers, in Urban and Rural Areas, December 2007 – 
December 2014 
  Urban Areas   Urban and Rural Areas 
  All  Male 
Sala-
ried  
Female 
Sala-
ried  
Labou-
rer 
Domes-
tic 
Workerb 
  All  Male 
Sala-
ried  
Female 
Sala-
ried  
Labou-
rer 
Domes-
tic 
Workerb 
A Compliance with the IESS: % of employees affiliated to the IESS by their employers   
Jun-07a 42.8 37.8 43.7 0.5 10.4             
Dec-07 41.4 36.1 41.8 1.8 12.5   34.0 33.5 39.5 2.1 11.7 
Jun-08 43.8 40.6 44.1 2.0 11.4   36.5 37.7 41.2 2.1 10.6 
Dec-08 43.7 40.5 44.7 3.6 13.1   36.0 38.3 42.3 3.9 11.5 
Jun-09a 47.8 45.7 49.0 1.3 17.3             
Dec-09 48.0 46.9 50.0 2.1 16.6   39.9 44.1 46.5 2.1 14.4 
Jun-10 52.7 49.8 54.8 3.7 23.2   43.7 47.8 52.6 2.4 20.4 
Dec-10 54.3 53.3 57.8 1.9 22.3   45.2 50.6 54.5 2.1 19.7 
Jun-11 58.4 56.0 61.7 2.3 34.3   49.6 54.2 59.0 3.1 31.0 
Dec-11 62.2 61.8 66.3 5.4 33.9   53.3 59.8 63.5 4.4 31.6 
Jun-12 62.6 62.8 67.5 4.0 37.8   53.7 61.3 65.0 3.8 35.9 
Dec-12 64.6 64.9 70.0 5.8 27.8   54.7 62.9 66.7 4.1 27.7 
Jun-13 66.2 66.5 70.8 2.0 42.8   56.4 64.7 67.9 2.3 39.4 
Dec-13 62.8 64.4 68.0 2.6 34.9   54.5 63.2 65.6 2.3 32.5 
Jun-14 67.3 68.4 72.8 3.6 47.8   57.9 66.5 69.9 3.4 43.7 
Dec-14 64.3 67.1 67.7 2.9 41.3   58.2 67.2 66.0 2.9 44.3 
                        
B Noncompliance with the NMW: % of (full-time) employees earning less than the 95% of the NMW 
Jun-07a 27.0 21.7 33.0 50.3 84.5             
Dec-07 26.4 22.3 32.1 47.0 72.1   33.5 24.8 36.0 61.7 74.0 
Jun-08 27.5 24.0 35.0 47.3 79.5   33.7 26.2 39.9 59.3 81.3 
Dec-08 23.4 18.6 30.7 40.7 71.4   31.0 21.2 34.2 58.1 73.2 
Jun-09a 31.5 29.1 39.2 54.7 85.3             
Dec-09 29.2 25.7 32.9 52.5 80.7   37.0 28.6 37.1 67.5 83.1 
Jun-10 22.8 21.4 25.8 43.7 66.1   30.6 23.2 29.0 61.3 69.7 
Dec-10 22.0 19.5 26.2 45.5 61.9   28.7 21.7 29.6 58.0 64.0 
Jun-11 25.6 25.2 30.7 52.6 63.2   33.3 27.6 34.2 67.7 66.1 
Dec-11 22.3 21.1 25.9 51.4 65.4   29.6 23.1 28.8 66.7 68.0 
Jun-12 21.1 18.9 24.4 48.2 54.0   27.4 21.1 26.1 61.0 56.0 
Dec-12 16.7 13.9 19.7 39.0 56.7   24.0 15.8 22.1 57.5 60.0 
Jun-13 28.2 28.4 34.7 57.6 75.9   34.9 30.3 37.5 69.7 76.3 
Dec-13 25.0 24.0 29.4 49.4 68.0   30.6 25.6 31.9 61.9 69.1 
Jun-14 25.9 26.1 31.0 55.8 59.3   31.4 27.8 32.4 66.9 60.6 
Dec-14 26.9 25.2 35.1 52.1 66.0   30.9 26.7 36.8 60.6 63.1 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU 2007-2014. 
a The ENEMDU survey of June 2009 covers urban areas only. 
b Although the minimum wage for domestic workers before 2010 was lower than the NMW, I use the value of 
the NMW in all years to compute noncompliance with the NMW for this group of workers.   
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Table 2.14 Labour Force in Ecuador, by sector June 2008 - June 2011 
 
  Urban Areas   Urban and Rural Areas 
Sector Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11   Jun-08 Jun-09a Jun-10 Jun-11 
Private Covered Sector 46.0 44.8 44.7 44.6   42.9   42.5 41.8 
Uncovered Self-
employed Sector 
24.8 25.7 27.4 28.4   27.7   29.5 31.0 
Business Owners  5.5 4.7 4.4 3.7   5.0   4.1 3.5 
Covered Public Sector 10.3 10.3 11.4 11.9   8.0   8.8 9.3 
Unpaid Family Workers 7.0 6.0 4.5 5.0   11.3   8.9 9.4 
Unemployment 6.4 8.4 7.7 6.4   5.2   6.2 5.0 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0   100.0 100.0 
Total Labour Force (in 
million) 
4.43 4.52 4.41 4.38   6.59   6.58 6.55 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU June 2008- June 2011. 
a The ENEMDU survey of June 2009 covers urban areas only 
 
 
Table 2.15 Workers in the Private Covered Sector, by subgroup June 2008 - June 2011 
 
  Urban Areas   Urban and Rural Areas 
Subgroup Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11   Jun-08 Jun-09a 
Jun-
10 
Jun-11 
Salaried Men 50.5 50.2 48.4 50.1   43.4   40.8 42.6 
Salaried Women 27.6 27.9 29.0 28.8   23.2   23.4 23.5 
Labourers 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.2   26.0   28.3 27.1 
Domestic Workers 8.2 8.1 8.7 7.9   7.3   7.6 6.8 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0   100.0 100.0 
Total Workers 
(in million) 
2.04 2.03 1.97 1.95   2.82   2.80 2.74 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU June 2008- June 2011. 
a The ENEMDU survey of June 2009 covers urban areas only. 
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Figure 2.4 Kernel Density Estimates of the Distribution of Wages (Earnings) of Full-time 
Private Sector Employees, and of Full-time Self-employed Workers, June 2008 - June 2011 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU June 2008-June 2011  
Note: for the density estimation the Epanechnikov kernel is used as the kernel function and the bandwidth is 
given by the “rule-of-thumb” proposed by Silverman (1986). The vertical line corresponding to the log of the 
NMW in each year. 
 
Figure 2.5 Components of the Campaign illustrated in a Ministry of Labour brochure 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour 2011. 
Note: a) A labour inpection taking place. b) Cars of the Ministry of Labour. C) The branch of the 
Ministry of Labour in the City of Manta before the Campaign (left) and after the Campaign (right). 
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Table 2.16 Number of Labour Inspectors in each provincial branch of the Ministry of Labour, 
by year 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Azuay 5 8 8 12 16 26 27 30 20 
Bolivar 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 
Cañar 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 
Carchi 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 2 
Cotopaxi 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 4 
Chimborazo 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 5 
El Oro 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 14 12 
Esmeraldas 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 3 4 
Guayas 0 0 0 0 12 59 51 46 35 
Imbabura 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 8 5 
Loja 0 0 0 0 0 5 12 9 8 
Los Rios 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 3 
Manabí 0 0 0 0 0 14 25 20 18 
Morona Santiago 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 
Napo 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 
Pastaza 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 2 
Pichincha 0 0 14 14 7 57 70 70 54 
Tungurahua 0 0 4 4 3 13 10 9 9 
Zamora Chinchipe 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Galapagos 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 
Sucumbíos 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 3 2 
Orellana 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 4 5 
Santo Domingo 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 6 7 
Santa Elena 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 
Regional Secretariat  0 0 15 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Regional Secretariat - 
Coast 
0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Not specified  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 10 13 48 55 46 240 269 260 213 
 Source: Administrative records of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Labour, 2015. 
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Table 2.17 National Survey of Employment and Unemployment (ENEMDU), 2-2-2 rotation 
process from June 2007 to September 2015. 
 
ENEMDU Survey Round 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Jun-07 Sep-07 Dic-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Dic-08 Mar-09 Jun-09 
O0 S0 S0 W0 W0 S0 S0 W0 W0 
P0 T0 T0 X0 X0 T0 T0 X0 X0 
Q0 Q0 U0 U0 Y0 Q0 U0 U0 Y0 
R0 R0 V0 V0 Z0 R0 V0 V0 Z0 
                  
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
  Sep-09 Dic-09 Mar-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Dic-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 
  S2 S2 W2 W2 S2 S2 W2 W2 
  T2 T2 X2 X2 T2 T2 X2 X2 
  Y0 U2 U2 Y2 Y0 U2 U2 Y2 
  Z0 V2 V2 Z2 Z0 V2 V2 Z2 
                  
  33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
  M39 M42 M45 M48 M51 M54 M57 M60 
  Sep-11 Dic-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dic-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 
  S4 S4 W5 W5 S4 S4 W5 W5 
  T4 T4 X4 X4 T4 T4 X4 X4 
  Y2 U4 U4 Y4 Y2 U4 U4 Y4 
  Z2 V4 V4 Z4 Z2 V4 V4 Z4 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). 
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Table 2.18 Comparison of Distribution of Working-Age Population across Sectors between 
the Complete ENEMDU and the Baseline Surveys of the Panel Data Sets 
 
  Jun-08   Jun-10 
Labour Sector (or employment 
status) 
Complete 
ENENDU 
Baseline 
Survey of 
Panel 1 
  
Complete 
ENENDU 
Baseline 
Survey of 
Panel 2 
Private Covered Sector 32.2 30.2   27.6 27.9 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector 17.4 18.6   18.6 19.5 
Business Owners (Patronos) 4.3 4.3   2.9 3.2 
Public Sector 7.8 7.8   9.0 8.2 
Unpaid Family Workers 5.3 5.6   3.6 3.4 
Unemployment 4.4 4.1   5.0 4.7 
Not in Labour Force 28.6 29.4   33.4 33.1 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 
Total individuals aged 15 to 70 17,398 11,144   29,325 10,974 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU-June 2010 and its sub-sample panel data set in June 2010. 
Sample includes all individuals aged 15 to 70 years living in urban areas. 
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Table 2.19 Descriptive Statistics for Uncovered Self-employed Workers with Earnings 
Below, At, and Above the NMW in June 2010 
 
  Full-time Workers Only   
Both Full-time and Part-
time workers 
Characteristics (% in each 
category) 
Below 
the 
NMW 
At the 
NMW 
Above 
the 
NMW 
  Below 
the 
NMW 
At the 
NMW 
Above 
the 
NMW 
Gender               
Male 71.5 62.9 79.1   63.5 58.1 74.1 
Female 28.5 37.1 20.9   36.5 41.9 25.9 
Ethnicity               
Mestizo / White / others 93.9 93.3 89.9   94.4 94.0 91.4 
Indigenous / Afro 6.1 6.7 10.1   5.6 6.0 8.6 
Age               
15-24 3.9 2.2 2.2   4.8 2.6 2.9 
25-34 16.2 16.9 18.7   15.3 16.2 20.1 
35-44 29.6 20.2 28.1   26.5 25.6 27.0 
45-54 25.7 28.1 23.0   25.7 26.5 25.9 
54-64 19.6 23.6 19.4   22.5 22.2 17.2 
65+ 5.0 9.0 8.6   5.2 6.8 6.9 
Education               
Primary (1–6years)  37.4 43.8 41.7   39.4 40.2 36.2 
Secondary (7–12years)  44.7 38.2 47.5   43.8 38.5 48.3 
University (13–21 years)  17.9 18.0 10.8   16.9 21.4 15.5 
Industry                
Agriculture  2.8 3.4 4.3   2.8 3.4 3.4 
Manufacturing  14.0 11.2 11.5   14.1 10.3 12.1 
Service  3.9 9.0 2.2   6.8 9.4 6.3 
Construction  7.8 5.6 9.4   8.0 6.0 8.6 
Commerce  47.5 44.9 45.3   49.0 47.0 43.7 
Transportation  16.8 21.3 23.0   12.9 18.8 21.3 
Finance  7.3 4.5 4.3   6.4 5.1 4.6 
                
Number of Observations 179 89 139   249 117 174 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data set June2010-June2011. The sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 15-70 who reported being self-employed workers in June 2010. 
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Table 2.20 OLS Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on Wage 
Growth of Fulltime Covered Workers in Baseline Surveys Who Report Being Full-time or 
Part-time Covered Workers in Follow-up Surveys, by groups 
 
  
For Fulltime Workers in Baseline Surveys Who Report Being Full-time or Part-
time Workers in Follow-up Surveys 
  Salaried Men Salaried Women Labourer Domestic Worker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates 
C*Below  0.092* -0.038 0.094 0.009 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.076) (0.082) 
C*At 0.059 0.07 0.118* 0.146* 
  (0.037) (0.047) (0.064) (0.077) 
          
OLS difference-in-differences estimates with controls 
C*Below  0.092* -0.024 0.115 0.018 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.078) (0.080) 
C*At 0.048 0.068 0.126** 0.140* 
  (0.036) (0.046) (0.062) (0.076) 
          
N 1,288 1,041 825 732 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to full-time private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys who report being full-time or part-time private covered workers in the follow-up 
surveys. The treatment group is the subgroup of covered workers indicated in each column. The comparison group 
is the same as that for Table 3 (covered workers with wages above the NMW). 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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Table 2.21 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the 
Probability of Leaving the Private Covered Sector for Another Sector/Status, for Different 
Groups of Private Covered Workers 
ç Full-time Workers Only 
  C*Below   C*At 
Marginal 
Effect  
Std. Err.   Marginal 
Effect  
Std. Err. 
Panel A: Origin is Salaried Men           
Self-employed -0.033 (0.039)   -0.03 (0.031) 
Public 0.014 (0.018)   -0.023* (0.014) 
Unemployed 0.033 (0.031)   0.006 (0.022) 
Not in Labour Force 0.011 (0.022)   0.025 (0.018) 
Part-time Private Covered 0.026 (0.028)   0.003 (0.018) 
N 1,635 
Panel B: Origin is Salaried Women           
Self-employed 0.008 (0.037)   -0.002 (0.028) 
Public -0.012 (0.012)   -0.014 (0.017) 
Unemployed -0.045 (0.031)   -0.01 (0.029) 
Not in Labour Force 0 (0.038)   0.054 (0.033) 
Part-time Private Covered 0.038 (0.040)   0.037**  (0.019) 
N 1,331 
Panel C: Origin is Labourer           
Self-employed 0.078 (0.055)   0.048 (0.058) 
Public -0.005 (0.009)   -0.005 (0.009) 
Unemployed 0.049 (0.055)   -0.028 (0.034) 
Not in Labour Force 0.014 (0.014)   0.01 (0.012) 
Part-time Private Covered 0.019 (0.056)   0.001 (0.055) 
N 1,034 
Panel D: Origin is Domestic Worker            
Self-employed -0.024 (0.061)   0.007 (0.040) 
Public -0.005 (0.010)   -0.005 (0.010) 
Unemployed -0.008 (0.040)   -0.031 (0.032) 
Not in Labour Force 0.075 (0.062)   -0.07 (0.079) 
Part-time Private Covered 0.1 (0.085)   -0.002 (0.072) 
N 915 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to full-time private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys. The treatment group is the sub-group of covered workers indicated in each Panel. 
The comparison group is the same as that for Tables 5: private covered workers who were earning above the 
NMW. The marginal effect of interactions terms derived from the mlogit coefficient estimates and are evaluated 
at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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Table 2.22 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign on the 
Probability of Subsequent Employment for Self-employed Uncovered Workers 
 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  All Men Women   All  Men Women 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates         
C*Below  0.065 0.012 0.207   -0.061 -0.072 -0.014 
  (0.087) (0.105) (0.166)   (0.071) (0.089) (0.123) 
C*At 0.002 -0.012 0.092   -0.028 -0.01 -0.034 
  (0.096) (0.112) (0.177)   (0.079) (0.099) (0.135) 
                
Probit difference-in-differences estimates with controls     
C*Below  0.057 -0.01 0.233   -0.084 -0.108 -0.02 
  (0.088) (0.106) (0.168)   (0.072) (0.090) (0.124) 
C*At 0.002 -0.024 0.151   -0.035 -0.038 0.006 
  (0.096) (0.113) (0.182)   (0.081) (0.101) (0.135) 
                
N 734 511 223   1,009 650 359 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) self-employed 
workers in the baseline surveys. The treatment group is the group of self-employed workers indicated in each 
column. The comparison group are self-employed workers who were earning above the NMW. Control variables 
are: age, years of schooling, and industry. The marginal effect of interactions terms derived from the probit 
coefficient estimates and are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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Table 2.23 OLS and Probit Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the Campaign 
on Poverty for Different Groups of Private Covered Workers 
 
  Full-time Workers Only   Both Full-time and Part-time Workers 
  
Salarie
d Men 
Salaried 
Women 
Labourer 
Domestic 
Worker 
  
Salaried 
Men 
Salaried 
Women 
Labourer 
Domestic 
Worker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Raw OLS difference-in-differences estimates 
C*Below  -0.088* -0.042 -0.078 -0.009   -0.078 -0.042 -0.119 -0.036 
  (0.049) (0.045) (0.099) (0.064)   (0.049) (0.043) (0.083) (0.072) 
C*At 0.014 0.031 -0.101 -0.074   0 0.011 -0.144* -0.065 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.077) (0.059)   (0.034) (0.032) (0.076) (0.049) 
                    
Probit difference-in-differences estimates with controls 
C*Below  -0.071* -0.075 -0.066 -0.03   -0.063 -0.069 -0.097* -0.049 
  (0.041) (0.057) (0.064) (0.113)   (0.042) (0.052) (0.058) (0.091) 
C*At 0.018 0.041 -0.051 0   0.01 0.015 -0.088* 0 
  (0.030) (0.038) (0.046) (.)   (0.030) (0.040) (0.052) (.) 
                    
N 1,228 981 772 689   1,364 1,104 874 762 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDU panel data sets: June 2008-June 2009 and June2010-June2011. 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample is restricted to (full-time) private covered 
workers in the baseline surveys who remain employed as (full-time) private covered workers in the follow-up 
surveys. The treatment group is the subgroup of covered workers indicated in each column. The comparison group 
is the same as that for Table 10 (covered workers with wages above the NMW). Control variables are: gender, 
ethnicity, age, years of schooling, and industry. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.  
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3 The Impact of the National Minimum Wage Policy on Wage 
Inequality in Ecuador 
3.1 Introduction  
Minimum wage laws have been an effective policy tool in shaping the distribution of wages in 
developed countries. Research into the cases in the US, UK and Canada shows that the 
introduction, or increase (in real terms) in the value, of a binding minimum wage significantly 
reduced wage dispersion (see (Card and Krueger 1994b) for the US; Dickens et al. 1999 for the 
UK; Fortin and Lemieux 2000 for Canada) or, alternatively, that the fall in the real value of the 
minimum wage increased wage inequality (see DiNardo et al. 1996 and Lee 1999 for the US;  
Machin and Manning 1994 for the UK). In developing countries, however, such a direct 
relationship between changes in the minimum wage and wage dispersion has not been evident. 
For example, in the case of Honduras (Gindling and Terrell 2009), Uruguay (Borraz and 
Pampillon 2011) and Thailand (Leckcivilize 2015), researchers have found that increases in the 
real value of the minimum wage have not compressed the wage distribution among covered 
workers because of a lack of compliance with the law.  
 In this paper, I analyse the distributional effects of increases in both of these components 
of the national minimum wage (NMW) policy in the case of Ecuador: the level of the minimum 
wage and the intensity of enforcement of the law. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is 
the first attempt to evaluate the compression effect of the minimum wage policy when there is 
an increase not only in the level of the minimum wage but also in the intensity of enforcement 
of the labour law. The contribution of this paper is relevant considering that the increase in the 
other component of the NMW policy of Ecuador resulted in a significant improvement in 
compliance with the law. This case is important since the problem of noncompliance with the 
minimum wage is widespread in developing countries (Marshall 2007; Rani et al. 2013). 
 To estimate the effect that the changes in both components of the NMW policy had on 
wage dispersion during the period 2000 – 2016, I use the methodology proposed by Lee (1999). 
Lee (1999) exploits the state-variation in the effective minimum wage, which is defined as the 
difference between the statutory minimum wage and the median wage in each state, to identify 
the impact of changes in the level of the minimum wage in the US. In order to account for the 
changes in noncompliance with the law, and to capture the improvements that took place in 
Ecuador in 2011, under an enforcement campaign, I adjust Lee's (1999) measure of the effective 
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minimum wage of each province by the level of noncompliance in that province. I implement 
this adjustment based on the definition of the Kaitz index (Kaitz 1970). This adjustment is a 
contribution to the empirical literature for the future implementation of Lee's (1999) method to 
countries with high noncompliance.     
 The results suggest that the NMW policy has indeed compressed the wage distribution 
in Ecuador. Specifically, I found that the steady increase in the real value of NMW through the 
period 2000 to 2016, and the increase in the enforcement of the NMW law since 2011, increased 
the wages of workers located up through the 60th percentile, although the magnitude of the 
impact decreases as one moves upwards in the wage distribution. Based on a counterfactual 
analysis, I also find that these changes in the NMW policy explain around a half of the decline 
in wage inequality that took place between 2000 and 2016. 
 One limitation of the methodology used, and hence the results obtained, is that it ignores 
the potential negative effects that changes in NMW policies can have on employment levels. 
This prediction is exactly what I found in a previous study where the results show that the 
increases in both the value of the NMW and in the intensity of enforcement of the law lead to 
employment losses in the covered sector (Guzman 2017). By restricting the analysis to all 
salaried workers with nonzero (or negative) wages, I do not include unemployed workers and 
those who migrated from the covered sector to the uncovered self-employment sector, as 
consequence of the changes in the NMW policy.   
 This study focused exclusively on the direct effects that changes in the NMW policy 
have on the distribution of wages among covered workers. In Ecuador, the NMW law covers 
all employees in the economy, regardless of the sector in which they work, e.g. the formal or 
informal sector. Hence, both employees in small establishments (with less than five or ten 
workers) and in unregistered firms, regarded as informal enterprises by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO 2002), are covered by the NMW law. The workers that are not covered by 
the NMW law are the self-employed and business owners, because they cannot be forced to 
pay themselves the NMW. 
 The reminder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents a brief review of 
the theoretical approaches and empirical literature concerning the impact of minimum wage 
policies on wage inequality. Section 3.3 provides a background to the NMW policy in Ecuador. 
Section 3.4 describes and discusses the data. Section 3.5 describes the empirical strategy, while 
the regression results are presented in Section 3.6. In section 3.7 a counterfactual analysis is 
performed. Section 3.8 concludes.  
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3.2 Related literature 
The effects of the minimum wage policy in developing countries is usually analysed using two-
sector models where workers are classified into the covered and uncovered sector. For covered 
workers, the models predict that a binding minimum wage will compress the wage distribution, 
albeit with the risk of employment losses under a competitive market setting, and with no 
disemployment effects under an imperfectly competitive labour market (Freeman 1996). In 
both scenarios, the models assume perfect enforcement, and by implication, complete 
compliance with the minimum wage in the covered sector. This assumption is at odds with a 
growing body of empirical evidence, especially in developing countries (see Marshall 2007; 
Rani et al. 2013, for a review). Despite this problem, most empirical studies have focused solely 
on measuring the effect on the labour market of changes in the value of the minimum wage (see 
Maloney and Mendez 2004; Neumark and Wascher 2008, for a literature review).   
 Some studies that focus on the distributional effects, in particular, suggest that the 
problem of noncompliance is the reason why the minimum wage policy has not been an 
effective redistribution tool. For example, Gindling and Terrell (2009), for the case of 
Honduras, and Leckcivilize (2015), for Thailand, find that the minimum wage affects only the 
wage distribution of workers in large firms, and that this policy has no effect in the small scale 
private sector because of noncompliance. Similarly, Borraz and Pampillon (2011), for the case 
of Uruguay, find that the increase in the real value of the minimum wage after 2004 had no 
impact on wage inequality because of a lack of compliance with the law.  
 Basu et al. (2010) observe that the problem of noncompliance is the reason why the 
theoretical predictions of the standard models have not been replicated in practice, especially 
in developing countries. The authors relax the assumption of perfect enforcement and develop 
a theoretical model of the minimum wage policy, under an imperfectly competitive labour 
market. They predict that an increase in the intensity of enforcement will increase the wages of 
workers whose employers start to comply with the minimum wage law.  
 If there are increases in both components of the minimum wage policy: in the level of 
the minimum wage and in the intensity of its enforcement, one will expect that these changes 
will increase wages of workers in the lower tail of the wage distribution to exactly the new 
wage floor. Assuming that workers earning above the minimum wage are not affected by the 
changes in the minimum wage, i.e. no spillover effects, the increase in wages for those who 
were earning below the minimum will result in a compression of the wage distribution (the 
“censoring” effect hypothesis). Alternatively, the compression effect of the changes in the 
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minimum wage policy will be weaker if the value of the minimum acts as an index and wages 
above the minimum are set as multiples of the minimum wage. Even under this scenario, 
however, as long as the spillover effects gradually diminish as one moves upwards in the wage 
distribution, the minimum wage policy will still reduce wage inequality. 
 In this study, I aim to contribute to the literature by testing these predictions. 
Specifically, I exploit the fact that the Ecuadorian government, apart from increasing the value 
of the NMW (in real terms), implemented an enforcement programme to improve compliance 
with the NMW. These policy changes allow me to estimate the distributional effect of changes 
in both components of the minimum wage. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper 
to do so. I perform the analysis with three specific objectives in mind. The first is to evaluate if 
the changes in the NMW policy have influenced the wage distribution. The second is to observe 
if the NMW policy has increased the wages of workers located at the lower percentiles by more 
than those located in higher percentiles, thus reducing wage dispersion. Finally, a third 
objective is to estimate how much of the decline in wage inequality can be attributed to the 
changes in the NMW policy. 
3.3 The Changes in Both Components of the National Minimum Wage 
Policy in Ecuador 
In Ecuador, the NMW law covers all employees in the economy, regardless of the sector in 
which they work, e.g. the formal or informal sector. Employees have to be affiliated by their 
employer to the Ecuador Social Security Institute (IESS is its Spanish acronym), which implies, 
in theory, compliance with the NMW. The workers that are not covered by the NMW law are 
self-employed individuals and business owners because these workers cannot be forced to 
affiliate themselves IESS and pay themselves the NMW. 
 The value of the NMW is fixed by the Consejo Nacional de Salarios (CONADES is the 
Spanish acronym). This is a tripartite committee composed by one representative from the 
Ministry of Labour, one from private employers, and one from workers’ bodies. The members 
of the CONADES have to set the NMW by consensus. If they cannot agree, the Ministry of 
Labour sets the NMW, which is generally the case. Additionally, the NMW is used by Sectorial 
Councils as a floor in order to fix the sectoral minimum wages. This approach to setting the 
minimum wages implies, in theory, that all employees in the economy should earn at least the 
NMW. 
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 Since the dollarization of the economy in 2000, the NMW is set annually, and is 
published by the Ministry of Labour in December of the preceding year. From 2000 to 2016, 
the real value of the NMW has increased steadily (see Figure 3.1), with the largest increases 
taking place in the years 2001, 2002 and 2008 (See Figure 3.1 and Table 3.6 in the Appendix). 
The increases set in 2000 and 2001, applicable for the year 2001 and 2002, respectively, were 
mainly aimed at recovering the real value of the NMW after the high inflation of the late 1990s, 
during which the nominal value of the NMW was kept constant (at 100.000 Sucres). The other 
large increase in the NMW, applicable for the year 2008, was enacted in 2007 when a new 
government took office.  
 Regarding the other component of the NMW policy, in 2010 the Ministry of Labour 
launched a campaign programme (hereafter the Campaign) to increase the intensity of 
enforcement of the law, which resulted in a significant reduction in noncompliance in 2011 (see 
Figure 3.1). I capture noncompliance with the NMW law using the percentage of full-time 
employees who are paid less than 90% of the value of the monthly NMW, in November-
December each year.  
 In this study, I exploit the exogenous variation in noncompliance rates resulted from the 
Campaign. Originally launched in March 2010, the Campaign was targeted at domestic workers 
and their employers. In January 2011, the government extended the programme to cover all 
salaried workers in the economy. Under this broader Campaign, the number of labour inspectors 
increased from 46 in 2010 to 240 in 2011, distributed across all provinces in Ecuador so as to 
provide staff to the new branches of the Ministry of Labour (see Table 3.5 in the Appendix). 
Furthermore, to signal the credible enforcement of the NMW, in a referendum in May 2011, 
the government asked Ecuadorians whether employers that did not affiliate their employees to 
the Ecuador Social Security Institute (IESS is its Spanish acronym) should go to prison. This 
question was approved with 55.02% of valid votes and created awareness in respect to this issue 
within the Ecuadorian society. 
 The changes resulting from the Campaign can be regarded as an exogenous variation in 
the intensity of enforcement of the NMW law. The government’s decision to start the Campaign 
programme in 2010 was not driven by an increase in noncompliance, rather it started as a 
strategy of the government to protect the most vulnerable employees in the economy, the 
domestic workers. Before the Campaign started, domestic workers used to have a minimum 
wage set at a lower level than the NMW, and less than 15% of them were affiliated to the IESS 
(see Panel A of Table 2.13 in Chapter 2). By the end of 2010, however, the government realised 
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that the Campaign for domestic workers not only increased compliance with the affiliation to 
the IESS among domestic workers, from 14% to around 20%, but also among all private 
employees, from 40 to 45% (see Panel A of Table 2.13 in Chapter 2). This motivated the 
government to extend the scope of the programme by including all private employees. 
Figure 3.1 The National Minimum Wage (monthly value in USD as of 2010) and 
Noncompliance 
 
Source: The real value of the NMW is computed using the nominal value published by the Ministry of Labour and 
the CPI Historical Series of the INEC. Noncompliance with the NMW is estimated from the ENEMDUR 2000-
2016, excluding 2002 which covers urban areas only. The ratio of noncompliance corresponds to the percentage 
of full-time employees who are paid less than 90% of the value of the monthly NMW, in each year.  
  
 Both the steady increase in the real value of the NMW and the improvement in 
compliance with the NMW law suggest the potential role of the NMW policy in compressing 
the wage distribution in Ecuador. In the next section, I discuss the data used this study and 
present some basic trends in wage inequality.  
3.4 Data and Basic Trends in Wage Inequality 
3.4.1 Data 
I use microdata from the ENEMDUR (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo y Desempleo Urbana y 
Rural) between 2000 and 2016. The ENEMDUR has been carried out around November each 
year since 2000, by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC is its Spanish 
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acronym). It covers both urban and rural areas, with the only exception being in 2002 when the 
INEC surveyed urban areas only. These surveys are representative at the national, regional, 
provincial and large cities levels, and are the official data set used in Ecuador to compute and 
monitor labour market indicators, and measures of income poverty and income inequality.  
 The ENEMDUR collects data on individual characteristics for every member of the 
household including age, working status and labour sector, the wages of salaried employees, 
the earnings of self-employed workers, and the hours worked for all employed individuals. 
Salaried employees are covered by the NMW law and this is the main group of analysis in this 
study. This group of workers includes public sector employees, private salaried workers, 
labourers and domestic workers. Additionally, I use the group of uncovered self-employed 
individuals as a placebo group; I test my identification strategy by analysing the effects of the 
NMW on their earnings distribution. 
 The wages of covered workers, and labour earnings of self-employed individuals, as 
reported in the ENEMDUR, are gross of taxes. The questionnaire asks each worker for up to 
three sources of labour income: main job, secondary job and other job; and also asks for 
different sources of non-labour income. The wage (earnings) variable used in this study refers 
to the hourly wages (earnings) of workers (both full-time and part-time) in their main job. I 
compute this variable from the reported monthly wage (earnings) of workers, without 
subtracting any deduction or adding any payment in kind, divided by the number of usual hours 
worked. Additionally, as a robustness check, I also present the results using the reported 
monthly wages (earnings) of full-time workers only. This exercise helps to reduce any 
measurement error that might come from combining monthly wages (earnings) and usual hours 
worked (per week) to generate the hourly wage (earnings) variable. 
 In order to maintain comparability with other studies for Ecuador that analyse the effects 
of minimum wages in the labour market (see Canelas 2014; Wong 2017), I restrict the sample 
to workers aged between 15 and 70 years. I also exclude workers with wages (earnings) below 
the bottom, or above the top, percentile, in each province and year. Using this individual data, 
I calculate all percentiles of provincial wage distributions of covered workers for the period 
2000-2016. I also compute all percentiles of provincial labour earnings distribution of 
uncovered self-employed workers. Following Autor et al. (2016), I calculate the percentiles 
weighting individual observations by their ENEMDUR sampling weights multiplied by their 
weekly hours worker. Finally, I aggregate the data across provinces and years in order to 
construct my cross-sectional/time series panel, where the number of provinces N = 20 and the 
number of years T = 16. 
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 The analysis is performed using this province-year level data. The average number of 
workers per province (per year) is 847 for covered workers and 547 for uncovered workers (see 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the Appendix for the sample size by year and province for covered and 
uncovered workers, respectively). I use provincial wage (earnings) distributions for the original 
20 provinces of Ecuador because the ENEMDUR, since it was first collected in 2000, is 
representative at this level.6 Finally, there is heterogeneity in the level of wages between 
provinces and also in the rates of compliance with the NMW law. This heterogeneity generates 
variation across provinces in our measures of both components of the NMW policy, which 
helps to capture the effects of the policy (to check the data for each province see Figures 3.6 in 
the Appendix). 
3.4.2 Basic Trends in Wage Inequality 
Using the restricted individual-level data, I first show the evolution of the wage distribution for 
the period 2000-2016. Specifically, in Figure 3.2, I display kernel density estimates of the log 
hourly (real) wage distribution for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2016. The density estimates 
are based on the Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth given by the “rule-of-thumb” 
proposed by (Silverman 1986). Additionally, Figure 3.2 shows three vertical lines which refer 
to the (log) of the real value of the NMW in the years 2000, 2005 and 2016. 
 The kernel density estimates for 2000 and 2005, in Figure 3.2, show that the value of 
the NMW is located around the median, meaning therefore that around half of salaried workers 
have wages that are located below the NMW. This suggests a clear problem of noncompliance 
with the minimum wage law. In 2010 and 2016, however, the wage distributions show evidence 
of a spike at the NMW and a compression of the distribution. From the cumulative distribution 
function shown in the Appendix (see Figure 3.4), we can also note that around 50-60 percent 
of hourly wages are located at or below the value of the NMW, which suggests that hourly 
wages at or above the 70th percentile are not affected directly by the NMW. 
 Using the province-level data, next, I describe the evolution of the of the 10th, 30th, 50th 
and 90th percentiles of the hourly wage distribution relative to the 70th percentile. I define this 
difference as percentile gaps, which are I compute by subtracting from each percentile (p), by 
province and year, the corresponding 70th percentile S0X,'(Y) − 0X,'Z[U. The data shown in Figure 
3.3 refers to the yearly change in the average of each percentile gap, across all 20 provinces, 
                                               
6 The 20 provinces are part of mainland Ecuador. The Galapagos Islands, which is also a province of Ecuador, is not included in this analysis. 
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standardised to its value in 2000 (to check the data for each province see Figure 3.7 in the 
Appendix). This data derives from a weighted regression of each percentile gap on year and 
provincial dummies, with regression weights given by the total of the ENEMDUR sampling 
weights multiplied by salaried workers’ weekly hours worked for each province and year. 
Figure 3.2 Kernel Density Estimates of the Log Hourly Wage Distribution of Covered 
Workers, 2000 - 2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016.  
Note: for the density estimation, the Epanechnikov kernel is used as the kernel function and the bandwidth is given 
by the “rule-of-thumb” proposed by (Silverman 1986). The vertical line corresponding to the log of the hourly 
NMW in each year. 
  
 Overall, the data in Figure 3.3 shows a decline in wage inequality, especially since 2006. 
The 10th percentile, relative to the 70th percentile, increases by around 0.60 log points between 
2000 and 2016. Or, equivalently, wage inequality at the bottom of the distribution measured by 
the 70-10 percentile gap reduces by approximately 0.60 log points. Wage inequality at the 
lower-middle and middle of the distribution remains relatively constant until 2005 and then it 
decreases from 2006 onwards. Between 2005 and 2016, the 70-30 percentile gap falls by 
approximately 0.28 log points and the 70-50 percentile gap decreases by around 0.12 log points. 
Finally, wage inequality at the top of the distribution remains relatively constant throughout the 
period of analysis. 
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Figure 3.3 Trends in Wage Inequality and the National Minimum Wage (NMW) Policy: 
Ecuador 2000-2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016. 
Notes: Figure 3.3 depicts the evolution of the difference between the log of percentiles 10th, 30th, 50th, 90th and the 
log of the 70th percentile, computed for each province. The effective NMW results from the differential between 
the value of the NMW and the 70th percentile of each province. Noncompliance is measured by the percentage of 
full-time employees who are paid less than 90% of the value of the monthly NMW, in each province. The NMW 
adjusted for noncompliance refers to an index of the NMW policy which adjusts the effective NMW by the rate 
of noncompliance. All series refer to the weighted average of the estimates across the 20 provinces of continental 
Ecuador and are standardised to their value in 2000.   
 
 The falling trend in wage inequality during the 2000s goes in line with the findings of 
Ponce and Vos (2014), who conclude, based on the evolution of the Gini index of the labour 
income distribution, estimated from the ENEMDUR, that most of the reduction in earnings 
inequality occurred during the first half of the decade. My estimates of the Gini indexes of the 
labour income distribution and wage distribution confirm this conclusion (see Figure A2 in the 
Appendix). When I analyse the evolution of the percentile gaps, however, as shown in Figure 
3, I find that this statement is true only for the reduction of inequality at the bottom of the 
distribution. The 70-10 percentile gap decreases by 0.28 log points during the first half of the 
2000s and then by 0.23 log points during the second half. On the other hand, inequality at the 
lower-middle (measured by the 70-30 percentile gap) and middle of the distribution (measured 
by the 70-50 percentile gap) remains relatively constant during the period 2000-2005. 
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 Ponce and Vos (2014) argue that the significant drop in earnings inequality during the 
first half of the decade is explained by the recovery in real wages and employment after the 
1999 financial crisis. Based on the results in Figure 3.3, this may be the case for inequality at 
the bottom of the distribution, but not for inequality at the middle of the distribution. From 2006 
onwards, wage inequality decreases markedly, not only at the bottom but also at the lower-
middle and middle of the wage distribution. The question that arises is what force, or policy, 
explains these reductions in wage inequality.  
 Figure 3.3 reveals that the changes in wage dispersion in the lower half of the wage 
distribution move in close tandem with the changes in the NMW policy. Wages at the 10th, 30th 
and 50th percentiles, relative to wages at 70th percentile, and the effective NMW adjusted for 
noncompliance, show an upward trend from 2006 onwards. The upward trend in the effective 
NMW adjusted for noncompliance results from the combined changes in the two components 
of the NMW policy. For example, between 2007 and 2008, the impact of the value of the NMW 
measured by the (unadjusted) effective NMW increases significantly, but noncompliance 
remains relatively constant. In contrast, between 2010 and 2011, the (unadjusted) effective 
NMW decreases but noncompliance reduces significantly by around 6 p.p.   
3.5 Methodology 
To identify the effects of the NMW on the wage distribution, I follow the method proposed by 
Lee (1999) and the modifications to it suggested by Autor et al. (2016). In both papers, the 
authors assess the effects of the changes in the value of the legislated minimum wage in the 
United States, exploiting the state-variation in the relative level of the minimum wage with 
respect to the median wage of each state. Lee (1999) defines the effective minimum wage, \0] X,', for each state s in year t as 7\KOHlog	(MWX,'), log	(NMW,')I − log	(0X,'d[)9, i.e. the 
maximum between the log of the state and federal minimums minus the log median wage. 
Identification is based on the fact that the states where the minimum wages bite more, i.e. those 
with a higher effective minimum wage, will experience a greater compression in wages than 
the states with a lower effective minimum wage. 
 Lee (1999) assumes that the level of wage inequality in state s at time t will be 
determined by the level of latent wage inequality (i.e. wage inequality in the absence of a 
minimum wage policy) captured by time effects, and the effective minimum wage. The key 
identification assumption, in this case, is that the state-variation in latent wage inequality is 
uncorrelated with states’ median wage levels. Autor et al.( 2016) argue that this is not the case 
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for the US; they find a positive correlation between states’ median wage levels and a measure 
of states’ wage inequality that is unlikely to be affected by the level of the minimum wage (the 
p60/p40 ratio). They propose using state fixed effects and state trends to correct the bias in 
Lee’s estimates. 
 Lee’s (1999) model, with Author’s et al. (2016) modifications to estimate the effect of 
changes in the value of the minimum wage on inequality at any point of the wage distribution, 
for (in this paper) province s in year t, which includes province fixed effects and provincial 
linear trends is of the form: 
 
 "/e70X,'Y 9 − "/e70X,'f 9 = 6,Y7log	(gE$') − log	(0X,'f )9	 																																																								+	61Y Slog	(gE$') − 	"/e70X,'f 9U1 																																																															+	='Y + +X[Y 		+ +X,Y ∗ J + ;′X,'=Y + hX,'Y 	 (3.5) 
 
where 0X,'Y  is the percentile p of the real hourly wage distribution of province s at time t and 0X,'f  denotes a level of local wages that may be unaffected by the NMW. The percentile gaps, 
the outcome variables, are the difference between each percentile 0X,'Y  and the comparison 
percentile 0X,'f . Lee (1999) and Author et al. (2016), for the case of the US, use 0X,'fid[, the 
median, as the wage level that is unaffected by the minimum wage law. As shown in Figure A1 
(in the Appendix), the value of NMW in Ecuador locates at or below the 60th percentile of the 
wage distribution, for this reason I use as comparison the 70th percentile, 0X,'fiZ[, and assume 
that wages at or above this level will be unaffected by the NMW. Other studies for developing 
countries also use the 70th percentile of wage distribution (see Bosch and Manacorda 2010, for 
Mexico; Borraz and Pampillon 2011, for Uruguay). 
 In Eq. 3.1, year fixed effects are represented by δkl; province fixed effects are denoted 
by γn[l ; and provincial linear trends are captured by +X,Y ∗ J. ;′X,' is a vector of the provincial 
control variables, which include the share of workers in each age group (15-20, 21-30, ... ,61-
70), the share of workers classified by educational level (primary, secondary and tertiary), the 
share of females, the fraction of workers living in urban areas, and the proportion of workers 
by one-digit industry. Finally, hX,'Y  is an error term, which I assume to be uncorrelated with: the 
province and year effects, provincial trends, and provincial control variables.  
 The differential 7"/e(gE$') − "/e(0X,'fiZ[)9 is the effective NMW, \0] X,', for each 
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province s at time t. In Ecuador, the value of the NMW is set yearly nationwide but wage levels 
vary greatly across provinces. My identification strategy therefore exploits this variation of the 
effective NMW across the 20 provinces, and over 16 years from 2000 – 2016, to identify the 
distributional effects of the NMW. The coefficients on the effective NMW, 6,Y, and on its 
quadratic term, 61Y, capture the effect of the changes in the NMW. Specifically, the impact of 
the changes in the effective NMW on the p to q=70 percentile gap is given by 6,Y +261Y7"/e	(gE$') − "/e(0X,'fiZ[)9. 
 For example, if p=10 the coefficients 6,,[ and 61,[measure the effect of the effective 
NMW on the wage gap between the 10th percentile and the 70th percentile of the wage 
distribution. In the results section, I estimate Eq. 1 for percentiles p=10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 
90. For the cases in which p=80 and 90, the coefficients on the effective NMW must not be 
significantly different from zero, as I am assuming that the NMW has no effect on wages at the 
70th percentile or above. This assumption is testable, and its rejection would undermine the 
reliability of my estimates of the effect of the NMW. 
 One limitation of the implementation of Lee’s (1999) and Author’s et al. (2016) strategy 
in the context of developing countries is that the effective minimum wage does not take into 
account the changes in the intensity of enforcement of the law and the heterogeneity in the 
levels of noncompliance across provinces. In developed countries, this may be not a problem, 
but, in developing countries, where there is widespread noncompliance (Marshall 2007; Rani 
et al. 2013), it is a major issue. There can be a high legislated level of the NMW and a low level 
of local earnings, which generates a high effective NMW, but this is meaningless if there is no 
institution that enforces compliance with the law. In this paper, therefore, I also contribute to 
the literature by modifying Lee’s (1999) measure of the effective minimum wage to take 
account of noncompliance.  
 The original Kaitz index (Kaitz 1970) adjusts the value of the minimum wage by the 
fraction of workers most likely to be affected the law. For the US, therefore, it adjusts the 
minimum wage by the fraction of teenagers in each state. Analogously, I adjust the relative 
value of the NMW by multiplying it for one minus the rate of noncompliance in each province 
s at time t, in this way: 
 \0] pqrstuvqX,' = "/e wgE$'0X,'Z[ ∗ 71 − g5X,'9x 
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where gE$' denotes the real hourly NMW, in year t, and 0X,'Z[ is the 70th percentile of the real 
hourly wage distribution, in province s in year t. g5X,' is the rate of noncompliance with the 
NMW in province s in year t; it is the percentage of full-time employees who are paid less than 
90% of the value of the monthly NMW. The effective NMW adjusted for noncompliance 
captures changes in both components of the minimum wage policy: 1) changes in the real value 
NMW across time, and 2) changes in noncompliance with the law across time for each province.  
 In Eq. 3.2, I replace the effective NMW, \0] X,', with the effective NMW adjusted for 
noncompliance, \0] pqrstuvqX,', in this way:  
 
 	"/e70X,'Y 9 − "/e70X,'f 9 = 6,Y y"/e wgE$'0X,'Z[ ∗ 71 − g5X,'9xz 
																																																				+	6	1Y y"/e wgE$'0X,'Z[ ∗ 71 − g5X,'9xz
1
 
																																											+	='Y + +X[Y + +X,Y ∗ J	 + ;′X,'=Y + hX,'Y  
(3.6) 
 
 The adjustment helps to identify the effects of the NMW policy in three ways. First, g5X,' introduces an additional source of variation across provinces and over time, Second, it 
helps to deal with the problem of division bias, which results from a using a variable potentially 
measured with error in both sides of the regression equation (Borjas 1980). In other words, Eq. 
1 uses the 70th percentile of the wage distribution directly on both sides of the equation and, 
because of measurement error, the effective NMW may be spuriously correlated with the 
outcome variable. The adjustment by noncompliance mitigates this problem. Third, it generates 
a more comprehensive measure of the changes in NMW policy, because \0] pqrstuvqX,' 
captures both the increases in the NMW and the reduction in noncompliance (see Figure 3.2).  
 The coefficients on the effective NMW and on the rate of compliance are restricted to 
be the same in Eq. 3.2. In Eq. 3.3, I write the unrestricted version of Eq. 3.2, where the 
coefficients on both components of the NMW policy are allowed to be different. In the results 
sections, I present the regression estimates of the restricted model, Eq. 3.2, and the unrestricted 
model, Eq. 3.3, for each percentile gap (difference between percentiles p=10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60, 80, 90 and the 70th percentile). With Eq. 3.3, I also test in the results section if the restriction 
of equality of marginal effects of both components of the NMW policy is valid.  
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 	"/e70X,'Y 9 − "/e70X,'f 9 = 6,Y7log	(gE$') − log	(0X,'f )9 + ),Ylog71 − g5X,'9	 
 																																								+	61Y	7log	(gE$') − log	(0X,'f )91 + )1Y"/e71 − g5X,'91 																				+	='Y + +X[Y + +X,Y ∗ J + ;′X,'=Y + hX,'Y 		 (3.7) 
3.6 Results 
I begin by estimating the distributional impact of the effective NMW without accounting for 
compliance with the law. Table 3.1 presents the OLS estimates of Eq. 3.1 using the effective 
NMW, \0] X,'.	Each entry refers to a separate regression, where each row refers to the effect of 
the effective NMW on the wage gap between selected percentiles (10, 20, 30, … ,90) and the 
70th percentile of the wage distribution. I report the first derivative for each dependent variable 
with respect to the effective NMW evaluated at its hours-weighted average over all provinces 
and all years between 2000 and 2016, in this way 6,Y + 61Y(\0] ). OLS regressions are weighted 
by the total of the ENEMDUR sampling weights multiplied by the weekly hours worked in 
each province and year, and standard errors in parentheses are clustered by province. 
 In Column 1, I present the OLS estimate including year and province fixed effects. 
Column 2 includes provincial trends, and Column 3 shows the results including provincial 
controls. The estimates of the marginal effect of the effective NMW, without accounting for 
compliance, are all positive and statistically significantly different from zero, including the 
estimates for percentiles above the 70th. The significant relationship between the effective 
NMW and the upper tail of the wage distribution violates my identification assumption and, as 
suggested by Autor et al. (2016), is a signal of bias in the estimates. A possible candidate is 
division bias (Borjas 1980), since the 70th percentile, potentially measured with error, is 
included directly on the left- and right-hand side of Eq. 3.1. 
 Autor et al. (2016) show that the OLS estimates of Eq. 3.1 lead to an upward bias in the 
estimates of the impact of the minimum wage in both the lower and the upper tail. The authors 
address this problem using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy, with the effective 
minimum wage instrumented by the statutory minimum wage in each state. Since there are no 
provincially set minimum wages in Ecuador it is not possible to use this strategy in this case. 
In the country, all provinces are subject to the same change in the NMW from one year to the 
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next, so I cannot identify this aggregate effect from the year fixed effects that are also included 
in Eq. 3.1.  
Table 3.1 OLS Relationship Between the Log(p) – Log(p70) and the Effective NMW, 
Log(NMW) – log(p70), for Selected Percentiles of the Wage Distribution of Covered 
Workers, 2000-2016 
  Effective NMW 
  (1) (2) (3) 
p10-p70 0.366*** 0.328** 0.425*** 
  (0.103) (0.133) (0.158) 
p20-p70 0.386*** 0.392*** 0.476*** 
  (0.073) (0.088) (0.097) 
p30-p70 0.356*** 0.408*** 0.402*** 
  (0.065) (0.076) (0.066) 
p40-p70 0.309*** 0.424*** 0.450*** 
  (0.070) (0.090) (0.078) 
p50-p70 0.261*** 0.397*** 0.475*** 
  (0.067) (0.073) (0.081) 
p60-p70 0.185*** 0.254*** 0.264*** 
  (0.045) (0.042) (0.052) 
p80-p70 0.147*** 0.165*** 0.258*** 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.073) 
p90-p70 0.159* 0.284*** 0.480*** 
  (0.083) (0.062) (0.091) 
        
Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial trends Yes Yes 
Provincial controls   Yes 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016.  
Notes: N = 320, with number of provinces = 20 and number of years =16. Sample period is 2000-2016. Each entry 
in the table refers to the marginal effect of the effective NMW, evaluated at its hours-weighted average across 
provinces and years. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level and shown in parentheses. Provincial 
controls include the share of workers in each age group (15-20, 21-30, ... ,61-70), the share of workers classified 
by educational level (primary, secondary and tertiary), the share of females, the fraction of workers living in urban 
areas, and the proportion of workers by one-digit industry. 
 *10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.  
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 In Table 3.2, I estimate the marginal effect of the NMW by including in the right-hand 
side of the equation both components of the NMW policy. Columns 1-3 present the estimates 
of the restricted model (see Eq. 3.2) using the effective NMW adjusted for compliance, \0pqrstuvq{ X,'. Columns 4-12 show the results of the unrestricted model (see Eq. 3.3). 
Specifically, columns 4, 7 and 10 show the marginal effects of the (unadjusted) effective NMW 
and columns 5, 8 and 11 shows the marginal effects of the rate of compliance. Columns 6, 9 
and 12 report the p-value of the test of equality of marginal effects of the (unadjusted) effective 
NMW and the rate of compliance, 6,Y + 61Y(\0] )	= ),Y + )1Y71 − g5| 9.  
 Using \0pqrstuvq{ X,' instead of \0] X,' seems to address the problem of division bias: 
Columns 1-3 of Table 3.2 show no significant effect of the NMW policy to percentiles above 
the 70th. It is also interesting to highlight that while the estimates for the upper tail of the 
distribution decrease in magnitude, and became not significant, the estimates for the lower part 
of the distributions increase in magnitude. Additionally, for the middle of the distribution, 
percentile 40th and 50th, the magnitude of the estimates with and without the adjustment is 
roughly the same (see Column 2 of Table 3.1 vs Column 2 of Table 3.2).  
 Comparing the results of the restricted and unrestricted model in Table 3.2, we can see 
that the restriction of equality of marginal effects for both components of the NMW policy is 
valid for regressions that have the p10-p70, p20-p70, and p30-p70 gaps as dependent variables. 
For these regressions, we do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of marginal effects of the 
effective NMW and the rate of compliance (see p-value in Column 9).  
 For percentile 40th and 50th, the estimates of the effect of both components of the NMW 
policy are positive and significant differently from zero, but they differ in magnitude. For these 
percentiles, the effect of the changes in compliance are far lower than the effect of changes in 
the value of the NMW. One would expect these results since the increase in the intensity of 
enforcement of the NMW law will have a larger effect on wages of workers earning far below 
the NMW than on workers with wages close to the NMW. For percentiles 60th and above the 
effect of changes in compliance are not significantly different from zero, while effects of 
changes in the value of the NMW are positive and significant differently from zero. This 
suggests that, even accounting for compliance, in the unrestricted model, the fact that the 70th 
percentile, potentially measured with error, is included directly on the left- and right-hand of 
the regression continues to generate bias in the estimates. 
 My preferred estimates are therefore, the ones from the restricted model (se Eq.3.2). 
The results in Columns 1-3 of Table 3.2 suggest that the changes in NMW policy had a 
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significant impact on reducing wage inequality in Ecuador. The effects are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level for percentiles up to the 60th, and the magnitude of the 
impact decreases as one moves upwards in the wage distribution. The estimates are robust to 
model specification; the inclusion of provincial trends and provincial controls do not change 
the magnitude of the estimates significantly, and they remain statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Column 2 shows the results of my preferred specification of Eq. 3.2, using province and 
year fixed effects, and adding provincial trends. Based on these estimates, a 10 log point 
increase in the effective NMW policy reduces the 70-10 percentile gap by approximately 8.2 
log points, the 70-30 percentile gap by roughly 4.5 log points, and the 70-50 percentile gap by 
3.8 log points.  
 Table 3.3 shows additional robustness checks, but the conclusions do not change. In 
columns 1 and 2, I report the results of regressions that use the unweighted data (as opposed to 
that weighted by total of the ENEMDUR sampling weights multiplied by the weekly hours 
worked in each province and year). Columns 3 and 4 show the estimates of the effects of the 
regression using the percentiles of the monthly wage distribution of full-time workers only (as 
opposed to the hourly wage distribution of both full-time and part-time workers) and weighting 
by workers rather than by worker hours. In both cases, I show the estimates for the specification 
with province and year fixed effects (see Columns 1 and 3) and, of my preferred specification, 
adding provincial trends (see Columns 2 and 4). None of the alternative specifications makes 
any substantial difference to the estimates of the impact of the effective NMW adjusted for 
noncompliance.  
 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.3 show the results for workers in the uncovered sector. In 
this case, I still use the same measures of the effective NMW adjusted for noncompliance as in 
Table 3. 2 – computed based on the 70th percentile of the wage distribution of covered workers 
and, for the adjustment, the rate of noncompliance among covered workers. The results for 
uncovered workers show that when I do not add provincial trends the estimates for the p20-
p70, p30-p70, p40-p70 and p50-p70 percentile gaps are positive and significant at the 5% level 
(see Column 5). When provincial trends are added, however, the estimates decrease in 
magnitude and none of them remain statistically significant at conventional levels (see Columns 
6).  
 
  
100 
Table 3.2 OLS Relationship Between the Log(p) – Log(p70), and the Effective NMW accounting for Noncompliance, Restricted and 
Unrestricted Models, for Selected Percentiles of the Wage Distribution of Covered Workers, 2000-2016 
  Restricted   Unrestricted 
  Effective NMW adjusted for 
Compliance 
  Effective 
NMW 
Compli-
ance 
p-
value 
  Effective 
NMW 
Compli-
ance 
p-
value 
  Effective 
NMW 
Compli-
ance 
p-
value     
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
p10-p70 0.872*** 0.827*** 0.800***   0.804*** 0.954*** 0.217   0.742*** 0.889*** 0.158   0.732*** 0.836*** 0.973 
  (0.073) (0.095) (0.094)   (0.083) (0.072)     (0.111) (0.098)     (0.101) (0.094)   
p20-p70 0.716*** 0.684*** 0.681***   0.776*** 0.743*** 0.236   0.727*** 0.671*** 0.314   0.742*** 0.698*** 0.563 
  (0.039) (0.067) (0.081)   (0.045) (0.053)     (0.063) (0.083)     (0.058) (0.100)   
p30-p70 0.496*** 0.453*** 0.437***   0.636*** 0.474*** 0.923   0.611*** 0.362*** 0.436   0.571*** 0.392*** 0.070 
  (0.050) (0.067) (0.069)   (0.048) (0.070)     (0.062) (0.083)     (0.067) (0.098)   
p40-p70 0.407*** 0.428*** 0.428***   0.542*** 0.325*** 0.305   0.584*** 0.264*** 0.081   0.582*** 0.268*** 0.002 
  (0.040) (0.072) (0.070)   (0.055) (0.058)     (0.076) (0.050)     (0.061) (0.071)   
p50-p70 0.316*** 0.383*** 0.362***   0.444*** 0.230*** 0.003   0.526*** 0.243*** 0.003   0.561*** 0.196*** 0.001 
  (0.049) (0.077) (0.085)   (0.056) (0.050)     (0.071) (0.059)     (0.079) (0.058)   
p60-p70 0.134*** 0.170*** 0.166***   0.266*** 0.058 0.012   0.302*** 0.078 0.013   0.301*** 0.063 0.033 
  (0.042) (0.049) (0.056)   (0.038) (0.042)     (0.040) (0.051)     (0.056) (0.056)   
p80-p70 0.062 0.015 0.068   0.153** -0.001 0.008   0.138* -0.063 0.004   0.245*** -0.035 0.004 
  (0.081) (0.089) (0.085)   (0.066) (0.057)     (0.072) (0.061)     (0.085) (0.050)   
p90-p70 0.024 0.054 0.135   0.189** -0.045 0.000   0.257*** -0.087 0.001   0.457*** -0.105 0.000 
  (0.061) (0.094) (0.107)   (0.083) (0.061)     (0.081) (0.095)     (0.108) (0.114)   
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Provincial trends Yes Yes           Yes   Yes 
Provincial controls   Yes                   Yes 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016.  
Notes: N = 320, with number of provinces = 20 and number of years =16. Sample period is 2000-2016. Each entry in the table refers to the marginal effect of the explanatory 
variable, evaluated at its hours-weighted average across provinces and years. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level and shown in parentheses. Provincial controls 
include the share of workers in each age group (15-20, 21-30, ... ,61-70), the share of workers classified by educational level (primary, secondary and tertiary), the share of 
females, the fraction of workers living in urban areas, and the proportion of workers by one-digit industry. Columns 6, 9 and 12 report the p-value of the test of equality of 
coefficients on the Effective NMW and on the rate of compliance (see unrestricted model, Eq. 3.3.) *10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.
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Table 3.3 Robustness Checks for the OLS Relationship Between the Log(p) – Log(p70) and 
the Effective NMW adjusted for Noncompliance, Restricted Model, for Selected Percentiles, 
2000-2016. 
  Effective NMW adjusted for noncompliance (Restricted Model) 
  Covered Workers   
Uncovered Workers 
  Unweighted   Full-time   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
p10-p70 0.809*** 0.793***   0.993*** 1.011***   0.207 0.036 
  (0.087) (0.094)   (0.082) (0.096)   (0.135) (0.136) 
p20-p70 0.713*** 0.688***   0.839*** 0.830***   0.227** 0.062 
  (0.058) (0.064)   (0.053) (0.046)   (0.112) (0.099) 
p30-p70 0.521*** 0.473***   0.667*** 0.717***   0.246*** 0.098 
  (0.048) (0.047)   (0.086) (0.080)   (0.087) (0.092) 
p40-p70 0.419*** 0.382***   0.470*** 0.509***   0.243*** 0.144 
  (0.038) (0.036)   (0.077) (0.068)   (0.088) (0.094) 
p50-p70 0.300*** 0.280***   0.390*** 0.433***   0.172** 0.103 
  (0.036) (0.044)   (0.055) (0.047)   (0.073) (0.087) 
p60-p70 0.132*** 0.113**   0.365*** 0.426***   0.102* 0.036 
  (0.042) (0.049)   (0.061) (0.066)   (0.055) (0.065) 
p80-p70 0.047 0.032   0.1 0.138*   -0.028 0.005 
  (0.050) (0.061)   (0.065) (0.081)   (0.049) (0.056) 
p90-p70 0.174** 0.200*   0.024 0.123*   -0.137 -0.151 
  (0.081) (0.104)   (0.067) (0.072)   (0.108) (0.113) 
                  
Province FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Provincial 
trends   
Yes 
    
Yes 
    
Yes 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016.  
Notes: N = 320, with number of provinces = 20 and number of years =16. Sample period is 2000-2016. Each entry 
in the table refers to the marginal effect of the effective NMW, evaluated at its hours-weighted average across 
provinces and years. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level and shown in parentheses. Provincial 
controls include the share of workers in each age group (15-20, 21-30, ... ,61-70), the share of workers classified 
by educational level (primary, secondary and tertiary), the share of females, the fraction of workers living in urban 
areas, and the proportion of workers by one-digit industry. 
 *10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.  
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 Uncovered workers, such as self-employed workers and business owners, cannot be 
forced to pay themselves the NMW. Hence, one might expect to find no effect among these 
workers. The results in Table 3.3 for this group of workers, once I add provincial trends, are in 
line with this proposition. This exercise also helps to test my identification strategy of using 
this group of workers as a placebo group. Assuming that covered and uncovered workers are 
affected in the same way by other factors that might influence the changes in the distribution 
of labour earnings, the fact that I do not find a significant effect for uncovered workers suggests 
that the results for covered workers, under the preferred specification, are not capturing 
changes in wage dispersion generated by reasons other than the changes in the NMW policy. 
3.7 Counterfactual Estimates of the Changes in Wage Inequality 
Until now I have focused on measuring the relationship between the changes in the NMW 
policy and the changes in wage dispersion. I estimate that the increase in the level of NMW 
and the reduction in noncompliance have reduced lower tail inequality, but how much of the 
decline observed since 2000 can be attributed to the changes in the NMW policy? Based on 
Lee (1999) and Autor et al. (2016), I present reduced form counterfactual estimates of the 
change in latent wage inequality in a scenario without the changes in the NMW policy —that 
is, the change in wage inequality that would have been observed had the value of NMW been 
held constant (in real terms) and had there not been any improvement in noncompliance with 
the law.  
 I consider three time periods for the counterfactual analysis: 2000-2016, 2000-2010, 
and 2000-2005. The period 2000-2016 covers both changes in the NMW policy: the yearly 
increase in the real value of the NMW and the significant reduction in noncompliance that took 
place in 2011. The time frame 2000-2010 excludes the significant drop in noncompliance, but 
includes the largest increase in the real value of the NMW (in absolute terms) that took place 
between 2007 and 2008. This time period also allows my results to be compared with the 
findings of Ponce and Vos (2014). Finally, the period 2000-2005 excludes the two major 
changes in the NMW policy. 
 Following Autor et al.'s (2016) procedure to estimates changes in latent wage gaps, I 
first generate the rank for each worker in its respective province-year wage distribution, using 
the individual-level data. Then, I adjust each worker’s wage by the quantity:  
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 	∆log	('(,*+, ) = /+,012'34567894(,*:; −2'34567894; (,*+=          																													+	/?,0 12'3567894; ?(,*: − 2'34567894; ?(,*+=				 (3.8) 
 
where 2'34567894; (,*+ is the observed end-of-period effective NMW adjusted for 
noncompliance in province s in some year @1, and 2'34567894; (,*: is the corresponding 
beginning-of-period effective NMW adjusted for noncompliance in	@0. /+,0  and /?,0  are 
estimated coefficients from the OLS estimates of Eq. 3.2, shown in Table 3.2 for selected 
percentiles.  
 Finally, I pool the adjusted wage observations to form a counterfactual national wage 
distribution and compare the changes in wage inequality in the simulated distribution to those 
in the observed distribution. As in Autor et al. (2016), I compute the standard errors by 
bootstrapping the estimates within the province-year panel.  
 The bootstrap procedure takes provinces as the sampling unit, and thus I start by 
drawing 20 provinces with replacement. I next estimate the restricted model, Eq. 3.2, for the 
selected provinces using the percentile estimates. I run the OLS regressions of Eq. 3.2 with 
regression weights given by the total of the ENEMDUR sampling weights multiplied by 
salaried workers’ weekly hours worked for the selected provinces. I next apply the coefficients /+,0  and /?,0  of Eq. 3.2 to get adjustments, ∆'(,*+, ,	in Eq. 3.4 and calculate the counterfactual 
wage distribution by applying them to the individual-level ENEMDURs. Table 3.4 reports the 
mean and the standard deviation of 200 replications of this counterfactual exercise. 
 Panel A of Table 3.4 shows the results of the counterfactual analysis for the period 2000 
– 2016. In this case, @1=2016 and @0=2000. Adding ∆CDE('(,*+, ) to the corresponding (log) 
wage of each worker in 2016 would adjust the 2016 distribution to its counterfactual under the 
realised effective NMW adjusted for noncompliance in 2000. Similarly, Panel B reports the 
results for the period 2000-2010. In this case, the counterfactual estimates are computed using 
the coefficients on the effective NMW from analogous regressions for the shorter sample 
period. Adding ∆CDE('(,*+, ), when	@1=2010 and @0=2000, to the corresponding (log) wage of 
each worker in 2009 would adjust the 2010 distribution to its counterfactual had the NMW 
policy in 2010 equalled the NMW policy in 2000. In the same way, Panel C reports the 
counterfactual results for the 2000 – 2005 period. 
 
  
104 
Table 3.4 Actual and Counterfactual Changes in Wage Gap Ratios, for Selected Percentiles, 
Between Selected Years: Changes in Log Points (100 * Log Change) 
    Latent Change 
  Observed change Effective NMW adjusted for Noncompliance 
  FE FE, 
 Trend 
FE, Trend, 
Controls  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. 2000-2016       
p70/p10 -66.6 -34.8*** -35.5*** -36.9*** 
    (2.3) (3.3) (2.7) 
p70/p30 -39.8 -22.1*** -22.5*** -22.9*** 
    (1.4) (2) (2) 
p70/p50 -18.6 -9.3*** -7.3*** -8*** 
    (1.7) (2.3) (2.3) 
p90/p70 -0.7 0.4 0.6 -1.6 
    (2.8) (2.6) (3.4) 
Panel B. 2000-2010       
p70/p10 -60.4 -34.3*** -35.1*** -35.8*** 
    (3.6) (4.1) (3.9) 
p70/p30 -35.5 -17.1*** -18*** -18.5*** 
    (2.6) (3.9) (2.6) 
p70/p50 -21.9 -5.9** -7.7*** -7.7*** 
    (2.5) (2.4) (2.5) 
p90/p70 15.4 17.7*** 13.8*** 13*** 
    (2.3) (3.4) (4) 
Panel C. 2000-2005       
p70/p10 -28.5 -17.6*** -16.8** -18.4*** 
    (6.1) (6.6) (6.6) 
p70/p30 -12.3 -3.3 -3.3 -5.2 
    (3.7) (4) (3.9) 
p70/p50 -5.9 -2.6 -2.9 -3.6 
    (2.7) (2.7) (3) 
p90/p70 5.9 8.9*** 8.6*** 7.3* 
    (3) (3.2) (3.8) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016.  
Note: Estimates represent changes in actual and counterfactual wage gaps (for selected percentiles), between 2000 
and 2016, between 2000 and 2010, and between 2000 and 2005, measured in log points (100 * log change). 
Counterfactual wage changes in Panel A represent counterfactual changes in the selected percentiles gaps had the 
effective minimum wage adjusted for noncompliance in 2016 equalled the effective minimum wage adjusted for 
noncompliance in 2000 for each province. Counterfactual wage changes in Panel B represent changes had the 
effective minimum wage adjusted for noncompliance in 2010 equalled the effective minimum wage adjusted for 
noncompliance in 2000 for each province. The counterfactuals (using point estimates from the 2000 - 2016 period) 
are formed using coefficients from the OLS estimations of Eq. 3.2, reported in columns 1 to 3 of Tables 3.2, 
shown for selected percentiles. Counterfactuals using point estimates from the 2000 - 2010 period are formed 
using coefficients from analogous regressions for the shorter sample period. In the same way, Panel C reports the 
counterfactual results for the 2000 - 2005 period. Marginal effects are bootstrapped as described in the text; the 
standard deviation associated with the estimates are reported in parentheses. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level.    
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 Table 3.4 also shows that while the magnitude of the observed drop in the 70/10 ratio 
is around the same during the first half and second half of the 2000s, most of the fall in the 
30/70 and 50/70 ratios took place during the second half of the 2000s (see Column 1, Panels B 
and C). These findings suggest that the argument of Ponce and Vos (2014) may apply for the 
drop in lower-tail inequality, but not for the reduction in inequality at the low-middle and 
middle of the distribution. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the 70/30 and 70/50 ratios remain 
relatively constant between 2000 and 2005, and show a falling trend from 2006 onwards. 
Additionally, the counterfactual estimates in Panel B of Table 3.4 suggest that the changes in 
the NMW explain between 49 and 65 percent of the reduction in wage inequality in the lower-
middle and middle of the distribution between 2000 and 2010 (see Column 3). 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the counterfactual estimates of the change in the 70/10 
ratio for the 2000 – 2016 period and for the 2000 – 2010 period are the same, at around 0.35 
log points (see Column 3 Panels A and B of Table 3.3). This implies that the compression in 
the lower-tail of the wage distribution that took place from 2011 onwards is entirely driven by 
the changes in the NMW policy. Especially by the increase in the intensity of enforcement of 
the NMW law. 
3.8 Conclusions 
Although noncompliance with minimum wage policies is known to be high in developing 
countries, policymakers usually focus their attention solely on changes to the value of the 
minimum wage. For example, in Latin America, compliance with the minimum wage ranges 
from a best-case level of 70% to 80%, as in Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay and Panama, to a worst-
case level of 25% to 50%, as in Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Paraguay (Marshall 
2007). In this context, increasing the level of the minimum wage in order to compress the wage 
distribution might not be effective without a parallel increase in the intensity of enforcement 
of the labour law. This study suggests that increases in both components of the NMW policy 
served to compress the wage distribution in Ecuador between 2000 - 2016, and that they 
account for around half of the observed reduction in wage inequality.  
 The compression effect of the Ecuadorian minimum wage policy can be divided into 
two time periods. In the period 2005-2010 there was a significant increase in the real value of 
the NMW, especially in 2008 when the new government increased it by 17.12 USD (in real 
terms), from 200.68 USD per month in 2007 to 217.80 USD in 2008. The steady increase in 
the real value of the NMW compressed the wage distribution, by increasing wages at the lower 
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half of the wage distribution. Before this period, between 2000 and 2005, there was a 
significant reduction in wage inequality, but most of this was due to the recovery in wages at 
the lowest decile of the distribution after the deep financial crisis of the late 1990s. Wages at 
the low-middle and middle of the distribution (relative to the 70th percentile) remained 
relatively constant during this period (see Figure 3.3). 
 Since 2010, there was also an increase in enforcement of the NMW law, generated 
through an awareness campaign programme. This increase in enforcement resulted in a 
significant reduction in noncompliance with the NMW law in 2011. The increased enforcement 
of the NMW law, along with the increase in the real value of the NMW through the period 
2010-2016, compressed the wage distribution by pushing wages at the lower half of the 
distribution towards the value of the NMW, which is located at around the 50th to 60th 
percentiles (see Figure 3.4 in the Appendix).  
 The wages of workers in the lower half of the distribution (relative to the 70th 
percentile) increased by more during the Campaign period, years 2010-2016, than in the pre-
campaign period, years 2005-2009 (see Figure 3.3). Among these workers, those at the lowest 
decile experienced the largest increase during the Campaign period. Additionally, during the 
Campaign period, the NMW policy accounted for all the observed reduction in the 70/10 
percentile ratio. This implies that, if there were no change in the NMW policy after 2010, wage 
inequality at the lower part of the distribution (as measured by the 70/10 percentile ratio) would 
not have reduced further as we observed.  
 The further reduction in wage inequality from 2010 onwards occurred in a context of 
increased enforcement of labour regulations. This highlights the role that the other component 
of the minimum wage policy can have on reducing further wage inequality, especially in the 
context of high noncompliance. Policymakers who seek to use a minimum wage as a policy 
tool to compress the wage distribution should therefore not forget the intensity of enforcement 
of the law as an additional policy instrument. That said, policymakers also have to consider 
that, as I found in a previous study (see Guzman 2017), better enforcement and higher 
compliance with the NMW might also lead to a migration of low-paid workers from the 
covered sector into the uncovered self-employment sector or to unemployment.  
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3.9 Appendix 
Table 3.5 Number of Labour Inspectors in each provincial branch of the Ministry of Labour, 
by year 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Azuay 5 8 8 12 16 26 27 30 20 
Bolivar 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 
Cañar 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 
Carchi 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 2 
Cotopaxi 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 4 
Chimborazo 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 5 
El Oro 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 14 12 
Esmeraldas 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 3 4 
Guayas 0 0 0 0 12 59 51 46 35 
Imbabura 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 8 5 
Loja 0 0 0 0 0 5 12 9 8 
Los Rios 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 3 
Manabí 0 0 0 0 0 14 25 20 18 
Morona Santiago 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 
Napo 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 
Pastaza 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 2 
Pichincha 0 0 14 14 7 57 70 70 54 
Tungurahua 0 0 4 4 3 13 10 9 9 
Zamora Chinchipe 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Galapagos 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 
Sucumbíos 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 3 2 
Orellana 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 4 5 
Santo Domingo 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 6 7 
Santa Elena 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 
Regional Secretariat  0 0 15 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Regional Secretariat - 
Coast 
0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
N t specified  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 10 13 48 55 46 240 269 260 213 
 Source: Administrative records of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Labour, 2015. 
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Table 3.6 Changes in the Value of the National Minimum Wage 
Year 
Nominal NMW 
(USD) 
Real NMW 
(USD of 2010) 
Increase in real 
terms (USD) 
Increase in real 
terms (%) 
2000 57.00 124.72     
2001 85.70 136.21 11.48 9.21 
2002 104.90 148.22 12.01 8.82 
2003 121.90 159.58 11.37 7.67 
2004 135.60 172.78 13.20 8.27 
2005 150.00 187.07 14.29 8.27 
2006 160.00 193.17 6.10 3.26 
2007 170.00 200.68 7.51 3.89 
2008 200.00 217.80 17.12 8.53 
2009 218.00 225.75 7.95 3.65 
2010 240.00 240.00 14.25 6.31 
2011 264.00 252.69 12.69 5.29 
2012 292.00 265.93 13.23 5.24 
2013 318.00 281.93 16.00 6.02 
2014 340.00 290.99 9.06 3.21 
2015 354.00 291.41 0.42 0.15 
2016 366.00 296.17 4.76 1.63 
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador (Monthly Statistical Reports) and National Institute of Statistics and Census 
(CPI Historical Series)  
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Table 3.7  Sample Size by Province and Year of the Data Used to Generate the Percentiles of Provincial Wage Distributions of Covered Workers 
  2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Azuay 1062 1036 895 890 703 831 1017 1044 971 1018 928 917 1047 1294 1318 1287 
Bolivar 197 148 608 598 649 687 606 619 589 558 468 528 615 568 641 606 
Cañar 190 266 697 697 561 652 733 763 683 677 490 548 683 697 697 661 
Carchi 121 143 797 793 774 867 769 744 764 822 585 661 792 918 892 905 
Cotopaxi 268 226 697 705 722 785 750 822 625 670 517 569 776 1421 1417 1313 
Chimborazo 370 275 571 598 588 596 602 650 535 561 410 492 547 645 653 615 
El Oro 750 731 1361 1445 1324 1289 1491 1533 1457 1598 1235 1442 1445 1558 1520 1543 
Esmeraldas 224 262 1000 975 1031 1087 1095 1068 935 1051 719 750 1006 1207 1147 1081 
Guayas 2645 2146 2167 2276 2234 2303 2092 2203 2734 2790 2498 2524 2705 2964 2791 2757 
Imbabura 333 327 763 746 766 754 741 732 746 801 682 625 779 1669 1714 1670 
Loja 280 403 578 646 616 696 706 670 628 652 543 649 655 690 650 644 
Los Rios 727 570 1310 1351 1200 1353 1337 1325 1143 1241 1079 1104 1226 1160 1247 1184 
Manabí 832 734 1077 1108 1149 1115 1111 1119 1024 1092 977 1065 1199 1223 1136 1143 
Morona Santiago 129 142 117 111 79 107 111 142 93 117 81 102 146 585 583 561 
Napo 154 178 215 193 239 228 197 211 163 214 148 164 215 1504 1258 1262 
Pastaza 206 175 112 99 117 118 111 138 103 108 77 113 105 649 620 561 
Pichincha 1662 1719 1742 1763 1827 1860 1632 1735 2170 2342 2017 1961 2380 2943 2715 2658 
Tungurahua 454 356 763 766 824 763 890 1034 952 996 833 885 948 1425 1420 1332 
Zamora Chinchipe 138 130 99 74 56 92 98 93 84 84 73 97 97 647 636 605 
Sucumbíos 196 207 181 174 161 160 190 198 179 186 125 144 183 728 734 744 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENEMDUR 2000-2016. 
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Table 3.8 Sample Size by Province and Year of the Data Used to Generate the Percentiles of Provincial Earnings Distributions of Uncovered 
Self-employed Workers 
  2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Azuay 692 736 615 603 562 598 533 632 623 634 625 540 631 882 816 879 
Bolivar 234 225 544 604 562 561 461 501 493 496 375 427 527 495 411 545 
Cañar 283 270 575 583 504 528 473 481 394 456 427 490 579 504 467 490 
Carchi 102 121 590 591 483 492 406 394 364 369 322 328 412 484 379 447 
Cotopaxi 275 257 590 614 621 595 515 541 487 508 432 468 510 1037 929 1013 
Chimborazo 437 382 582 598 611 600 493 520 501 478 395 383 591 664 555 587 
El Oro 557 474 687 777 739 699 763 775 717 711 711 742 732 895 793 818 
Esmeraldas 242 256 867 870 809 845 686 570 569 624 490 550 583 684 624 670 
Guayas 1703 1401 1068 1325 1299 1179 1207 1179 1542 1545 1425 1547 1439 1695 1712 1832 
Imbabura 261 297 494 542 518 601 438 381 420 396 426 360 433 1000 809 975 
Loja 414 378 568 595 574 560 450 551 428 503 487 518 556 574 566 627 
Los Rios 453 423 692 817 777 701 572 553 583 641 595 637 585 657 544 719 
Manabí 518 541 752 1084 869 851 727 626 625 730 687 650 593 722 661 846 
Morona Santiago 140 136 119 128 91 101 129 105 89 122 98 108 122 582 579 611 
Napo 88 100 165 179 145 182 104 132 104 159 102 90 123 928 913 1099 
Pastaza 147 143 69 85 67 69 56 57 65 77 48 64 63 516 490 492 
Pichincha 818 840 796 844 845 841 731 700 1014 1062 1125 999 978 1243 1180 1413 
Tungurahua 341 321 731 679 638 616 699 791 689 700 694 657 772 1131 982 1055 
Zamora Chinchipe 63 48 67 99 70 96 61 67 58 75 63 64 70 590 569 583 
Sucumbíos 179 161 127 153 128 121 95 100 76 91 128 88 77 393 392 432 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENEMDUR 2000-2016 
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Figure 3.4 CDF Estimates of the Log Hourly Wage Distribution of Covered Workers, 2000 - 
2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016.  
Note: The vertical line corresponding to the log of the hourly NMW in each year. 
 
Figure 3.5 Trends in Income Inequality by Income Source, Gini Coefficient, 2000-2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016, excluding 2002* which covered urban areas only. 
Error bars show point-wise 95% confidence intervals, calculated using bootstrap standard errors (50 replications).  
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Figure 3.6 The Effective NMW, The Effective NMW Adjusted for Noncompliance, and the Rate of Noncompliance by Province 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016. 
Notes: The effective NMW results from the differential between the value of the NMW and the 70th percentile of each province. Noncompliance is measured by the percentage 
of full-time employees who are paid less than 90% of the value of the monthly NMW, in each province. The NMW adjusted for noncompliance refers to an index of the NMW 
policy which adjusts the effective NMW by the rate of noncompliance. All series are computed using the ENEMDUR sample weights.  
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Figure 3.7 Trends in Lower-Tail Inequality by Province 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ENEMDUR 2000-2016. 
Notes: The Figure depicts the evolution of the difference between the log of percentiles 10th, 30th, 50th and the log of the 70th percentile, computed for each province. All series 
computed using the ENEMDUR sample weights. 
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Part   II 
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4 The Impact of a Cash Transfer Programme on Food 
Expenditure: The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) of 
Ecuador 
4.1 Introduction  
Cash transfer (CT) programmes are widely used in developing countries as a policy tool to 
break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. In Latin America, CTs gained popularity 
at the beginning of the 2000s and the majority of countries implemented conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programmes (i.e., tied to certain behaviours such as: school enrolment, health 
check-ups, and attendance at health information sessions). CTs were established with the 
objective of fostering the accumulation of human capital among children in poor families, 
focusing mainly on access to food, health and education.  
 In Ecuador, the first means-test CT programme was launched in 2003 and was called 
the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH). Mothers of children aged 0-18 years qualify to receive 
a monthly transfer if they are in the bottom two quintiles of the “Selben” index. In contrast to 
most CT programmes in the region, the BDH was implemented as an unconditional cash 
transfer (UCT) programme. The objectives of the programme, as defined by the Ministry of 
Economic and Social Inclusion, are: (i) to ensure a minimum consumption of food and access 
to basic services, (ii) to reduce child malnourishment, and (iii) to incentivise school 
attendance.7 
 The impact of this unconditional cash transfer programme on access to food is a 
relevant question considering that in the last decade the fraction of children with chronic 
malnutrition in the country has stagnated at around 25% (SIISE 2015). There are two papers 
that analyse the effects of the BDH on food expenditure. The first one finds that rural 
households that were randomly assigned to receive the transfer have a significantly higher food 
share, after the programme, compared to households in the control group (Schady and Rosero 
2008). The second one finds that the programme increased the total amount of food expenditure 
for beneficiary household in urban areas (Buser et al. 2017). However, this prior research has 
                                               
7 These goals are outlined in the description of the BDH programme available online at: 
http://www.inclusion.gob.ec/objetivos-bdh/.  
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been mostly silent on the question of which of the components of food expenditure has 
increased the most. 
 In this paper, I assess the effects of the BDH on food expenditure and its components, 
using a dataset that covers both urban and rural areas. The objective is to identify if the BDH 
improves the quality of the diet of the beneficiary households. For example, the Ecuadorian 
government has a goal that at least 260 Kcal /day of food intake should consist of proteins; 
based on a diet of 2000 Kcal /day this goal implies that at least 13% of food energy should 
derive from proteins.8 In this study, I reveal in which of the components of food expenditure 
the BDH has an effect. To do so, I classify the expenditure on food into eight groups, based on 
their nutritional intake: 1) proteins (meat, chicken, milk, etc.); 2) potatoes, yucca and other 
tubers; 3) cereals; 4) fruit and vegetables; 5) pulses; 6) fats and oils; 7) sugar and sweets; and 
8) miscellaneous food.  
 Additionally, I evaluate the effects of the BDH on the consumption of unintended items. 
While most of the studies in this regard focus on the effects of CTs on alcohol and tobacco 
consumption (see Evans and Popova 2014, for a review of the literature), I include in the 
analysis expenditure on mobile top-ups. I do so also with the objective of trying to deal with 
the problem of underreporting of expenditure on unintended items. This issue may be more 
present when asking individuals about their expenditure on alcohol and tobacco than when 
asking them about their expenditure on mobile top-ups. Finally, I also evaluate if the BDH has 
an impact on the consumption of durable goods. 
 The monthly CT increases poor household’s disposable income, shifting to the right the 
budget constraint of the household. This increase in total household income allows members 
of the household to consume more. If the family uses the CT to purchase more and better-
quality food, or invest in food production or productive assets, household food security and 
household diet diversity are improved. Additionally, the improvement in access to food may 
help to improve children’s nutritional intake if food resources are shared in a child-sensitive 
way within the household  (see Groot et al. 2017, for a comprehensive synthesis of the link 
between CTs and child nutrition). 
 Another mechanism by which the monthly CT can improve the availability of food, and 
its quality, is by affecting intra-household dynamics of bargaining power. If the transfer is 
received by women, as in the case of the BDH, then they are better able to advocate for their 
preferences as a result of controlling more resources. There is some evidence that rejects the 
                                               
8 See goal 2.1.2. in the Ecuadorian National Plan 2009-2013. 
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hypothesis of income pooling resources within the family and shows that transfers made to 
women have substantial and significant effects on family expenditure patterns increasing the 
expenditure on food and on items for children (Thomas 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; 
Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Doss 2006). Non-unitary economic models of 
household bargaining predict that transfers made to women will increase their bargaining 
power within the household and result in expenditure patterns that reflects better their 
preferences (see for example, Chiappori 1988; Bourguignon et al. 1993). 
 There are several studies that evaluate the effects of BDH. The studies show the 
programme increases school enrolment (Araujo and Schady 2006), but it does not have an 
effect on cognitive achievement (Ponce and Bedi 2010). With regard to child development for 
under 6s, a study finds that the programme has modest positive effects on development 
outcomes (including growth, cognition and language), but only for rural children (aged 36-72 
months) from the lowest income quartile (Paxson and Schady 2010). Similarly, for younger 
children (aged 12-35 months) in rural areas, another study finds that the BDH programme 
improves language development but it does not have an effect on child malnourishment 
(Fernald and Hidrobo 2011). 
 In terms of food expenditure, Schady and Rosero (2008) evaluate the effect of the BDH 
transfer received by women in rural areas on food share. The authors find that the BDH 
programme increases the expenditure on food as a fraction of total expenditure. They suggest 
that the BDH is used differently from other sources of income. This goes in line with the theory 
of non-unitary household’s model. An important limitation in respect to the external validity 
of their study, however, is that it covered rural areas only, while approximately 60% of BDH 
recipients live in urban areas. On the other hand, in a study for urban areas only, Buser et al. 
(2017) find that two years after beneficiary families lost the BDH transfer their young children 
weighted less and were shorter and more likely to be stunted than young children in families 
that kept the BDH transfer. The authors identified that the mechanism behind this result is a 
reduction in total household food expenditure by households that lost the transfer. 
 The studies that evaluate the impact of CCTs on food consumption patterns, for the 
region, find that the programmes increase expenditure on fruits, vegetables and products rich 
in proteins, such as meat, chicken, eggs, etc. (see Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004, for 
Oportunidades in Mexico; Maluccio and Flores 2005 for Red de Protección Social (RPS) in 
Nicaragua; Attanasio and Mesnard 2006, for Familias en Accion in Colombia; Martins and 
Monteiro 2016, for Bolsa Família in Brazil). In the case of the Mexican programme, 
Oportunidades, a study also shows that the programme increases the expenditure on durable 
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goods, including TVs, DVDs, phones, white goods, etc. (Angelucci et al. 2012). In contrast, in 
the case of the Nicaraguan programme, Red de Protección Social, Maluccio (2010) does not 
find evidence that the programme led to an increase in the consumption of this kind of items. 
 A distinguishing feature of the BDH compared to other CT programmes in Latin 
America, is that it was implemented as an unconditional cash transfer programme. This 
characteristic raises the question of whether UCT programmes generate similar effects in terms 
of changes in food consumption patterns or whether these kinds of transfers are spent on other 
unintended items such as mobile top-ups, alcohol and tobacco. Contributing to the answering 
this question, this study I evaluate the effects of the unconditional BDH transfer on expenditure, 
focusing primarily on food expenditure and its components. 
 UCTs allow recipients freedom of choice and assume efficient allocation of resources 
based on the specific needs of each household. On the other hand, from a paternalistic view, 
in-kind transfers can be useful to correct distortions in the use of the cash transfer, although 
these kinds of transfers may not provide the specific items the family needs. A middle 
approach, between these two options, are CCTs, with which the recipients get the cash, but on 
the condition that the money is used to achieve specific objectives.  
 In the case of the BDH, the marketing campaign when launching the programme 
stressed that beneficiaries were responsible of enrolling their children to school and taking the 
under 5’s to health centres for growth and preventive check-ups. In addition, the beneficiaries 
were encouraged to participate in nutrition and family planning talks. However, in practice, the 
government never enforced and monitored compliance with these conditions, which makes the 
BDH an UCT programme.9  
 After using a regression discontinuity identification strategy, the results suggest that the 
BDH has an impact on food consumption by increasing the expenditure on protein-rich food 
such as meat, chicken, cheese, eggs, etc. for beneficiary household living in urban areas. The 
BDH increases the amount expended in this kind of products in both absolute terms (USD) and 
as a fraction of total food expenditure. This effect takes place mainly for beneficiary households 
with children under 5 years. For this group, the findings suggest that the programme also 
generates a change in the pattern of food consumption by reducing the spending on ready meals 
outside the house and substituting it with an increase in the expenditure on protein-rich 
products. 
                                               
9 In 2012, after the dataset used in this study was collected, the government started to randomly check the 
conditionalities covering a small fraction of beneficiary households. 
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 The remaining of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a background 
to the BDH cash transfer programme. In Section 4.3, I discuss and present my identification 
strategy. I describe the data used for the analysis in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the results 
of the analysis of the effects of the BDH on total expenditure and on food expenditure. Finally, 
in Section 4.7, I discuss the results and conclude. 
4.2 Programme Background  
The implementation of a cash transfer programme in Ecuador began in 1998 with the launching 
of the Bono Solidario. This unconditional cash transfer programme was designed to 
compensate poor household for the removal of gas and electricity subsidies. In 2003, the 
government merged the Bono Solidario with Beca Escolar, a conditional cash transfer 
programme designed to increase school enrolment. The Bono Solidario became an UCT 
programme and was renamed as Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH). The main goal of the 
BDH is to improve the accumulation of human capital among poor Ecuadorian families.  
 The BDH is the first cash transfer programme that uses a proxy means test to target the 
poorest families and select the beneficiaries. The score is computed using principal components 
analysis and it is called the Selben index. The information to compute the Selben score comes 
from the Registro Social (RS), which is a dataset of a census of poor households updated every 
five years. From 2003 to 2008 the BDH was targeted based on the Selben I index. All household 
in the lowest 40% of the Selben I distribution (those with a score less than 50.65) were defined 
as “poor” and were eligible to participate in the programme. The amount of the monthly 
transfer was initially $15 USD for households in the lowest 20% of the distribution and $11.50 
USD for those located above the 20% and below the 40% levels. In 2007, the transfer was 
increased to $30 USD for all households in the bottom 40% of the Selben I distribution. 
 From 2009 to 2013, the BDH was targeted based on the new Selben (Selben II) score 
using information from the second wave of the RS, mostly collected in 2008. The Selben II 
index is computed using 59 variables covering areas such as household asset, characteristics of 
the house (access to water, toilet, shower, type of floor, walls and roof, and household 
appliances), characteristics of the head of household (level of education, employment), 
characteristics of children, and household size (see Fabara 2009, for the complete list of 
variables). 
 During the time period from 2009 to 2013, all households with a score less than 35.6 
points in the Selben II were defined as “poor” and were eligible to get the monthly transfer of 
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$35 USD per month. Finally, in March 2013, the government reduced the cut-off and increased 
the amount of the transfer so that all households with a Selben II score lower than 32.5 were 
eligible to get a monthly transfer of $50 USD.  
 The target population of BDH are mothers in households defined as “poor” with 
children aged 0 to 18 years. The monthly transfer is received by women, who can be the head 
of the household or the wife of the head of the household. It can also be the case that the transfer 
recipient is the daughter of the head of the household or another woman, within the household, 
who has children under 18 years. The BDH transfer is collected by mothers through local banks 
and, since 2008, mothers also have the option of collect the transfer in food stores, pharmacies, 
and other establishments, that have a payment terminal machine. 
 The non-enforced conditions, called “co-responsibilities” by the administrators of the 
programme, are that school-aged children (5-18 years of age) have to regularly attend school 
and under-5s have to go to health checkouts. The administrators of the programme use the term 
“co-responsibilities” to reflect the responsibility that parents have in complying with the 
conditions of the programme. However, this approach implied, in practice, that there were no 
substantive efforts to control and enforce the conditionalities impose by the programme. This 
fact makes the BDH to be regarded as a UCT programme. 
 In this paper, I assess the effects of the BDH with data collected by the end of 2011. 
The amount of the unconditional monthly transfer was therefore $35 USD, which represents 
around 13% of the monthly national minimum wage (NMW, which equals $264 USD in 2011). 
In 2011, the annual budget of the programme was $722 million USD (around 1 percent of 
GDP) and the programme covered 1.2 million households (around 32% of the total number of 
households in Ecuador). Approximately 60% of the beneficiaries lived in urban areas and 40% 
lived in rural areas.  
4.3 Data 
I use the Survey of Socioeconomic Situation of Households (ESSHO for its Spanish acronym) 
collected between October and December 2011 by the Ministry of Social Development of 
Ecuador. The ESSHO survey covered both urban and rural areas. It collected information from 
a variety of households and individual characteristics, including an extensive and detailed 
module on household expenditure. I use this expenditure module to compute total expenditure 
and total food expenditure. I also distinguish between the different components of these two 
aggregates to analyse the effect of the BDH on expenditure components.  
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 The ESSHO 2011 has information for 1,422 households with children aged under 18 
years. One important characteristic of this survey is that it samples all the households registered 
in the Registro Social, with a sample designed such that the Selben II index of the selected 
households is normally distributed around the threshold of 36.5. This sample design gives us 
the opportunity to compare households with a Selben II index just below the threshold (treated 
group) with those with a Selben II index just above the threshold (control group) and have 
enough observations to make the comparison. 
 The ESSHO questionnaire asks about a wide range of household expenditures, 
including expenditure on durables, on household services, on food (to prepare and serve in the 
house, and ready meals consumed outside), on school-related items for under 5s, on school-
related items for children older than 5 years, on alcohol and tobacco, on mobile credit, and on 
other services such as entertainment and travel tickets. I calculate expenditure in each of these 
items and compute total expenditure. All expenditure items were converted into weekly flows 
and expressed in US dollars (the official currency of Ecuador since 2000). Additionally, I 
compute the share of expenditure in each of these items as fraction of total expenditure 
 For the analysis of the effect of the BDH on the components of food consumption, I 
first classify the expenditure on food into eight groups, based on their nutritional intake: 1) 
proteins (meat, chicken, milk, etc.); 2) potatoes, yucca and other tubers; 3) cereals; 4) fruit and 
vegetables; 5) pulses; 6) fats and oils; 7) sugar and sweets; and 8) miscellaneous food (which 
includes expenditure on food outside the house). For each group of food, I compute weekly 
expenditure in US dollars and the share of expenditure as fraction of total food expenditure. 
  In Panel A of Table 4.1, I show the average household weekly expenditure for the 
components of total expenditure, as well as the average of their shares as fractions of total 
expenditure. In Panel A of the table, I present the average of the weekly expenditure in each of 
the components of food expenditure and the average shares, as fractions of total food 
expenditure. I present the results for BDH recipients and non-recipients using the complete 
sample of the ESSHO (N=1422 households), with SELBEN II scores ranging from 1.5 to 77.3.  
 The results in Table 4.1 show that there are substantial differences in expenditure in 
USD, and in their shares, between recipients and non-recipients in almost all expenditure items. 
As expected, total expenditure for BDH recipients is about 61 USD lower than non-recipients. 
In line with the food Engel curve, poorer households that are beneficiaries of the BDH have a 
significantly higher food share, 44%, compared to richer households that score above the 
threshold, and do not receive the transfer, 38%. In terms of shares of expenditure for the 
components of total food expenditure, BDH recipients have a lower share on products rich in 
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proteins and have a larger share on cereals, pulses, fat and oils, and sugar and sweets, compared 
to non-recipients.  
Table 4.1 Household weekly expenditure in USD, BDH recipients and non-recipients 
  Mean (weekly, USD)   
Share (as fraction of the 
total) 
  Recipi- ents  
Non-
recipi- 
ents  
p-
value, 
diff 
  Recipi- ents  
Non-
recipi- 
ents  
p-
value, 
diff 
Panel A: Total expenditure and its components 
Total expenditure 110.79 172.14 0.00         
Food expenditure  45.65 55.64 0.00   0.44 0.38 0.00 
Food expenditure outside the house 10.10 17.99 0.00   0.08 0.10 0.00 
Alcohol and tobacco 3.17 2.28 0.03   0.02 0.01 0.00 
Mobile credit 1.70 3.35 0.00   0.01 0.02 0.00 
Household services 5.23 13.66 0.00   0.05 0.09 0.00 
Durables 30.47 56.19 0.00   0.26 0.26 0.36 
School-related for under 5s 0.34 1.03 0.00   0.00 0.01 0.00 
School-related (older than 5) 6.06 11.03 0.00   0.05 0.07 0.00 
Other expenses 8.06 10.97 0.00   0.07 0.07 0.63 
                
Panel B: Total food expenditure and its components    
Total food expenditure   55.75 73.64 0.00         
Proteins (meat, chicken, milk etc.)  16.06 21.81 0.00   0.28 0.30 0.04 
Potatoes, yucca and other tubers  2.23 2.68 0.00   0.04 0.04 0.13 
Cereals 9.97 10.63 0.06   0.19 0.16 0.00 
Fruit and vegetables  8.93 11.66 0.00   0.16 0.16 0.55 
Pulses 0.81 0.86 0.29   0.02 0.01 0.00 
Fats and oils 2.50 2.24 0.01   0.05 0.03 0.00 
Sugar and sweets  3.04 3.20 0.31   0.06 0.05 0.00 
Miscellaneous food  12.22 20.56 0.00   0.20 0.25 0.00 
                
Number of Obs. 774 648     774 648   
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
 
 In order to identify the effects of the BDH on food consumption, I need to work with a 
comparable sample of households. As stated above, households scoring below 36.5 in the 
Selben II index received the BDH, and households scoring above this threshold did not receive 
the BDH. This creates the conditions to use a regression discontinuity design (RD) to try to 
identify the effects of the programme.  
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 Restricting the sample to households within a very small interval around the threshold 
will provide a potentially unbiased estimate of the impact of the programme. However, the 
selection of the bandwidth around the threshold presents a clear bias–variance trade-off, where 
wider bandwidths will be more efficient (will have lower variance) at the expense of increased 
risk of bias in the estimates, and narrower bandwidths will be less efficient (will have larger 
variance) but are likely to be less biased. To implement the comparison, following Buser et al. 
(2017), I restrict the sample to household scoring within 0.3 standard deviations of the cut-off 
on Selben II index.  
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for selected variables of BDH recipients and non-recipients 
close to the SELBEN II threshold 
  Recipients Non-recipients p=value, diff 
Household characteristics 
Urban 0.78 0.75 0.51 
Proper roof 0.81 0.75 0.16 
Proper floor 0.84 0.83 0.86 
Proper walls 0.84 0.85 0.74 
Pipeline water access 0.65 0.76 0.03 
Proper toilet 0.90 0.95 0.05 
Proper shower 0.64 0.68 0.43 
Household size 4.93 4.68 0.21 
Crowding 2.17 2.01 0.25 
No. children aged 0-4 0.68 0.60 0.38 
No. children aged 5-18 1.75 1.73 0.92 
No. persons aged 19-44  1.85 1.79 0.61 
No. persons aged 45-64  0.65 0.55 0.22 
No. persons age 65 or older  0.02 0.01 0.54 
        
Head of household (HH) characteristics     
Age 41.68 41.25 0.71 
Years of education 6.86 7.75 0.02 
Female 0.25 0.20 0.30 
Indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian 0.13 0.15 0.61 
        
N 150 194   
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset.  
Note: Proper floor, roof, and walls are dummy variables indicating the state of the building where 1 denotes a 
“good” or “normal” state. Water access is a dummy indicator for whether the household is connected to the water 
network. Proper toilet and shower are dummy variables for the availability of toilet facility and shower in the 
household, respectively. Crowding denotes number of household members per room.  
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 In the ESSHO dataset, the interval of 0.3 standard deviations around the cut-off 
corresponds to a bandwidth of +/- 5 points in the Selben II index, from 31.5 to 41.5. In my 
main analysis of the effects of the BDH, I restrict the ESSHO sample to households scoring 
within this interval of the Selben II index; the number of observations in this restricted sample 
is 344, with 150 BDH recipients and 194 non-recipients. In Table 4.2, I present descriptive 
statistics for the restricted sample. The table shows that there are not significant differences in 
most of the households and head of household’s characteristics between BDH recipient and 
non-recipients. Additionally, as robustness checks, I also present the estimates of the effect of 
the BDH using a data driven method for the selection of the bandwidth. 
Table 4.3  Means of the outcome variables of BDH recipients and non-recipients close to the 
SELBEN II threshold 
  Mean (weekly, USD) 
  
Share (as fraction of the 
total) 
  Recipi- ents  
Non-
recipi- 
ents  
p-
value, 
diff 
  Recipi- ents  
Non-
recipi- 
ents  
p-
value, 
diff 
Total expenditure and its components 
Total expenditure 126.20 131.63 0.54         
Food expenditure  48.86 51.25 0.41   0.43 0.42 0.93 
Food expenditure outside the house 11.11 14.35 0.04   0.08 0.10 0.07 
Alcohol and tobacco 2.71 2.47 0.73   0.02 0.02 0.67 
Mobile credit 2.43 2.05 0.21   0.02 0.02 0.10 
Household services 6.26 8.83 0.00   0.06 0.07 0.01 
Durables 38.09 34.45 0.50   0.26 0.23 0.02 
School-related for under 5s 0.47 0.52 0.76   0.00 0.00 0.76 
School-related (older than 5) 7.20 8.15 0.35   0.06 0.06 0.55 
Other expenses 9.04 9.55 0.70   0.07 0.07 0.76 
                
Total food expenditure and its components    
Total food expenditure   59.97 65.60 0.13         
Proteins (meat, chicken, milk etc.)  17.23 18.16 0.48   0.29 0.28 0.54 
Potatoes, yucca and other tubers  2.58 2.56 0.96   0.04 0.04 0.79 
Cereals 10.27 11.11 0.24   0.18 0.18 0.91 
Fruit and vegetables  10.50 10.70 0.82   0.17 0.16 0.25 
Pulses 0.75 0.87 0.30   0.01 0.01 0.77 
Fats and oils 2.24 2.27 0.87   0.04 0.04 0.56 
Sugar and sweets  2.89 3.12 0.35   0.05 0.05 0.89 
Miscellaneous food  13.51 16.80 0.05   0.21 0.24 0.17 
                
Number of Obs. 150 194     150 194   
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
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 Finally, in Table 4.3, I also present the average of the outcome variables for recipient 
and non-recipients for my restricted sample. There are not significant differences in most of 
the components of total expenditure and of total food expenditure. The only exceptions are 
expenditure on household services and on food outside the household, for which non-recipient 
have a higher expenditure in USD and a higher share, as a fraction of total expenditure. 
4.4 Empirical Strategy 
The idea of the RD identification strategy is that assignment to the programme for each 
household, !, depends on the value of an observed continuous variable, running variable, "#, 
relative to a given threshold, denoted by $. For example, if "# > $ the household does not 
receive the treatment (control group), and if "# < $ the household gets the treatment (treatment 
group). In the RD design one compares the outcome variables between treated and control 
households within a small interval around the threshold. By restricting the analysis to 
observations close to the threshold the RD method try to make the treatment and control group 
as alike as possible. In a small interval around the threshold, controlling by the assignment and 
other covariates, any difference in the outcome variables between the treatment and control 
group can be attributed as the effect of the programme. 
  In Table 4.4, I present the relationship between the assignment rule and the self-
reported treatment status of households around the threshold. The table shows that eligibility 
and programme status match in about 83 percent of cases in the sample (287/344), but there 
are 36 households who are eligible for the BDH but report in the survey that they do not receive 
the programme. There are also 21 households who are not eligible for the programme but report 
in the survey that they get the BDH cash transfer.  
Table 4.4 Assignment rule and treatment status 
Treatment status Selben II score   
Less than 36.5 More than 36.5 Total 
Recipients 129 21 150 
Non-recipients  36 158 194 
        
Total 165 179 344 
       Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
 
 The results in Table 4.4 imply that treatment status in my restricted sample is not a 
deterministic function of the running variable. In this case, I cannot implement a sharp RD 
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design. However, the probability of receiving the BDH is a discontinuous function of the 
Selben II score at the threshold. As shown in Figure 4.1, there is an increase in the probability 
of being treated, with a sharp spike at the cut-off. Households with a Selben II index of less 
than 36.5 are about 50 percentage points more likely to receive the BDH compared with 
households that have a Selben II index of just above the 36.5. 
Figure 4.1 Relation between treatment and RS index 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Note: Following a suggestion by  Imbens and Lemieux (2008), two separate smoothed regression lines based on 
local polynomials are estimated on either side of the RS cut-off point of 36.5 and the predicted probabilities of 
treatment from these two regressions are plotted versus the RS index. For the local polynomial estimates the 
Epanechnikov kernel is used as the kernel function and the bandwidth is given by the “rule-of-thumb” proposed 
by Silverman (1986).  
 
 The main assumption behind the RD design is that unobserved characteristics vary 
continuously with the observed characteristics used to determine the treatment, for households 
around the threshold. This assumption may not be true if households can manipulate their 
position relative to the threshold. If there is not manipulation, then there should be no break in 
the distribution of the household score as the cut-off is approached from above or below. Figure 
4.2 shows the density of the Selben II index. In the figure, we can see that there is not a sharp 
increase in the number of observations either right above or right below the cut-off point of 
36.5. The results of the formal McCrary (2008) manipulation test confirm this finding; we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of no sorting around the threshold (the p-value of the t-test is larger 
than 0.10). 
  
127 
Figure 4.2 McCrary manipulation test 
 
Note: with a bin size of 0.79 and a bandwidth of 17 the density of the assignment variable, the SELBEN II index, 
does not show significant differences around the cut-off of 36.5. Using the formal sorting test proposed by 
McCrary (2008), we do not reject the null hypothesis of no sorting around the threshold (p-value=0.43). 
  
 Once I confirm that there is not the problem of manipulation, or sorting, around the cut-
off, I exploit the discontinuity in the probability of treatment around the cut-off (see Figure 
4.1) to identify the causal effect of the BDH. Specifically, I employ a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design and estimate the effects of the BDH using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
framework (Angrist and Lavy 1999; Hahn et al. 2001; Battistin et al. 2009). In the first stage, 
I instrument the treatment status, '#, with the assignment rule, 1{"# ≤ 36.5}, as follows:  
 
 	'# = 31{"# ≤ 36.5} + 5("#) + 8#9 + :# (4.1)  
 
where 1{"# ≤ 36.5} is an indicator function that takes the value of one when the Selben II score 
of household i is lower that the cut-off (36.5) and zero when the score is above the cut-off. 
  5("#)	is a smooth function of the Selben II index, "#. In the empirical literature it is 
common to use a high-order (third, fourth or higher) polynomial of the running variable, 
nevertheless, following the recommendations of Gelman and Imbens (2014), I present the 
results using a linear and a quadratic function. Finally, 8# is a vector of control variables that 
includes a dummy variable for households located in urban areas, a set of variables for the head 
of the household (female dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), 
and the number of individuals in the household. 
 The second stage is then: 
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 ;# = < + ='# + 5("#) + 8>? + @# (4.2) 
 
where ;# is the outcome variable, '# is a binary indicator for receiving the BDH transfer, 
instrumented by the assignment rule (see Eq. 4.1). Other notation is as in the first stage 
equation.  
 I run this model for total expenditure and for each component of total expenditure, both 
expressed in weekly USD. I also run the model for the expenditure in each component of total 
expenditure expressed in shares as fractions of total expenditure. Similarly, I run the model for 
each component of total food expenditure in weekly USD and in shares as fractions of total 
food expenditure.  
 In the parametric regression models, in the form of Eq. 4.2, I use the restricted sample 
of household scoring ± 5 around the discontinuity threshold and assume that households below 
and above the cut-off are essentially identical, prior to the treatment. Thus, any differences in 
expenditure patterns between these two groups, once controlled for the running variable, are 
regarded as the causal effect of the BDH.  
 In the fuzzy regression discontinuity case, the estimate of = in Eq. 4.2 is the treatment 
effect for those whose participation in the BDH is influenced by the assignment rule. This 
effect is usually called the local average treatment effect and is estimated only for the 
compliers, i.e.; household with a score less than the thresholds that received the BDH transfer 
and household with a score higher than the threshold that do not receive the transfer. 
 Finally, as a robustness check, I estimate the effects using nonparametric local 
polynomial estimators (Calonico et al. 2014a), with bias-corrected point estimators and robust 
standard errors (Calonico et al. 2014b). For the selection of the bandwidth around the cut-off, 
I use a mean-squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth selection procedure (Calonico et al. 
2017). These nonparametric estimators are the results of weighted polynomial regressions 
estimated separately to each side of the cut-off within the chosen bandwidth.  
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 BDH Programme Participation  
In Table 4.5, I show the estimate of the first stage equation (see Eq. 4.1), confirming the 
statistical significance of the discontinuity seen in Figure 4.1. The coefficient on the assignment 
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rule, my instrument, is around 0.51 and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all three 
specifications. Additionally, the partial R2 of the instrument is around 0.10 and the F-statistic 
is larger than 10, which suggest that our IV estimates of the effect of the BDH implemented 
via 2SLS are reliable (Stock et al. 2002) 
Table 4.5 Participating in BDH (first stage) 
  Participating in BDH  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Below cutoff point of 36.5 (Z=1)  0.511*** 0.509*** 0.503*** 
  (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) 
        
Quadratic term  N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y 
        
R2  0.456 0.457 0.477 
Partial R2 of excluded instrument  0.103 0.103 0.103 
F-Statistic on excluded instrument  38.872 37.048 36.485 
Source: Author’s calculations from the ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: N = 344. Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the province level appear in parentheses. Controls: dummy for urban areas, a set of variables 
for the head of household (female dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), and the 
number of individuals in the household.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
  
4.5.2 Effect on Total Expenditure and its Components  
Before I present the effect of the BDH on the patterns of food expenditure, I show the results 
of estimates of the impact of the BDH on total expenditure and its components, including total 
food expenditure in and outside of the house. Table 4.6 contains the results. In Column 1, I use 
a linear function of the running variable and do not add the set of the control variable, 8>. In 
Columns 2 and 3, I show the results using a quadratic function of the running variable without 
and with the set of the control variable, respectively. Column 3 shows the result of my preferred 
specification. In this model I control for characteristics of the head of the household (female 
dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), a binary variable for 
urban areas, and the number of individuals in the household. 
All three specifications show similar results. The IV estimates of the coefficient on the 
BDH treatment variable for the total expenditure model are large, positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Based on the estimate of the more comprehensive specification 
(Column 3), my preferred specification, the results suggest that effect of the BDH on total 
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expenditure is about $79.6 USD per week. Analysing each component of total expenditure, we 
can see that this effect is generated by higher expenditure on food (inside the house), on mobile 
credit and on household durables. However, when I analyse the effects on shares, as a fraction 
of total expenditure, there is not significant effect of the programme on the share of expending 
in these items. Additionally, the results of the programme effects on shares also show a 
reduction in the share of expending on meals outside the house. 
Table 4.6 IV estimates of the effect of the BDH on total expenditure and its components 
  
Programme Effects on 
Expenditure (USD)   
Programme Effects on 
Expenditure Shares (as 
fraction of total expenditure) 
  (1) (2) (3)         
Total expenditure 73.585** 73.495** 79.626**          
  (36.862) (36.589) (32.133)         
Food expenditure  16.339* 15.994* 16.870**    0.017 0.016 0.011 
  (9.158) (8.949) (8.355)   (0.070) (0.071) (0.073) 
Food expenditure 
(outside the house) 
-1.122 -1.142 -0.882   -0.049** -0.049** -0.047* 
(6.635) (6.571) (5.714)   (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Alcohol and tobacco 1.712 1.692 2.126   -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
  (3.068) (3.102) (3.503)   (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Mobile credit 2.380** 2.411** 2.539**    0.004 0.004 0.005 
  (1.134) (1.177) (1.160)   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Household services -1.966 -1.959 -1.552   -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 
  (3.924) (3.945) (3.919)   (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
Durables 44.424** 44.748** 49.159**    0.043 0.044 0.048 
  (19.514) (19.874) (20.202)   (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
School-related for 
under-5s 
0.549 0.546 0.686   0.002 0.002 0.004 
(0.684) (0.693) (0.774)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
School-related for 
children >5 years 
old 
5.472 5.419 4.891   0.02 0.02 0.013 
(4.354) (4.345) (4.254)   (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) 
Other services 5.796 5.787 5.791   -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 
  (4.393) (4.444) (3.770)   (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
                
Quadratic term  N Y Y   N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y   N N Y 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level appear in parentheses. Controls: dummy for urban areas, a set of variables for the 
head of household (female dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), and the number 
of individuals in the household.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
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 From the non-parametric analysis, see Table 4.12 in the Appendix, the fuzzy RD 
estimates of the effect of the BDH for total expenditure and expenditure on durable goods are 
significant only at the 10% level. The expenditure on mobile top-up remind significant at the 
5% level. The effect on food expenditure is not significantly different from zero. In terms of 
shares, none of the non-parametric estimates are significantly different from zero, under my 
preferred specification with controls. In this analysis, the bandwidths range from 6.2 to 15.2 
and are computed using the mean-squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth selection procedure 
(Calonico et al. 2017).  
 On Table 4.7, I present the IV parametric estimates of the BDH on total expenditure 
and its components for households classified into different groups: urban areas only, rural areas 
only, households with children under-5 years of age, and household without an under-5.  The 
results for expenditure on food (to be consumed inside house) reveal that the increase, in 
absolute terms, is mainly driven by the effect on BDH recipients living in urban areas. This 
result goes in line with the findings Buser et al. (2017). However, while the authors find that 
the magnitude of the effect of the programme is quite close to the monthly transfer of 35 USD, 
the estimates on Table 4.7 suggest that the magnitude of the effect is around the double; 14 
USD per-week or equivalently 60 USD per-month.  
 The results in Table 4.7 suggest that the BDH programme increases expenditure on 
school related items and services (books and notebooks, school uniforms, transport to school, 
tuition fees, etc.) for school-aged children living in urban areas, both in absolute terms (weekly 
USD) and as a fraction of total expenditure. On the other hand, the findings also suggest that 
the BDH programme reduces the expenditure on ready meals outside the house for household 
with under-5s, in both absolute terms (weekly USD) and as the fraction total expending 
  Before concluding this section, it is important to note that the IV estimates of the effect 
of the BDH are the ratio of the difference in average expenditure between those below and 
those above the cut-off (intention to treatment effect, ITT) to the first stage (treatment 
discontinuity). The IV estimates are therefore the effect of the BDH for the compliers within 
the chosen bandwidth. In Table 4.10 in the Appendix, I show the ITT estimates. For all of the 
outcome variables where the IV estimates are statistically significant, in Table 4.6, the ITT 
effects are positive and significant, but they differ in magnitude. As expected, the IV estimates 
are around the double of the ITT estimates, since the first stage coefficient is around 0.51. 
 In the next section, I examine if the increase in expenditure on food is driven by 
expenditure in nutrient rich products or in other products. 
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Table 4.7 IV estimates of the effect of the BDH on total expenditure and its components expenditure, for groups 
  Programme Effects on Food Expenditure (USD)   Programme Effects on Shares (as fraction of total exp.) 
  Urban Rural   
Under-5 in 
H. 
No under-
5 in H.   Urban Rural   
Under-5 in 
H. 
No under-5 
in H. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Total expenditure 82.627** 20.824   22.702 99.797***             
  (39.185) (55.606)   (29.064) (37.314)             
Food expenditure  14.440** 15.881   10.572 18.931   -0.004 0.117   0.065 0.006 
  (6.728) (32.576)   (9.992) (14.601)   (0.071) (0.134)   (0.073) (0.095) 
Food expenditure (outside) -2.286 -4.416   -15.811*** 9.309   -0.059** -0.052   -0.115*** 0.008 
(7.379) (10.091)   (6.001) (7.713)   (0.024) (0.073)   (0.037) (0.033) 
Alcohol and tobacco 2.878 -3.824   -0.535 2.44   0.002 -0.018   -0.026 0.016 
  (3.618) (7.561)   (2.507) (4.948)   (0.024) (0.064)   (0.021) (0.030) 
Mobile credit 2.338* 2.315   3.031**  0.794   0.001 0.017   0.01 -0.005 
  (1.238) (2.741)   (1.274) (1.502)   (0.006) (0.017)   (0.010) (0.008) 
Household services -2.001 -1.933   1.185 -4.582   -0.021 -0.031   -0.009 -0.03 
  (4.608) (4.673)   (3.935) (6.094)   (0.024) (0.023)   (0.020) (0.033) 
Durables 51.666** 17.000   12.777 65.759**    0.029 0.131   0.043 0.048 
  (23.241) (21.809)   (18.947) (26.684)   (0.039) (0.114)   (0.067) (0.067) 
School-related for under-5s 0.64 -0.072   1.86     0.003 0   0.013   
(0.834) (1.325)   (1.760)     (0.010) (0.012)   (0.019)   
School-related for children 
>5  
9.665*** -12.625   7.257**  -0.041   0.058*** -0.136   0.031 -0.023 
(3.305) (14.574)   (3.649) (6.037)   (0.020) (0.120)   (0.025) (0.058) 
Other services 5.287 8.499   2.365 7.187   -0.009 -0.029   -0.011 -0.02 
  (3.666) (11.165)   (4.572) (5.477)   (0.020) (0.048)   (0.026) (0.036)    
  
  
  
  
  
  
N 265 79   168 176   265 79   168 176 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. IV estimates using a second order polynomial of the Selben II index. Control variables: 
the number of individuals in the household; and for models shown in columns 3,4,7, and 8, I also include a dummy variable for urban areas. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the province level appear in parentheses. *10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
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4.5.3 Effect on the Components of Food Expenditure  
I now focus on the effect of the BDH on components of food expenditure. In Table 4.6, I 
showed that the BDH has a positive and significant effect on food expenditure, of about $17 
USD per week. The results in Table 4.8 help us to identify if the impact on food expenditure is 
generated by expenditure in a particular group of food items. The table shows that the effect 
on food expenditure is generated mainly by the increase in expenditure on items rich in proteins 
such as meat, chicken, milk, cheese, etc. The results in Table 4.8 suggest that the BDH 
programme has a large, statistically significant, positive effect of around $14 USD per week 
on expenditure in items rich in proteins. 
 The results for expenditure shares (as a fraction of total food expenditure), see columns 
4-6 of Table 4.8, suggest that the BDH generates a change in the pattern of expenditure on 
food. The programme increases the share of expending on protein-rich products in around 16 
percent and reduces the share of expending on sugars and sweets in about 3 percent. The results 
from the non-parametric analysis confirm these findings (see Table 4.13 in the Appendix). 
 Comparing the magnitude of the estimates of the effect on total food expenditure, about 
$17 USD per week, and on expenditure in items rich in proteins, around $14 USD per week, 
one can conclude that the impact on food expenditure is mainly driven by a higher expenditure 
on these items among beneficiary households compared to non-beneficiary households. This 
finding is similar to the results of other studies of the impact of CCT programmes in Latin 
America such as Progresa in Mexico (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004) and Familias en Acción 
in Colombia (Attanasio and Mesnard 2006), where the increase in consumption is largely 
driven by higher expenditure on animal products. However, in contrast to the research on the 
Progresa and the Familias en Acción programmes, I do not find that the BDH has a significant 
effect on expenditure on either fruit and vegetables or cereals. 
 In Table 4.9, I present the estimates of the effect of the BDH on the components of food 
expenditure for different groups of households. As found in the previous subsection, the 
increase on food expenditure take place mainly in beneficiary households living in urban areas 
and, as expected, the effect on expenditure on product rich in proteins is statistically significant 
only for urban areas (see Columns 1 and 5).  The results in Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8, of Table 4.9, 
reveal that the increase in expenditure, in absolute value (weekly USD) and in share, on protein-
rich products is more than the double for households with children under 5 compared to 
households where there is not an under-5.  
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 Table 4.8 IV estimates of the effect of the BDH on food expenditure components 
  
Programme Effects on Food 
Expenditure (USD) 
  
Programme Effects on 
Expenditure Shares (as fraction of 
total food expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Proteins (meat, 
chicken, milk)  
13.522** 13.401*** 14.452***   0.164*** 0.164*** 0.174*** 
(5.311) (5.184) (4.991)   (0.056) (0.056) (0.052) 
Potatoes, yucca 
and other tubers  
0.046 0.028 -0.111   -0.017 -0.017 -0.019 
(0.816) (0.809) (0.727)   (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Cereals 0.274 0.221 -0.155   -0.014 -0.013 -0.02 
  (2.303) (2.342) (2.501)   (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) 
Fruit and 
vegetables  
2.978 2.86 3.275   -0.03 -0.031 -0.03 
(4.558) (4.485) (4.340)   (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
Pulses 0.318 0.313 0.316   0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.510) (0.506) (0.480)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fats and oils -0.281 -0.289 -0.372   -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 
  (0.609) (0.627) (0.697)   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Sugar and sweets  -1.25 -1.262 -1.353   -0.029* -0.029* -0.030*   
  (0.931) (0.951) (0.905)   (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Miscellaneous 
food  
-0.391 -0.419 -0.064   -0.062 -0.061 -0.059 
(6.529) (6.462) (5.449)   (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
                Quadratic term  N Y Y   N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y   N N Y 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level appear in parentheses. Controls: dummy for urban areas, a set of variables for the 
head of household (female dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), and the number 
of individuals in the household.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
 
 Additionally, for households with under-5s the BDH programme also generates a 
reduction in expending on miscellaneous food, which is mainly composed by expending on 
ready meals outside the house, of about 15 USD per week, or 15 percent point as a fraction of 
total food expenditure. This effect implies that the BDH generates a change in the pattern of 
food consumption by reducing the expenditure on ready meals outside the house and 
substituting this expenditure with an increase in the expenditure on protein-rich products. The 
finding of this substitution effect allows me to answer the question of why the impact of the 
BDH on expenditure on protein-rich products, in absolute terms, is larger than the monthly 
transfer of $35 USD. 
 
  
135 
Table 4.9 IV estimates of the effect of the BDH on food expenditure components, for groups 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. IV estimates using a second order polynomial of the Selben II index. Control variables: 
the number of individuals in the household; and for models shown in columns 3,4,7, and 8, I also include a dummy variable for urban areas. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the province level appear in parentheses.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
 
  Programme Effects on Food Expenditure (USD)   
Programme Effects on Shares (as fraction of total 
food expenditure) 
  Urban Rural   
Under-5 
in H. 
No under-
5 in H.   Urban Rural   
Under-5 
in H. 
No under-
5 in H. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Proteins (meat, chicken, milk)  13.855*** 11.166   18.177** 7.751*   0.186*** 0.132   0.237** 0.091* 
  (4.566) (13.195)   (8.409) (4.445)   (0.050) (0.161)   (0.093) (0.048) 
Potatoes, yucca and other tubers  0.398 -2.838   -1.089 0.502   -0.012 -0.049   -0.023 -0.017 
  (0.737) (3.401)   (1.179) (1.244)   (0.016) (0.035)   (0.028) (0.014) 
Cereals 0.553 -3.548   -1.429 1.449   -0.021 0.031   0.015 -0.031 
  (2.713) (4.529)   (2.653) (2.974)   (0.039) (0.120)   (0.040) (0.048) 
Fruit and vegetables  0.428 12.382   -2.504 7.483   -0.044 0.038   -0.033 -0.031 
  (2.862) (17.868)   (4.255) (7.584)   (0.037) (0.121)   (0.052) (0.057) 
Pulses 0.091 1.202   0.699 -0.006   -0.003 0.018*   0.011 -0.009 
  (0.599) (1.099)   (0.841) (0.787)   (0.007) (0.010)   (0.010) (0.008) 
Fats and oils -0.435 -0.332   -0.754 -0.018   -0.017 -0.005   -0.013 -0.013 
  (0.790) (1.650)   (0.849) (1.215)   (0.015) (0.030)   (0.016) (0.020) 
Sugar and sweets  -1.269 -2.448   -3.450** 1.212   -0.027* -0.043   -0.047* 0.001 
  (0.956) (3.012)   (1.676) (0.916)   (0.016) (0.053)   (0.025) (0.017) 
Miscellaneous food  -1.467 -4.12   -14.888** 9.868   -0.062 -0.121   -0.147** 0.01 
  (7.273) (10.269)   (6.319) (7.515)   (0.063) (0.160)   (0.059) (0.094) 
                        
Quadratic term  Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Household size control Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
N 265 79   168 176   265 79   168 176 
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4.6 Conclusions 
CT programmes are a core social policy instrument in Latin America. These programmes were 
set with the goal of breaking the cycle of poverty by promoting the accumulation of human 
capital. With regard to their objective of improving the access to food, several papers have 
shown that CCTs in the region boost the consumption of fruits, vegetables and products rich in 
proteins. While there is a considerable empirical evidence that suggests that CCTs boost 
consumption of these products, there is no evidence of the effects of CTs when there is no 
enforced conditionality attached to them.  
 This study contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of CTs on consumption 
by evaluating the effects of an UCT programme implemented in Ecuador, the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano (BDH). I take advantage of the programme’s design and implement a 
regression discontinuity analysis. Using data around the threshold that is representative of both 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, I estimate the effects of the BDH on total 
expenditure and its components, focusing on food expenditure. 
 My findings suggest that households that receive the BDH, with a Selben II score just 
below the cut-off, spend more on products rich in proteins such as meat, chicken, eggs, etc. 
compared to households with a Selben II score just above the cut-off that do not get the transfer. 
This effect takes place only for beneficiary household living in urban areas. The difference is 
around $14 USD per week and in terms of share as a fraction of total food expenditure the 
difference is about 19 percentage points (see Table 4.9). These findings are in line with the 
impact evaluation of other CT programmes with conditionality attached to them (Attanasio and 
Mesnard 2006; Maluccio and Flores 2005; Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004). However, unlike the 
results of the effects of these CCT programmes,  I do not find a significant effect on expenditure 
on fruit and vegetables. 
 There are two pathways, and their interaction, that might explain this increase in 
expenditure on protein-rich food. First is the increase in the household budget, which in turn 
increases the capability to buy products as meat, chicken, milk, etc. that otherwise would be 
difficult to afford. Second, is the change in the intra-household dynamics. As argued by Schady 
and Rosero (2008), the BDH appears to increase the bargaining power of women within the 
household and, as a result, the BDH cash transfer is used differently from other sources of 
income. Considering that the BDH is received by mothers who have children, the increase in 
  
137 
expenditure on more nutritious food may be the result of a pattern of expenditure that better 
reflects their preferences. 
 Additionally, the BDH generates a substitution effect by increasing the expenditure on 
meat, chicken, eggs, etc. and reducing the expenditure on ready meals outside the house, for 
household with children under 5. This finding reinforces our conclusion that the BDH not only 
increases consumption but also generates changes in the pattern of consumption that reflect the 
preferences of the mother in the household. 
 With regard to the effects of the BDH on the components of total expenditure, the 
results suggest increases, in absolute terms, in the expenditure on mobile credit, mainly for 
household with under-5s, and on durable good, mainly for households where there is not an 
under-5. However, the effects in terms of shares as a fraction of total expenditure for these 
items are not significantly different from zero, at conventional levels. Additionally, in line with 
most of the literature, I do not find any effect of the BDH on expenditure on alcohol and tobacco 
(see Evans and Popova 2014, for a review of the literature).  
 The BDH increases expenditure on school related items and services (books and 
notebooks, school uniforms, transport to school, tuition fees, etc.), both in absolute terms and 
as a fraction of total expenditure, for beneficiary families living in urban areas. This increase 
and the increase in expenditure on products rich in proteins go in line with the objectives of the 
programme. Based on these results, one can conclude that the programme is achieving its 
objectives of increasing the access to more and better-quality food and facilitating the access 
to education for school-aged children. 
 From a policy perspective, the fact that the BDH increases the consumption of protein-
rich food for urban household with children under 5 highlights the importance that this policy 
has on reducing child malnourishment in the country. However, the fact that there is not a 
significant effect for households in rural areas should call the attention of policy makers. It can 
be the case that households in rural areas, which are more likely to produce their own food, are 
less prone to change their patter of food consumption. The reason may be the lack of access to 
other food products, apart from the ones they produce, and to information regarding good 
nutrition.  
 The fact that the BDH has no effect on expenditure on fruits and vegetables, in both 
urban and rural areas, unlike other CCT programmes in the region, should also call the attention 
of policy makers. One possible alternative to incentive the consumption of fruits and vegetables 
is to inform beneficiary families about the benefits of their intake. A channel to do so could be 
through media campaigns, as it was implemented when launching the program.  
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 Finally, an important limitation of this study is that the results show the local average 
treatment effect and the conclusions, therefore, apply only for beneficiary households with a 
Selben II index located below the cut-off around the threshold. The findings cannot be 
generalised to all BDH recipients and it is possible that the effects of the programme are 
different for households in the poorest quintile of the Selben II index. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4.10 Intention to treatment (ITT) estimates of the effect of the BDH on total 
expenditure and its components 
  
Programme Effects on 
Expenditure (USD)   
Programme Effects on Shares 
(as fraction of total 
expenditure) 
  (1) (2) (3)         
Total expenditure 37.573** 37.438** 38.940**          
  (17.261) (16.850) (13.959)         
Food expenditure  8.343* 8.147* 6.761   0.009 0.008 0 
  (4.524) (4.437) (4.590)   (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
Food expenditure 
(outside the house) 
-0.573 -0.582 -0.174   -0.025* -0.025* -0.021 
(3.530) (3.498) (3.326)   (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Alcohol and tobacco 0.874 0.862 1.246   -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
  (1.628) (1.647) (1.830)   (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Mobile credit 1.215** 1.228** 1.307**    0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (0.568) (0.582) (0.511)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household services -1.004 -0.998 -0.642   -0.012 -0.012 -0.01 
  (2.091) (2.104) (2.082)   (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Durables 22.683** 22.794** 25.895**    0.022 0.022 0.031 
  (9.376) (9.377) (9.426)   (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) 
School-related for 
under-5s 
0.281 0.278 0.515   0.001 0.001 0.003 
(0.349) (0.355) (0.418)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
School-related for 
children >5 years 
old 
2.794 2.76 1.429   0.01 0.01 -0.001 
(2.228) (2.219) (1.804)   (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) 
Other services 2.96 2.948 2.601   -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
  (2.198) (2.205) (1.520)   (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
                
Quadratic term  N Y Y   N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y   N N Y 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level appear in parentheses. Controls: dummy for urban areas, a set of variables for the 
head of household (female dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), and the number 
of individuals in the household.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
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Table 4.11 Intention to treatment (ITT) estimates of the effect of the BDH on the components 
of food expenditure  
  
Programme Effects on Food 
Expenditure (USD)   
Programme Effects on Food 
Shares  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Proteins (meat, 
chicken, milk)  
6.905*** 6.826*** 6.883***   0.084*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 
(2.424) (2.350) (2.298)   (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Potatoes, yucca 
and other tubers  
0.023 0.014 -0.296   -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 
(0.429) (0.424) (0.422)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cereals 0.14 0.112 -0.658   -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 
  (1.211) (1.230) (1.349)   (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Fruit and 
vegetables  
1.521 1.457 1.245   -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 
(2.350) (2.313) (2.279)   (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Pulses 0.162 0.159 0.109   0 0 0 
  (0.253) (0.250) (0.228)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fats and oils -0.143 -0.147 -0.223   -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.308) (0.315) (0.420)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sugar and sweets  -0.638 -0.643 -0.668   -0.015* -0.015* -0.014*   
  (0.466) (0.474) (0.467)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Miscellaneous 
food  
-0.2 -0.213 0.195   -0.032 -0.031 -0.022 
(3.443) (3.408) (3.137)   (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) 
                
Quadratic term  N Y Y   N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y   N N Y 
Source: Author’s calculations from ESSHO 2011 dataset. 
Notes: Sample limited to household with a Selben II score of ± 5 around the cut-off. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level appear in parentheses. Controls: dummy for urban areas, a set of variables for the 
head of household (female dummy, indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian dummy, years of schooling), and the number 
of individuals in the household.  
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
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Table 4.12 Non-parametric fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of the BDH on total 
expenditure and its components 
  
Programme Effects on 
Expenditure (USD)   
Programme Effects on Shares 
(as fraction of total 
expenditure) 
  (1) (2) (3)         
Total expenditure 82.805* 87.353* 93.914*           
  (45.703) (51.218) (52.065)         
Food expenditure  18.476 21.502 22.838   0.016 0.017 0.007 
  (12.761) (14.145) (14.514)   (0.069) (0.079) (0.082) 
Food expenditure 
(outside the house) 
-1.494 -0.403 2.739   -0.033 -0.053 -0.046 
(7.573) (8.308) (7.482)   (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) 
Alcohol and tobacco 1.233 1.21 1.245   -0.007 -0.002 0.001 
  (2.413) (2.926) (2.858)   (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Mobile credit 2.491* 2.752* 2.817**    0.007 0.006 0.006 
  (1.281) (1.424) (1.383)   (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household services -1.295 -2.519 -2.423   -0.038* -0.03 -0.031 
  (3.093) (4.501) (4.488)   (0.021) (0.032) (0.031) 
Durables 50.045* 52.908* 55.489*     0.052 0.045 0.049 
  (26.431) (30.151) (31.746)   (0.066) (0.078) (0.081) 
School-related for 
under-5s 
0.692 0.647 0.57   0.005 0.005 0.006 
(0.811) (0.983) (1.021)   (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
School-related for 
children >5 years 
old 
4.438 6.608 6.318   -0.002 0.01 0.011 
(3.970) (5.195) (5.350)   (0.024) (0.032) (0.035) 
Other services 4.989 3.801 4.103   -0.017 -0.014 -0.015 
  (4.162) (4.873) (4.993)   (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) 
                
Quadratic term  N Y Y   N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y   N N Y 
Note: The table shows robust estimates, and robust standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations 
varies for all expenditure models and specifications, since the bandwidths are data-driven and selected based on 
the MSE-optimal bandwidth method (Calonico et al. 2017). The bandwidths range from 6.2 to 15.2. A triangular 
kernel was used for all cases. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
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Table 4.13 Non-parametric fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of the BDH on food 
expenditure components 
  
Programme Effects on Food 
Expenditure (USD)   
Programme Effects on Shares (as 
fraction of total food 
expenditure)  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Proteins (meat, 
chicken, milk)  
13.014** 14.684** 15.223***   0.149** 0.183** 0.192**  
(5.641) (6.234) (5.881)   (0.060) (0.077) (0.075) 
Potatoes, yucca 
and other tubers  
0.267 0.211 0.02   -0.014 -0.025 -0.028 
(0.950) (1.116) (1.273)   (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) 
Cereals 0.672 0.487 0.509   -0.023 -0.032 -0.035 
  (3.047) (3.434) (3.408)   (0.034) (0.049) (0.048) 
Fruit and 
vegetables  
3.736 5.718 5.799   -0.012 -0.006 -0.008 
(3.807) (5.054) (5.232)   (0.041) (0.056) (0.056) 
Pulses 0.254 0.681 0.602   -0.001 0.004 0.002 
  (0.403) (0.529) (0.507)   (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fats and oils -0.313 -0.312 -0.372   -0.016* -0.018 -0.021*   
  (0.637) (0.715) (0.722)   (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Sugar and sweets  -1.485 -1.652 -1.619   -0.033* -0.040** -0.041*   
  (1.153) (1.304) (1.273)   (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) 
Miscellaneous 
food  
-0.532 0.809 2.102   -0.029 -0.062 -0.064 
(7.902) (8.606) (8.207)   (0.057) (0.079) (0.084) 
                
Quadratic term  N Y Y   N Y Y 
Covariates  N N Y   N N Y 
Note: (1), (2) and (3) present non-parametric estimates of the effect of BDH on food expenditure and its 
components. The table shows robust estimates, and robust standard errors in parentheses. The number of 
observations varies for all expenditure models and specifications since the bandwidths are data-driven and 
selected based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth method (Calonico et al. 2017). The bandwidths range from 6.0 to 
14.0. A triangular kernel was used for all cases. 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% significance level. 
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5 Conclusions and Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Findings and Link with Theory  
The objective of this thesis has been to analyse the impact of two major forms of social 
protection in the region: minimum wage policies and cash transfer programmes. The 
experience of the Ecuadorian national minimum wage (NMW) policy and the cash transfer 
(CT) programme, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), show the critical role of accounting 
for the intensity of enforcement when evaluating the effects of these policies. 
 In the case of the NMW, I evaluated the effects of this policy when there are increases 
in its two main components: the level of the statutory minimum wage and the intensity of its 
enforcement. In a region where noncompliance is widespread, the results of this thesis can 
encompass lessons for similar proposals elsewhere. The case of BDH is also relevant because 
unlike other programmes in the region it does not have an enforced conditionality attached to 
it. 
 In Part I of the thesis, I analysed the effects of the changes in the two main components 
of the NMW of Ecuador on wages, employment, and monetary poverty (Chapter 2) and on 
wage inequality (Chapter 3). Theoretically, one can expect that these changes will increase 
wages of low-paid workers whose employers start to comply with the labour law; additionally, 
the increases in the level of the minimum will also increase wages of workers whose employers 
already comply. These increases in wages will compress the wage distribution. In terms of 
employment, in a competitive market, employers will lay off less-skilled workers whose 
productivity (marginal revenue product) is less than the new enforced minimum wage. 
 The findings in Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that confirms the theoretical 
predictions. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I found that the increases in the two components of the 
NMW law increased wages of male covered workers and reduced the probability of remaining 
employed in the covered sector for the less-skilled workers, the labourers. Additionally, the 
increase in wages for male covered workers -both salaried and labourers-, who remained 
employed in the covered sector, reduced the probability of being poor for this group of workers 
and their families.  
 In the analysis of employment transitions, I found that most of the labourers who lost 
their jobs in the covered sector migrated to the uncovered sector and others became 
unemployed. This finding goes in line with the predictions of competitive dual-sector models 
for developing countries, originally proposed by Harris and Todaro (1970), where labour 
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markets are segmented into covered (formal) and uncovered (informal) sectors. Additionally, 
in line with dual-sector models, I found that the increase in labour supply in the uncovered 
sector reduced the earnings of uncovered self-employed individuals, who were earning at the 
NMW. 
 Unlike the case of male covered workers, the results for female covered workers, in 
Chapter 2, suggest that the changes in the two components of the NMW law did not have an 
effect on their wages and employment status. The only exception is the group of female 
domestic workers for whom I found a significant increase in wages and for whom the 
government implemented a special enforcement campaign. 
 In terms of wage compression, in Chapter 3, I found that the increases in the two 
components of the NMW law reduced wage inequality by increasing the wages of workers 
located up through the 60th percentile of the wage distribution. Additionally, in my 
counterfactual analysis, I estimated that the increase in the real value of the NMW, throughout 
the period 2000-2016, and the increase in the intensity of enforcement of the NMW, since 
2011, account for approximately 50% of the reduction in wage inequality we observe for the 
period 2000-2016.  
 In Part II, Chapter 4 of the thesis, I analysed the effect of the unconditional cash transfer 
programme of Ecuador, the BDH, on the components of food expenditure. Previous evidence 
of the impact of the BDH on food expenditure report that the programme increases the food 
share (as a fraction of total expenditure, Schady and Rosero 2008) and the total amount of 
expenditure on food (in absolute values, Buser et al. 2017). However, these studies do not 
analyse the effects of the BDH on the components of food expenditure. The evidence for other 
CTs implemented in the region shows that the transfer increases consumption of fruits and 
vegetables, and of items rich in protein such as meat, chicken, milk, eggs, etc. (see Hoddinott 
and Skoufias 2004, for Oportunidades in Mexico; Maluccio and Flores 2005 for Red de 
Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua; Attanasio and Mesnard 2006, for Familias en Accion 
in Colombia; Martins and Monteiro 2016, for Bolsa Família in Brazil).  
 In theory, we will expect that CTs will allow beneficiary families to purchase more 
food and other items and services, since the transfer increases poor household’s disposable 
income. If we consider that in most of the cases the transfer is received by the mother of the 
household, then we can expect that the transfer will also alter the intra-household dynamics of 
bargaining power. Mothers are paid the transfer with the main objective of investing in human 
capital of their children. In order to achieve this objective, they will spend on more and better-
quality food to improve the nutrition of their children. In this scenario, CT programmes will 
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also affect the pattern of food expenditure by reflecting better the preferences of the mother in 
the household and by going in line with the objective of the program of enhancing child 
nutritional status. 
 The findings in Chapter 4 go in line with these predictions, and with the empirical 
evidence of the effects of CCTs for other countries in the region. I found that the BDH 
increased food expenditure on protein-rich products such as meat, chicken, milk, eggs, etc. 
Additionally, I found that beneficiary families with under-5s spent significantly more on this 
kind of products and significantly less on sugar and sweets, and on meals outside the house. 
However, unlike other CCT programmes in the region, I did not find that the BDH increased 
expenditure on fruits and vegetables.  
5.2 Limitations and Further Research 
The findings of this thesis are not without important limitations. In this section, I discuss those 
that I consider imperative and suggest directions for further research.  
 In the empirical analysis of Chapter 2 the main limitation is that my identification 
strategy relies in two separate panel data sets of workers. One panel for the period before the 
increase in enforcement of the NMW law and one panel during the campaign. With this data, 
I do not follow the same worker before, and during the campaign period. Instead, I observe one 
group of workers twice before the campaign, and another group of workers twice during the 
campaign. My results rely on the assumption that workers in both of my panel data sets are 
comparable. It is not a big assumption since both samples are drawn from the same master 
sample.  
 Future research can omit this assumption if authors have access to a panel data set that 
follows the same workers before, during, and after the enforcement campaign. In the case of 
Ecuador, to the best of my knowledge, there is not such a dataset. On other countries, it can be 
feasible to plan the data collection process ahead of the changes in the minimum wage law. A 
panel data set that follows the same worker will provide more detailed evidence of the effects 
of the changes in the minimum wage policy, especially when analysing the dynamics of 
employment transitions.  
 Other limitation in Chapter 2, is that when I analyse the effects of the NMW law on 
poverty, I focused on monetary poverty. Further studies should examine the impact of the 
changes in the NMW policy in other measures of poverty that include other dimensions of 
people's experience of deprivation. With appropriate data, the analysis on multidimensional 
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poverty can also directly capture the effects that the changes in the minimum wage generate on 
dimensions such as health, education, empowerment, household adequacy and others. The data 
available for Ecuador does not allow me to implement such analysis. 
 Data that allows to compute multidimensional poverty indexes, such as surveys on 
living conditions, is not as periodically collected as surveys on employment. These surveys are 
also less likely to follow the same individual over time. This implies that if researches want to 
analyse the effects of changes in the minimum wage policy on multidimensional poverty 
indexes, they will have to plan the collection process of the data ahead to achieve this objective. 
 In Chapter 3, I showed that the NMW policy reduces wage inequality by increasing the 
wages of low-paid covered workers. However, by restricting the analysis to covered workers 
with nonzero (or negative) wages, I am losing some information regarding the number of 
people who lost their jobs or migrated to the uncovered sectors and, as a consequence, report 
zero or missing in their wage. Further analysis can include the number of zeros generated due 
to job losses to account for the potential adverse effects of the NMW law. This further research 
can also analyse the effect of the NMW policy on the distribution of labour earnings, including 
workers in all sectors of the economy (covered sector, uncovered self-employment, business 
owners, public sector, unpaid family workers). The data used in Chapter 3 will be enough to 
implement this analysis. 
 In Chapter 4, I showed that the unconditional cash transfer programme of Ecuador, the 
BDH, increased the consumption of protein-rich products such as meat, chicken, eggs, etc. The 
central assumption in order to conclude that this effect might improve the quantity and the 
quality of food intake for children within the house is that the resources are shared in a child-
sensitive way. Further research can overtake this limitation and collect data at the individual 
level to quantify the amount of food that children are actually eating. The analysis can also 
include the conversion of food consumption into per capita daily energy (in calories). Using 
information at the individual level, this analysis will provide more detailed information 
regarding food intake for children. The implications for the data collection process, however, 
are more demanding since interviewers will need to collect the information on food 
consumption for each member of the household. 
 Other limitation is that the analysis in Chapter 4 does not allow me to identify how 
much of the effect on the pattern of food consumption derives from the social marketing 
campaign around the BDH, how much derives from the fact that the BDH is transferred to 
women, and how much responds to the increase in household’s income per se. This can be a 
topic for future research. Answering this question is relevant since one can be tented to 
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conclude that a cash transfer with nonenforced conditions will generate the same results as a 
CCT programme that spend a significant amount of time and economic resources to promote 
and impose compliance with the conditions. It is necessary to identify what mechanism is 
driving more of the change in the pattern of food consumption generated by the BDH.  
 Finally, as I mentioned in Chapter 4, my fuzzy regression discontinuity approach 
provides an estimate of the local average treatment effect (ATE) for compliers at the threshold. 
This means that the results of this study cannot be generalized and, more importantly, it implies 
that the beneficiary households included in the analysis are the well-off between the poor. The 
results presented in this chapter should be interpreted in light of these limitations. 
5.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations  
Based on the results of Chapters 2 and 3, I can conclude that a well enforced minimum wage 
serves as a policy tool to increase wages of low-paid salaried workers. This policy also helps 
to reduce monetary poverty and wage inequality. The policy implications of these findings are 
important. They suggest that in countries with high noncompliance of the labour regulation it 
may be more relevant for policy makers to spend their efforts on increasing the intensity of 
enforcement of the existing minimum wage laws rather than only focusing on increasing the 
level of the minimum. 
  However, this policy also reduces employment in the covered sector. Covered workers 
who lost their jobs as a consequence of the increased enforcement of the NMW law are the 
ones who pay for the implementation of this policy. A well-designed contributory social 
security system will prevent them, and their families, from falling into poverty by providing 
access to an effective unemployment insurance. In Ecuador, as in many countries in the region, 
the labour law states this de jure social protection, but it is usually unclaimed. 
 In the case of Ecuador, the workers who lost their jobs are mainly labourers. These 
workers have low education and do manual work mostly in the agriculture and construction 
industries. Other way to help these workers is to implement training programmes to increase 
their productivity. These programmes can be on the form of on-the-job training to prevent them 
from losing their jobs, or training programmes directly implemented by the government for 
those who already lost their jobs.  
 Policy makers who want to use the minimum wage law as a social policy tool should 
consider that a higher and well-enforced minimum wage might be socially desirable, but it has 
a cost. Although they may value redistribution towards low-paid workers more than labour 
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market efficiency, the migration of low-skilled covered workers to (uncovered) self-
employment or to unemployment is a potential involuntary outcome that they also need to 
consider. These workers and their families, if not protected, can become poor. 
 In developing countries there is also a high proportion of individuals that are not 
covered by the contributory social security system. These individuals can be categorized into 
three groups: 1) self-employed workers, 2) economically inactive individuals, and 3) 
unremunerated workers. Non-contributory social assistance programmes such as cash transfers 
are the main protection schemes for families that depend on an economically inactive 
individual, or on an unremunerated worker. These individuals do not have earned income. This 
fact makes it difficult to think in a sustainable mechanism to include them in the contributory 
system. In the case of the Ecuadorian CT programme, the fraction of beneficiary families with 
an economically inactive head of household is around 22 percent, and the fraction beneficiary 
households with an unpaid household head is less than 1 percent (see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1). 
In the absence of a non-contributory protection scheme as the BDH these families will not have 
access to a social protection system.  
 On the other hand, self-employed workers (including farmers) and their families can be 
covered by contributory or non-contributory social protection. In the region, poor households 
that depend on a self-employed worker are covered by CT programmes. In the cases of 
countries as Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama, around half of beneficiary 
families have a head of household that is a self-employed worker or farmer (see Table 1.3 in 
Chapter 1). In countries as Peru and Paraguay this fraction is even higher. 
 It is also feasible to think that self-employed workers, and their families, can be covered 
by contributory social security systems. However, there are at least three factors that need to 
be considered in advance. First, self-employed workers do not have an employer, and this 
implies that these workers have to finance their affiliation to the social security systems all by 
themselves. This represents a barrier for extending the coverage to independent workers, 
especially for unskilled self-employed workers who have irregular earned income and limited 
payment capacity.  
 Second, self-employed workers usually have volatile employment conditions. These 
workers jump between working as independent workers to be salaried workers, they can also 
leave the labour force and enter again after a period of time. This unstable employment status 
will generate interruptions to their contributions and this can cut their rights to the benefits of 
the contributory system. Third, the high level of heterogeneity among independent workers 
makes it difficult to design a simple incorporation system. This heterogeneous group includes 
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independent professionals, unipersonal businesses struggling for economic sustainability, and 
low-skilled self-employed workers with limited access to information regarding the benefits of 
contributing to the social security systems. These three factors illustrate that there is not a 
simple solution to the extension of the contributory system to self-employed individuals.  
 Finally, an informal worker is typically defined as one that does not contribute to the 
social security system (see Hussmanns 2004, for a review of definitions of informality 
proposed by the ILO). Enforcing the affiliation of salaried workers to the social security and 
extending the coverage to self-employed workers is an option to reduce labour informality in 
the region. The increase in compliance with the affiliation of salaried workers to the social 
security system, and the possible expansion of coverage to self-employed workers, not only 
encourages labour formality but can also reduce the burden assigned to CT programmes by 
securing a pension for these workers when they reach retirement age.   
 The results in Chapter 4 suggest that the BDH, as other CT programmes in the region, 
serves as a protection tool for beneficiary families by helping them to increase the expenditure 
on products rich in proteins (chicken, meat, milk, eggs, etc.) and on school related items. The 
increase in expenditure on protein-rich products not only comes from the increase in household 
disposable income due to the transfer, but also derivates from a change in food expenditure 
patterns. BDH recipients, in urban households with children under 5, spend significantly less 
on sugar and sweets and on ready meals outside the house and significantly more on protein-
rich products. 
 The change in the pattern of food consumption, generated by the BDH, aligns to a 
behaviour that will benefit the nutritional status of children, if resources are shared in a child-
sensitive way. This result should not be minimized because it is a powerful proof that CTs can 
be used as a social policy tool to reduce child malnourishment. In the case of Ecuador, this fact 
is of paramount importance since a fourth of under-5s suffer from chronic malnourishment and 
this rate has stagnated during the last decade (SIISE 2015). 
 Additionally, policy makers should consider that CTs given to the mother of the 
beneficiary families serves as a protection tool not only by providing additional resources to a 
poor household, but also by increasing the bargaining power of women within the household. 
This change in the intra household dynamics can potentially benefit children, since mothers are 
usually the ones in charge of taking care of them. However, policy makers should not forget 
that assigning this role to women can decrease their participation in the labour market, making 
them more dependent on the monthly transfer. As highlighted by Mideros and O’Donoghue 
(2015), for households that received the BDH transfer, childcare and gender equity policies 
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can be used as complementary policy tools if paid-labour participation is to be promoted among 
the mothers of beneficiary households. 
 In the case of the BDH, the changes in the pattern of food expenditure are even more 
relevant for policy makers since this programme was implemented as an unconditional CT 
programme. One may be tented to suggest that UCTs serve as a protection tool, in terms of 
their effects on food consumption, in the same way as CCTs do. However, the BDH does not 
generate a significant effect on expenditure on fruits and vegetables, unlike other CCTs in the 
region. This fact suggests that the programme administrators need to further promote the 
consumption of this kind of products with initiatives such as nutrition educational workshops, 
or media campaigns. 
 Finally, the main objective of CTs is to ensure that children of beneficiary households 
achieve a sufficient level of human capital. This would allow them to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty and to remove the need for non-contributory social 
assistance to the next generation. The change in the pattern of food consumption towards 
expending more on protein rich products has the potential to minimize the problem on protein–
calorie malnutrition, and more specifically to combat the deficiency in the intake of iron, iodine 
and vitamin A. This is particularly important for young children in developing countries as 
there is consistent evidence that protein consumption has lasting beneficial effects on their 
cognitive development; especially when it takes place during the first 2 years of life, the period 
during which the brain is rapidly growing (Benton 2010). 
 While there is sufficient evidence that CTs increase school attendance, the fact that 
there is not a conclusive link between CTs and learning outcomes of school-aged children 
should call the attention of policy makers. One factor that can partially explain this issue is the 
fact that if there was a protein/calorie malnutrition when these children where under 2, it will 
be difficult to have a positive effect on school performance. Malnutrition in the first 2 years of 
life has a lasting impact on both behaviour and cognition (Benton 2010). Consequently, policy 
makers should put attention on improving the nutritional intake of children in their earlier life 
as this will have a lasting positive impact on their capacity of accumulating human capital in 
terms of cognitive achievement later in life. 
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